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Comte's Positive Philosophy.* By G. H. L...
general phenomena otight to be studied before the special modifications of This is not the proper place for a general comparison between organized and inorganized matter , in their various essential parts . At present , it is sufficient that we recognise the logical necessity of separating the science which embraces organized matter from that relating to inorganized matter , and of not proceeding to the study of organic phyties till after having established the general laws of inorganic physics .
As to inorganic physics , we see at once that by continuing to adhere to the order of generality and of dependence of the phenomena , they must be divided into two distinct sections , according as they refer to the general phenomena of the univ / erse , or specially to those which are presented to us W terrestrial matter . JJence we have celestial physics , or astronomy , geometrical and mechanical ; and terrestrial physics . There is the same necessity for "¦ this divisionas there was for the preceding one . , Astronomical phenomena being the most general , the most simple , and the most abstract of all , it is evident that the study of natural philosophy ought to commence with then ! , since the laws to which they are subject act on those of all other phenomena , they themselves being , on the contrary , essentially independent . In all the phenomena of terrestrial physics , we
observe the general effects ; of universal gravitation , besides certain other effects that are peculiar to theniselves , and that modify the first . It follows that when we analyze the simplest terrestrial phenomena , whether ^ it be a chemical phenomenon or even a purely mechanical one , we ah > rays find it more compound than the most complex celestial phenomenon . It is thus , for example , that the simple movement of a falling body , even when that of a solid only , really offers ( if we would take into account all the influencing circumstances ) , a more complicated subject of inquiry than the mbst difficult astronomical question . This consideration clearly shows how indispensable it is that a distinct separationbe made between celestial phvsics and terrestrial physics , and of passing to the study of the second only after the first , whichisI its rational basis .
Terrestrial physics iare , j m their turn , subdivided into two very distinct portions , according as they rehite t 6 bodies considered under the mechanical point of view , or under the chemical . In order to conceive the former in a truly methodical manner , there is evidently implied a previous knowledge of the other . For all chemical phenomena are necessarily more complex than physical phenomena ; they are dependent on them , without acting on them . Every one knows that all chemical action is subject to the influences of weight , heat , electricity , & c , and that , at the same time , it manifests something peculiar to itself which modifies the action of the preceding agencies .
The above , therefore , is the rational division of the principal branches of the general science of inorganic bodies . There is an analogous division , formed in the same manner , in the general science of organic bodies . All ' living beings present two orders of p henomena essentially distinctthose relating to the individual , and those relating to the species , more especially when it is sociable . It is chiefly in respect to man that this distinction is fundamental . The latter order of phenomena is evidently more complicated and more special than the former : it is dependent on it without influencing it . Hence , two great sections in organic physics , namely , physiology , properly so-called , and social physics , which are founded on the first .
In all social phenomena , we observe in the first place , the influence of the physiological laws of the individual , and also something special , which modifies their effects , and which concerns the action of individuals on one another . ' , It is singularly complicated in the human species by the action of each generation upon that which follows it . Hence it is evident , that in order to study social phenomena in a proper way , it is necessary to begin with a profound knowledge of the laws relating to individual life . On the other hand , it by no means follows from this necessary subordination between the two subjects of study ( as some physiologists of the first rank have been led to
believe ) , that we only see in social p hysics a simple appendix to physiology . Although the phenomena may certainly be homogeneous , they arc not at all identical ; and it is of radical importance to make a separation between the two sciences . For it would be impossible to treat the study of the species under the collective point of view , as a pure deduction from the study of the individual , since the social conditions which modify the notion of the physiological laws become there the most essential object of consideration . It follows that social physics ought' to be based upon a body of direct observations , suitable to it , —having the while due regard , us is proper , to its intimate and necessary connexion with physiology , properly so-called .
