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JLEGAX NOTES; 387
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.
-^ ¦ In The Present And Future Numbers O...
_plete to think education that even , is a an dangerous insufficient tiling allowance , nevertheless , of either , we is are better disposed than
sl total unacquaintance with the first principles of law or literature . The force of the common adage mentioned is indeed not
attributable to the fact that a partial knowledge may lead to mistakes , for utter ignorance will produce still morebut is due to the temptation
which a knowledge of special branches , holds out to speculations in _jsuch paths , which a more extensive knowledge would show to be
entirely unwarranted . The present case offers an illustration of , the mischief which an ignorance of elementary rules of law , or
_rather a forgetfulness of those of common sense , may occasion to a person who it is not likely would have been litigious , however
. accurate her legal acquirements might have been . It shows , moreoverthe great disadvantage in ordinary life under which
women labor , by reason of the present restricted code of female education . We should be sorry to see our readers ambitious of distinction
as Nisi Prius advocates , but , on the other hand , as mothers , trustees , and as frequently having the charge of persons incompetent to take
care of themselves , an acquaintance , however slight , with those princiles which are at the basis of laworder , property , and
. _society p , could hardly fail to be beneficial to them , . The facts of the present case were these : —Elizabeth Marston ,
an elderly lady in easy circumstances , went to reside with her niece and her husband , and in 1859 consulted an attorney as
; ± o the means she should adopt to make a provision for them , to whom she considered herself to be under many obligations .
Her intention appears to have been to have settled her property on Jierself for lifewith remainder after her decease to her niece and
family . Being , old and infirm , she wanted even ordinary circumspection . The attorney whom she consulted informed her that her
wishes could be effectuated either by means of a de * ed or a will , but that the former would be on the whole the cheaper instrument , as
it would pay no legacy duty . But he did not inform her of the other distinctions that exist in point of effect between a deed and
a will . A deed was accordingly executed by Elizabeth Marston , settling her property upon her niece and family , but without any
reservation of any interest whatever to herself . The Vice-Chancellor Stuart held that , as the attorney did not inform Elizabeth Marston
¦ of the whole effect which a deed would have in depriving herself of all future control over her property , she must be considered as
executing an instrument of the operation of which she was ignorant , and that it was consequently void in law and inoperative to pass the
property The Bill as purported in this case to be was settled filed by by it the . heir-at-law of Elizabeth
Marston , and by other persons claiming under an alleged will executed bher in 1843 and the Bill charged undue influence on
the part of y Elizabeth Marston , ' s niece and her husband . The
decision of the Vice-Chancellor , however , did not turn upon this
Jlegax Notes; 387
_JLEGAX NOTES ; 387
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Citation
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English Woman’s Journal (1858-1864), Feb. 1, 1862, page 387, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/ewj/issues/ewj_01021862/page/27/
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