On this page

• Text (3)

  Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.

  • 

    4 THE LBADE E ^ [No . 406, January 2,185...

  • 

    SPECIAL LETTERS FROM INDIA. (From a Mili...

  • 

    DIRECT RAILROAD FROM LONDON TO CALCUTTA....

• Transcript

  • Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.

    Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.

    Tee. Nrdlak Revolt. ?——T«B Fu«' Despatch...

    SUPPOSED ORIGIN OF THE REVOLT . The Homeward Mail publishes a translation of an Urdu paper , found in the house of a Vakil- of the Sudder Court , and consisting of an extract from the Lakhnau , native newspaper , of the 28 th of March , 1857 . The upshot of this document is to the effect that among the Mahomedans of Arabia , Turkistan , Persia , and Turkey , a great war for the defence and propagation of ' the faith' and the extirpation of ? the infidel' was at that time being organized . This statement is accompanied by an exhortation to the Muslims of India to prepare themselves for joining iu the struggle .

    4 The Lbade E ^ [No . 406, January 2,185...

    4 THE LBADE E ^ [ No . 406 , January 2 , 1858 .

    Special Letters From India. (From A Mili...

    SPECIAL LETTERS FROM INDIA . ( From a Military . Correspondent . ^) Nagpore , November , 1857 . To return to Nagpore and the Madras troops : it would be the most shortsighted and narrow-minded policy for our rulers to endeavour to persuade themselves , or for them to endeavour to persuade the people of England , that the Madras Sepoys , are really and truly loyal and devoted to their European masters . They are not . Their sympathies from the first rumour of the Meerut and Delhi outbreaks have been entirely with the mutineers : and in the bazaar , the mosque , and even the guard-room , there was but little concealment in the expression of those sympathies . As usual the last persons to bear a hint of the sepoys' opinions , hopes , and plans , were the officers of the Madras regiments : indeed the

    great majority of them now profess the greatest confidence in their men , and would indignantly repudiate the possibility of their ever having been disposed to join in the rebellion . "We have seen the same blind and fatal confidence in the officers of many Bengal and Native regiments ; and we have seen by how much the bloody results of fhe mutiny have been swelled * by persistance in that blind confidence , until the last moment of possible safety had passed . But still , although one cannot excuse that want of information and insight in the commandants and higher ranks of the army , it is impossible to quarrel with the junior officers for feeling confidence in their men . We may deplore the cause of that confidence—sheer ignorance—and urge the inefficiency of such officers with such troops , but the feeling is a noble and a truly military feeling , and we cannot quarrel with it .

    The Madras and Bomba 3 armies have always been kept in a more strict state of discipline , ' and there has alwaj'S existed a more soldier-like feeling , and a higher sense of duty among their officers , than among the officers of the Bengal army- It will be seen that I only speak comparatively . In the two minor armies the Bepoys were not quite so entirely left to take care of themselves , and allowed to have their own way . In the Madras Presidency especially , there was not such a profusion of staff and civil appointments open to military officers , and consequently not such a constant and universal anxiety to escape from regimental duty . The system and traditions of the Madras and Bombay armies were better ; and in both there was a greater mixture of castes and races , although the proportion of actual

    lowcaste and out-caste sepoys was much less than has been generally supposed and represented . But one-half of the Bengal army was composed of Brahmins and Rajpoots , who by their superior numbera and social position gave the tone to the whole corps ; only two other respectable Hindoo castes , Aheers and Kayaths , were ever admitted to the ranks ; and the small number of Mussulmans , drawn from the same localities with the Hindoo sopoys , had hardly any objeot or interest that was separate from their comrades , and no stronger inducement to remain faithful to the British Government . On the other hand , the attraction of Delhi , and their ancient monarchy , when once that became the word of action , was , of course , stronger with the Mussulmans than with the Hindoos .

    But now you will ask me why the contagion of mutiny did not spread to the Madras army , why it has bo slightly affected the Bombay army , and why the Irregular corps , whose system I have praised and advocated , have in so many instances followed the lead of the regiments of the line . Before touching on the general and particular , the remote and exciting , causes of the rebellion , I will endeavour to answer these questions . And Arst , aa to the Irregular and Local regiments . Many of them mutinied certainly , but a very large minority at least of them are doing good and active service to this day , while , with the exception of two battalions ,

    the-81 et-ftt-Saugftr _ ftpd ^^^ 5 ^( l _^ t ^ Julpigoreo , every one of the regular corps has ^ eitllier muiinludl >' r"has'beon disarmed . And another observation must be made , that with the exception of one or two instaneos , the men of the mutinous Irregular corps have not attempted to murder their officers ; in many cases they have treated them with marked care and consideration ; and , in almost every corps , there has been a not inconsiderable party that have remained true to their allegiance . Every circumstance has concurred to show the superior temper and spirit of the men of Irregular corps , and the stronger influence and control of their three selected European officers , when compured with the blindness and helplessness , of the numerous regimental ofHaorn at the regular corps . This is the more remarkable when