We find , as the result of this discussion , that Positive Philosophy is naturally divided into-Jive fundamental sciences , whose succession is determined by a necessary and invariable subordination , based upon tho simple , Jut profound , comparison of the . corresponding phenomena . " Those sciences we—astronomy , physics , chemistry , " physiology , and lastly , sociology . The 'l' 8 t slates to phenomena the most general , tho most simple , tho most abstract , and the most remotel y connected with humanity ; they act on all < » e others , without being acted on by them . Tho phenomena falling under ' le " *> ftre , on tho contrary , tho most special , tho most complex , the most concrete , and the most directly interesting to man ; they depend 11010 ov l ° ss on all tho preceding oaos , without exorcising any iufluouco
upon them . Between these two extremes , the degree of speciality , of complication , and of individuality 6 f the phenomena , is gradually increasing , as Well as their successive dependence . One very essential characteristic of our classification is , its necessary conformity to the actual order of the development of natural philosophy . This is verified by all we know of the history of the sciences , particularly during the two last , centuries ,. where we are able t © follow their course more exactly . Indeed , one sees that since the rational study of each of the fundamental sciences requires , as a preliminary , the cultivation of all those that precede it in our encyclopaedical hierarchy , it could have made no real
progress , nor assumed its true character , until after a great development of the anterior sciences relative to phenomena more general , more abstract , and less complex , and independent of the others . It is , therefore , in this order that the progression , although simultaneous , must have taken place . This consideration is , in my eyes , so important , that I believe it impossible really to comprehend the history of the human mind without paying regard to it . The general law , which governs throughout this history , and which I have expounded in the preceding chapter , cannot be properly understood , unless , in its applications , we combine it with the encyclopedical formula which we have just established . For , it was in the order laid
down in this formula that the different theories held by mankind reached successively , first , the theological state , next , the metaphysical state , and last of all , the positive state . If we do not take it into account when referring to the operation of the law of this necessary progression , we shall often meet with difficulties that appear insurmountable , since it is clear that the theological or metaphysical state of some fundamental theories must have temporarily coincided with each other , and in fact coincided at times with the positive state of those which go before them in our encyclopaedical system , —a circumstance which tends to throw upon the verification of the general law an obscurity that can only be dispelled by the preceding classification .
In the third place , that classification presents the very remarkable property of marking with exactness the relative states of perfection of the different sciences , which consists essentially in the degree of precision with which the phenomena , are known to us , and in the more or less intimate cor-ordination of our knowledge of them . The more general ; simple , and abstract the phenomena , the more precise are our ideas with respect to them , Mathematical propositions , for example , are the most precise of all . But Comte reminds us that precision is one thing , certainty another . An absurd and false proposition may be made very precise , and , on the other hand , although the sciences vary in the degree of precision , they all present results equally certain . The reader should not suppose that any one science is less certain in its results than another , because it is less precise .
Lastly , the most interesting characteristic of our encyclopedical formula , on account of the importance and multiplicity of the immediate applications which we can make of it , is that of directly determining the true general plan of a scientific and entirely rational education . This is a direct consequence of the very composition of the formula . It is evident , in fact , that before undertaking the methodical study of any one of the fundamental sciences , it is absolutely necessary to be prepared by an examination of such of them as refer to the phenomena that go before in our encyclopaedical scale , since the latter always weightily influence those whose laws are to be the subject of study .
If the remark is eminently applicable to general education , it is as much so to the special education of the savans . The natural philosophers who have not in the first place studied astronomy , at least under tho general point of view ; the chemists who before occupying themselves with their own science , have not previously studied astronomy , and , after it , physics ; the physiologists who have not prepared themselves for their special labours by a preliminary study of astronomy , of physics , and of chemistry j all want one of tho fundamental conditions of their intellectual development . It is still more evident in the case of those minds who would devote themselves to the positive study of social p henomena , without having first acquired a general knowledge of astronomy , physics , chemistry , and physiology . '
. __ _ . ., It is a proposition at the very root of M . Comte ' s system , that until the sciences are systematically learned in their natural order , which at present is seldom the case , a scientific education will be incapable of realizing its most general nnd essential results . He proceeds to point out that it is not only as to doctrine that his encyclopredical law serves jus a basis for a scientific education ; it is of equal importance as to method . In passing from one science to another , we discover the several modifications which method , ( essentially tho same in all ) undergoes . A . proper knowledge > of the positive method can only be acquired in this way . Each science develops characteristic processes of its
own : one , observation—another , experiment of one . sort—a third , experiment of another sort . And they ought to bo taken in the encyclopedical order . What rntionnl product , of any great natural superiority , can como from a mind which occupies itself from the very outset with the study of the most complicated p henomena , without having first been made to understand , by m examination of the most simple phenomena , what it is wo call a law ' what it is to observe , —what is a positive conception , —what even k logical reasoning ? Such , however , is still at this day tho ordinary course
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), May 1, 1852, page 17, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_01051852/page/17/
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