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Leader (1850-1860), 15th September 1855, Edition 2 of 2, Page 17, fePjPEMBg g ^saaggg Twm liabib^ S93

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      Fepjpembg G ^Saaggg Twm Liabib^ S93

      fePjPEMBg g ^ saaggg Twm liabib ^ S 93

      - R^Leneraii K2lapka The War. Th« Wa*- I...

      - r ^ lENERAIi K 2 LAPKA THE WAR . Th « Wa * - iniheEaat- From the Tear 1853 to July 1855 . An Historico-Critical Sketch o / tte Campaigns on the Danube . By General George Klapka . Translated from MS . by Lieutenant-Colonel A . Mednyiinsky . .. Chapman and Hall . This is a political , as well as military criticism on the conduct of the War . General Klapka has claims to be heard beyond those of a mere soldier . He is intimately acquainted with the arena of the war , in Eastern Europe and Western Asia . He has studied the genius and the tendencies of the varied populations spread along the borders of the Russian and Ottoman Empires . He is familiar with the spirit of the Russian policy , and , without being enwhich he

      slaved by the infatuation of a favourite idea , has distinct views , develops with as much candour as enthusiasm . It results that the summary here presented , though personal and peculiar , is honest , clear , and careful . As an outline-history of the Russian War , no more lucid narrative could be desired . As a review of , statesmanship and of strategic ? , we have seen none less passionate , or more convincing , except , perhaps , an episodical criticism in the pamphlet of General Mierolawski . We will constitute ourselves , for the occasion , the exponents of General JHapka ' s ideas , and present the essence of his summary , which may serve a double purpose : that of recalling the original necessity of the contest in which England is engaged , and proving the futility of any attempt to keep in view , at once , high European interests , and the establis hed maxims of European diplomacy .

      In the spring of 1853 , says the General , the Emperor Nicholas thought the time had arrived when he might consummate the traditional policy of the Russian Czars—already pursued during two centuries—and take a large portion of Turkey under his own control . The other great Powers seemed disunited ; the Porte had confessed its weakness by yielding to Austrian claims ; its arms had been barely successful in Montenegro . The time , therefore , appeared ripe for an assault on this declining authority . Demands were accordingly made , which would have placed the Russian Government at the head of eleven millions of Ottoman subjects , and these were rejected . The occupation of the Principalities ensued ; but the Turks , instead of surrendering to threats , declared war , and set their military forces in motion . The first campaign was favourable to their arms ; Omar Pacha , having gained the day at Kalafat and Oltenitza , advanced on Bucharest , and the world expected that he would now retort the attack upon Russia .

      But here diplomacy interfered . Austria , which guards the Russian frontier as Prussia nurses the Russian , trade , solicited a political concession from Great Britain and France . The further successes of Omar Pacha , her internuncio declared , would imperil the peace pf Europe ; and , to save the peace of . Europe , no less than to conciliate Austria , Great Britain and France adopted a course which spared the Czar , and left him a long opportunity to repair his losses on the Danube . The Turks , therefore , half-way to victory , went into winter quarters ; the Western Powers delayed ; the Sclavonian populations of the border were disappointed ; the invaders of Wallachia Were reinforced ; and while the Ottoman army was forbidden to move , the Russian fleet , without let or hindrance , enacted the massacre at Sinope . This event roused public opinion in the East and in the West . The Turks muttered " Treason ; " the English burned to see vengeance taken ; the French Cabinet made a move in advance . The indulgent " Four

      Points , " rejected by Russia , completed the term of grace , arid the combined fleets were wafted , by the popular breath , into the Euxine sea . Nominal war commenced ; but during the spring of 1854 , Omar Pacha alone combated the enemy . Austria , by her friendly offices , had enabled the Czar to prepare at leisure an army of 120 , 000 men , which menaced the line of the Danube , forced a passage , and hovered upon the road to Constantinople . The Greek insurrection beckoned them onward ; the Turks were alarmed , but diplomacy maintained its composure . A plan of the Wallachians to revolt in the Russian rear was discountenanced as in opposition to existing interests . The conservative policy of Austria ruled even $ \ e Allied camps , and the Wallachian patriots , disarmed and expelled , were driven within the jurisdiction of Prince Gortsehakoff ' s courts-martial . Russia , meanwhile , employed the revolutionary artifice which the Allies rejected , and organised

      a CJreeo-Slavonian legion . Then followed the weakening of the Turkish line by Russian attacks , until the enemy ' s progress was checked under the walls of Silistria . A few persons , who seem to argue upon the principle that every plan of operations not adopted would infallibly have succeeded if tried , believe that the Ottomans should have been left to their own resources , which would have enabled them to beat the Russians from Silistria , and establish the integrity of their own frontier . Clearly , however , the Arab-Tabia did not repel Prince Paskievitch . Silistria was nobly defended , yet it is impossible to doubt that it nraBt have submitted to the final processes of the siege . But the Allies were preparing to march in the direction of the Danube ; a concentration of Turks was , taking place at Shumla ; and secret notes , in all probability , were passing between Vienna and St . Petersburg . The Russians , therefore , retreated from , an insecure position , the Turks were in readiness to follow them , when again diplomacy interfered in behalf of the political constitution of Europe .

