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October 7, 1854.] THE LEADER. 945
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TO CORRESPONDENTS. "A Burgess of Sheffie...
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SATURDAY, OGTOBEE 7, 1854. .
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There 13 nothing so revolutionary, "beca...
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THE CAMPAIGN IN" THE CRIMEAWHAT IT LEADS...
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CUTTING OP THE AUSTRIAN KNOT. Theee will...
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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Transcript
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.
October 7, 1854.] The Leader. 945
October 7 , 1854 . ] THE LEADER . 945
To Correspondents. "A Burgess Of Sheffie...
TO CORRESPONDENTS . "A Burgess of Sheffield" should give his name and address . It is impossible to acknowledge the mass of letters we re ceire . Their insertion is often delayed , owing to a press of matter ; and when omitted it is frequently from reasons quite independent of the merits of the communication . No notice can be taken of anonymous communication * . Whatever is intended for insertion must be authenticated by the name and address of the writer ; not necessarily for publication , but as a guarantee of his good faith . Communications should always toe legibly written , and on one side of the paper only . If long , it increases the difficulty of finding space for them . We cannot undertake to return rejected communications . A . U letters for the Editor should be addressed to 7 , Wellington-street , Strand , London .
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Saturday, Ogtobee 7, 1854. .
SATURDAY , OGTOBEE 7 , 1854 . .
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There 13 Nothing So Revolutionary, "Beca...
There 13 nothing so revolutionary , "because tkere is nothing 39 unnatural and convulsive , as the strain to keep things fixed when all the world is by the very law of its creation in . eternal progress . —De . Aknoid .
The Campaign In" The Crimeawhat It Leads...
THE CAMPAIGN IN" THE CRIMEAWHAT IT LEADS TO . Fob all political purposes , it may be assumed that Sebastopol is taken . After the great military achievements of the Crimea , commence the great political difficulties . There is a diplomatic Sebastopol still . * Emperor Francis Joseph , receiving a telegraphic announcement of the battle of Alma , sends a message of congratulation to EmperorNapoleon . " Austria , " say all the profound publicists , " will join the " Western Allies , now that she sees the cause of Russia
is hopeless . " No doubt . Austria saves Russia B y joining . England and France . The Austrian diplomatists have proved themselves , in this last phase of the Eastern question , to be the first statesmen of Europe : they comprehend that the military war tends to become a political war ; and they intercept a declaration of war against Despotism by bringing one-half of the forces of Despotism into the camp of Liberalism . They thus not only save Russia , Hungary , and Italy , but they bid for the Principalities , —Turkey to take the Crimea .
It would , no doubt , be a grotesque conclusion of the war against Bussia to aggrandise Austria ; and we may anticipate that English liberalism will protest—a section of our cabinet breaking away from Lord Aberdeen , and offering temporary services to the liberal cry . ^ But if English liberals will resolutely insist on the war being regarded , from the presont point , as a war , no longer for the maintenance of Turkey , but for the suppression of Russia , as a political system , the Austrian alliance may yot bo turned to good account .
This generation of Englishmen has now tasted blood—and that will do it good . Having entered on war , and found that war does not necessarily riiin trade or blight harvests , this generation of Englishmen will hnvo a tendency to go on with war . It can afford war— 'commercially . It can afford war—politically . The period is so far felicitous that there is no question of tho day but the war . There ia no colonial difficulty to suppresses in the first Pitt ' a wmo ; there is no demand for reform , as in tho second Pitt ' s time ; there is no Catholic nation to conciliate ( M > . Disraeli thinks there
is one to insult ) , as in Castlereagh ' s time . The nation , revelling in this war , perhaps illogically , but still heartily , is headed by a G-overnment which , unlike preceding Governments carrying on war , is not a party Gtoverninent , —is essentially and sincerely , a national Government . The circumstances are then propitious for a long campaign against Czardom .
Austria will now attempt to procure a peace . But if the French and English nations force the French and English Governments to advance to St . Petersburg next spring , Austria will still exhibit her enormous ingratitude to Uussia . Our object is not to repudiate the Austrian alliance : it is to paralyse Austria , which can only be effected by accepting her alliance .
A war against despotism—and one at a time : that would be a rational cry for liberal public meetings demanding that Parliament be summoned to sustain fhe Cabinet against secret diplomacy and despairing dynasties . May not we be attacking Vienna via St . Petersburg ? May not , indeed , Vienna thus lead back to Paris ? We are in for a long war ; and , having , the faults of our forefathers to warn us of blunders , we ought to take care that , when peace is at last signed , we may Lave gained something for our money . . :
Cutting Op The Austrian Knot. Theee Will...