    we consider that the men of the Irregular regiments are drawn from exactly the same districts and exactly the same classes as the men of the line . And yet the European officers of the Irregular corps are not selected with sufficient conscientiousness and care ; nor are they entrusted with sufficient independent authority ; while the native officers are taken from the ranks , and promoted for the most part on the same faulty principles that we have already alluded to when speaking of the regular infantry . There is much room for improvement in the Irregular system , but its superiority has been conspicuously proved . of the have

    Six or seven battalions Bombay army been found tainted with mutiny ; two have exploded very much in the style to which we have now become accustomed , and in one officers have been murdered . Nor have the mutineers been entirely confined to the Poorbeea sepoj-s of the same caste and locality as the Bengal sepoys , as was at first stated . Many of the mutineers of the 27 th N . I ., who lulled three young officers at Kolapore , were Mahrattas and Decc . anee Mussulmans . The better organization and discipline of the Bombay and Madras armies , and their differences of race and language , have had much to do with their general good behaviour , but the great cause of their salvation has been their removal from the scenes of excitement and temptation by

    considerable distances . The tide of rebellion has never swept before their doors ; they have never been in actual communication with the actors in the mutiny ; the contagion never actually reached them . But they were all much interested and excited by the rumours which they heard , in proportion to their vicinity to the disturbed districts , and I hesitate not to state , on information which appears to me to be quite unimpeachable , that all their sympathies and hopes were with the mutineers and rebels . The Madras and Bombay sepoys have no more affection for our race , and no more devotion to our

    Government , than those of Bengal . It must be remembered that I am speaking of a time of general madness and confusion , when the ties of duty and custom are relaxed or broken , when superstition and vague dreams of glory and plunder rule the hour . Where the Bombay troops , as at Neemuch and Nusseerabad , did come partially within the circle of contag ion , they were found utterly untrustworthy , and the lives of their officers hung by a thread . At Bombay , Ahmedabad , Kurrachee , Shikarpore , Kolapore , Belgaum , and Dharwar , there have been plots among the sepoys , and severe examples have been made of many of them .

    At this place , Nagpore , which may be considered to have been throughout these dangerous times the advanced po 3 t of the Madras arm ) -, there were plots and conspiracies among all ranks and classes , except the very highest—the Kanees of Nagpore and their nearest relations , who kept to their old traditional policy of fidelity to the British Government . But the most powerful and dangerous class of conspirators kept themselves carefully in reserve , and watched tho course of events , ready to take advantage of any favourable opportunitv for action . The only plot that came to

    anything like maturity wa 3 one got up by some fanatical Mussulmans in the city of Nagpore , iu conjunction with some native officers in the Irregular cavalry ; and it was from the first a complete and dismal failure ; the sepoys of the Irregular regiments denounced themselves the emissaries who came to try and persuade them to join ; very few even of the Irregular covulry were let into the secret ; and the whole affair exploded prematurely , or rather flushed in the pan ; the leaders were arrusted without an attempt at resistance or rescue ; nine of them were hanged after a fair trial , and not a shot has boon fired on either side up to the present day .

    But during these days of conspiracy , tho Madras sepoys at Kamptee wore tampered with by influential and disaffected natives , and such answers were returned to their overtures as clearly proved what I have been enforcing , that the sympathies of the Madras sepoys were entirely with the insurrectionary movement , and that if they had got a tempting opportunity they would have joined in it . They only wanted a beginning to bo made and a rallying-point of some sort , a standard either of a Rajuh , or a pretender , of the Mussulman faith , to bo exhibited , for them to take thoir part aguiust the Feringheos . But they never got tho steam up here ; and a second excitement is not easily to be produced after a dismal and ignominious failure . who have

    All honour and credit to tho Madras troops bnhaved so well during a season of great difficulty and danger ! all honour to thoir officers , for the excellent state of discipline in which those troops havo been kept for many years ! but do not lot us fall into droama of fancied security regarding thorn . They are not to bo trusted ^ thoy ~ have-not _ tUej {^ ntontcd or loyal spiri t thut ought to bo desired and miglitTJoobTalnodiinrthe-nativo troops . Had one or two of thoir battalions mutinied in tho midst of tho Delhi excitement , hud one brigade gone wrong , tho contagion would havo spread throughout the army like wildnro , as it did through the Bengal army ; for the Madras troops arq as much attached and held together by thoir ' bhyo bund , ' or brotherhood , as tho Bengal army it ) . And one-third of tho Mudrna infuutry and the whole of tho cavalry are Muhoinodun . Wo must never forget the mutiny at Volloro , or suppose that the Madras mon are of a different clay from thoso of Bengal . Hnd tho brigade at Nagpore gono wrong , tho uopoya at Hyderabad could not huvo remuineil quiet ,