CUTTING OP THE AUSTRIAN KNOT . Theee will , indeed , be one sequel to the reduction of Sebastopol , which has not yet presented itself conspicuously enough , but which is brought out in stronger relief by the circumstances of the present week . The efforts to keep the two great German Powers would become more unsuccessful in proportion as the two Courts of Berlin , and Vienna grow more divided in their view . Prussia desires to compromise , to trim . Austria is becoming engaged more and more in alliance with those powers who are coercing " Russia , and are succeeding in the coercion- Here lies the true cause of the division , which has a different force for Austria and for Prussia . The more the Western Powers succeed in beating the Czar the more certainly does it appear the interest of Austria to take part with the victorious side . There is a point from which she could scarcely retract .
If Austria were once to stand in arms against Russia , it is highly improbable that the Czar would any longer keep measure with his former po'otegec . He that gave might think to take away ; and the Czar , who restored Hungary to Austria , might try to snatch ifc back , and to give it to the Hungarians . Now , Austria has continued so
much to increase her connexion with the Allies , in act as well as diplomacy , as to render ifc difficult for her to avoid going yet farther ; and as she abstained from breaking off , when the Allies were still at Varna , it really seema improbable that she would retract when they are at Sebastopol—or could retract . Their success is her bond .
For Prussia the success of the Western allies has almost the opposite effect . The more Russia is pressed , supposing the Czar to remain firm in resistance , the higher would he bid for aid , and tho moro Prussia might ho led to speculate in the Russian alliance . Tho last note from Prussia indicates something of this . While we havo no intimation
that ahe has yet withdrawn equivocating negotiation with tho Western Powers , eho places herself distinctly in antagonism to Austria in Germany . The whole drift of tho laafc Prussian note in answer to tho Western circular is involvod in a laboured suggestion that Austria , working with foreigners , must b y that fact bo non-Gorman . One specimen will exemplify tho spirit and tendency of this
note . It is remarked that the navigation of the Danube will be free in proportion as the foreign element is absent ; meaning that Austria must have nothing to do with France or England in protecting that river . Now it was Bussia that permitted the mud to grow up at the mouth ; and it is that passive cause of the war that Prussia would restore ! Leave the Danube alone , cries Prussia , and
all will be right ; yet the whole war is testimony to the falsehood of the suggestion . The note plainly lets us see that Prussia is steadily working to oust Austria from the confidence of Germany , and to bring over the German Powers to llussia . The success of that aim is another question ; the aim itself is enough for our present purpose , as showing the tendency of the two German Powers to separate more widely than ever .
One prevailing idea seems to be , that a new distribution of territory may take place on the Pruth—that Austria may have Moldavia and Bessarabia , Turkey receiving the Crimea instead , Turkey would then have no frontier conterminous with Russia in Europe ; Austria would have a better military frontier to the East . Of course , we need not say , these notions are altogether premature : the frontiers will be planned when the frontiers
are gained ; the victors will dispose of the vanquished territory in a common council ; and happy will ifc be for those Powers who have earned the rigjit to sit at that council . But fall out as events may , there is every prospect that Austria will not lose by the Western alliance . Certain friends of Italy and Hungary mourn at the prospect ; we rejoice , and we believe that several friends of those countries—some of the most sharpsighted amongst them—will appreciate our
reasons . No extension of Austrian territory , especially nVeormexion with the belligerent West , can fail to l > ring to her increased employment for her military strength . Already she garrisons Moldavia and Wallachia , not with subject Turkey , but with Turkey stronger than she has been for generations . Every step in this direction exposes Austria to new enemies ; her retractation is more and more cut off ; the corresponding necessity of cementing her alliance more and more is displayed even to Viennese discernment , By
vigorous acts her financial position has been amended ; but it will need further recruitment ; and in that process she must be sustained by the public opinion of her own citizens , by the financial opinion of moneyed Europe . She has to insure , and to borrow upon her policy of insurance . It can be done , and it is necessary to do something of the kind . She must ensure herself , inter alia , against tho recurrence of 184 i 8 . She can . A skeleton machinery for obtaining the support of tho people long existed , oven in the dried
representative system of Lombardy . Hungary has been loyal ; Bohemia -would be more loyal if she had the opportunity to form a corporate opinion . JSTot one of tho countries yet named produces all the wealth that freedom and energy give . The example of Sardinia , loyal and steadily improving , with the development of constitutional freedom , is at hand . Even Turkey is an example , Tho great presont facts are pregnant with lessona , with hopos . If 181-8 could produce a Stndion ,
if tho House of Mapsburg has producod a Leopold , arc wo to prcsumo that Vienna and tho family can never ngnin give fcirth to statesmen or princes capable o ? understanding the dynamics of circumstances ? If Austria wore to add to tho nllinnco with tho West and Turkey , an nllinnco also with Italy , with Hungary , with Bohemia , there would bo no danger for her in tho employment of hor armies on garrison duty ; treasures would soon grow for her in tho plains of Hungary
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Oct. 7, 1854, page 9, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_07101854/page/9/
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