    the Nizam could not have resisted the impulse , or would have been struck down and replaced by one of his brothers , the whole Deccan would have been in a blaze , Poona , Sattara , Kolapore , the Carnatic , would have sent forth hordes of rebels and mutineers . We have escaped from a terrible , incalculable aggravation and extension of the shock our empire has received , and in my next letter I will give you a more particular account of the cause of our escape . Nagpore was for two months the most critical point in India . Remember that I have been speaking of the Madras army during a period of general excitement and madness . That time has passed by ; and the Madraseea are just as trustworthy now as they ever were . I don ' t

    doubt that they will attack the Bengal mutineers with as much determination as they would any other enemy of the Government . They have no great love for the haughty Brahmins and Kajpoots of the north ; and now that the Delhi delusion has been dissipated , they have begun to regain their old faith in the overwhelming power of their British masters . . But the Bengal sepoys served us faithfully for a hundred years , and I doubt not , were they organized on exactly the old footing , they would serve us faithfully for many years more . But it would be utter insanity to try them . The fact is that our sepoy army was on much too large a scale , and organized on a faulty and degrading plan . We want a large reduction and a sweeping reform .

    I shall endeavour in my next letter to show that this was no mere pretorian rebellion ; and that it was only in a very confined sense the result of a deeply-laid conspiracy . It was very much of a national uprising , and could not , by any amount of precautions , have been postponed many years . Nothing but a course of reparation and restoration can prevent the recurrence of a similar attempt at a war of extermination against us . At present there is nothing to be done but the signal and exemplary punishment of the mutineers and rebels ; should it be necessary for the next three years to hunt them down in every village and hill of the peninsula , it must be done ; not a single murderer must escape a disgraceful death , not a single mutineer must escape transportation . There are distinctions to be drawn in the guilt Jof regiments and individuals , but none should escape without feeling the consequences of its rebellion . E . V .

    Direct Railroad From London To Calcutta....

    DIRECT RAILROAD FROM LONDON TO CALCUTTA . We have received the following , addressed by Mr . William H . Villiers Sankcy , C . E ., to the Earl of Clarendon , iu January last . It shows that the Channel Viaduct forms a part of his original project for a * through' Railway from London to Calcutta : — My Lord , —Now that there is so much said and written about the Suez Canal , and as the English Government has been repeatedly culled upon to aid in the undertaking , 1 wish to lay before your Lordship some considerations of importance , which it would be well to take seriously into account before laying out eight millions of public money , especially as the Canal might be filled in again with sand swept across tho desert by the simoon ,

    " And , like tho baseless fabric of a vision , Leave not a wreck behind . " In former times , when the rate of water transit greatly exceeded tho speed of journeys by land , it was an advantage to connect tracts of water by canals ; . now , however , things arc altogether changed by thu introduction of railways , and every milo of a route that can be travelled by land may be got over in less than a quarter of the time thut it would take to traverse a like distance by soa . From this it will bo seen that a greut dvtour may oven bo made on land , and still the time required to perform a given journey be less than following tho diroct route by water ; how much more advantageous , then , must it be to take the direct course by an uninterrupted railroad , in preference to going u long way round in vessels . And hero I would draw attention to tho fact that all tho plans yet proposed for shortening tho route to India are behind tho age .

    In a few years the coasts of Englund and Franco will be united by rail , either by a tunnel under tho bed of tho Channel , by a viaduct of new construction , spanning the Channel itao {/ ' on ? nolea , or , what would bo better , by a hollow iron passage laid on tho surface of tho ground under water , like tho submarine telegraph ; and this latter plan could bo easily and economically carried into effect . In tho event of such a railroad being established , tlo whole of tho East is capable of being connected with England-by-land . —JiftUway-Jcomniunication to ttlroudy

    made between Calais and tho Valley of the Danubo , ana what is now required is to continue that lino from noor Donnunworth to Vienna , along the banks of the Dunubc , and following tho same valley as much as possible ) , to prolong tho railroad by tho shortest and boat route to Constantinople . There thq narrow channel whloh separates tho capital of Turkey from tho uminlnnJ . tho Asiatic continent , might bo crossed in tho niuunor I havo alluded to for effecting tho communication botweo " tho neighbouring ahorow of tho British Olmnnul . From thence , tho ahortcat practicable route should bo taken to roach tho Porniun Gulf , after which tho lino should

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Jan. 2, 1858, page 4, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_02011858/page/4/