      . Perhaps the most flagrant error in the whole unfortunate series was then committed . '' Austria , protending to threaten the Russian flank , covered , in fact , the Russian frontier . She was permitteth )» by the inconceivable docility of the Allies , to establish a separate treaty with Turkey , excluding every other nation from the Principalities , acquiring the monopoly of military occupation on the Danube ; the right of aettinflfbounds to the success of Omar Pachjyand the power of compelling Great Britain and Franco to seek a distant fie , ] d , far from the avenues of Europe , fur from the centres of political disaffection , Mwhero every Curtiu . s might plunge into the gulf , and whore Russian , prestige might bo lost without Austrian interests being endangered . The result undeniably has been , in spite of success , that the military reputation of Russia . him been enhanced , while the prestige of Great Britain has been sacrificed ^ whether by false policy or by incapacity it is hard to say . ^ 'Iriattpthor'direufeion the Turks continued to lose ground . Their Asiatic frontier ' was ' Wkfcche'd by Russian armies , and in the autumn of 1854 they ^ e $ « tted , ; ty ; imnortant positions , a twofold defeat- It is the opinion of Creneral Klapka that a email European nucleus should have been planted

      here ; the tribes of Georgia and the Caucasus should have been encouraged to revolt ; from the 60 , 000 Georgians and 80 , 000 mountaineers . capabt ^ of bearing arms , 50 , 000 or 60 , 000 martial auxiliaries might have beealevied ; We prefer General Klapka ' s estimate on this subject to that of Mr . Duncan ? who deals carelessly with the history and character of the Circassian nation . After a succession of corroborative details , the General writes : s All that has hitherto been said tends to show how little care the Allies , from the very beginning , bestowed upon the warlike events in Asia , and particularly in the Caucasus ; otherwise they could but have seen that the whole mountain rang ? forms part of the southern theatre of war , and is to Russia in the south what Poland is tfl her in the west , viz ., her most vulnerable part . The Allies ought to have been aware that an energetic offensive in the Caucasus , and the defeat of their enemy there , would have immensely promoted the success of their arms on the other scenes of action . It was possibly apprehended that the possession of those districts Would bringbut little direct advantage , and that even that little could not easily be turned to account ; but , on the other hand , it was entirely forgotten-what enormous Russian forces would thereby be destroyed , and that , by means of that acquisition , in the following year a Turco-Persian and Circassian army , numbering hundreds of thousands of combatants , might have been called into existence to deluge Russia as far as the Don and the Wolga . Neither was it taken into consideration that so tremendous an invasion would have shaken that empire to its very foundation , and have produced consequences of the highest and most beneficial importance to humanity . In a word , everything was disregarded and forgotten , and the conquest of Russia confined to preparations for a descent upon the Crimea . General KJapka examines rigorously the policy of the Crimean campaign . He first states the general objects announced : — The pressure of Russia upon Europe had already lasted far too long a period ; she had been too long allowed to form a barrier to civilisation , and a check to the freedom of thought and of action . It was high time to put a limit to her encroachments , and to reduce the balance of power to an equitable and natural basis . From the outset the shadows of disappointment gathered over these generous anticipations . The Gallipoli camp , the Varna parade , the inde » cision of the Western governments , their desperate search after a compromise , —all were auguries of a war begun with infirmity of purpose , and pursued amidst a confusion of plans . Lord Raglan is described by the General as a man of acknowledged merit , and popular with the army ; but too old , too cautious , too slow , governed too much by tradition , and too " little acquainted with the theatre of war , to succeed in the face of so many difficulties . He selected an incompetent staff " , and suffered the odium created by their errors and negligence . The best generals of France declining to associate with the men of the coup d ' etat , St . Arnaud , & Kabylie conqueror , headed the French troops , who neither trusted nor respected him . With such leaders , with small forces , with no means of land-transport , no pontoons , no siege trains , the Allied armies were thrown upon the Crimean territory , hurried forward by the diseased impatience of the French Marshal , and , against the judgment of Lord Raglan hurled upon and through the Russian lines at the Alma , and thence diverted from their original object to attack the south side of Sebastopol : — The flank march of the Allies succeeded marvellously . Had they but taken advantage of the surprise of the enemy and attempted an immediate assault upon the city , which at that moment was weakly garrisoned , they might possibly have succeeded in carrying both the town and the arsenal ere the Russians had time to ere , ct regular works of defence . But , instead of this , they took to protracted reconnoitrings , in this case overdoing what had been utterly disregarded on the Alma , where a more accurate reconnoissance would have assisted them in a better arrangement of the' plan of battle . Here , on the contrary , protracted reconnoitrings led to perpetual indecision and preparation , and finally to a formal siege , which had never entered the calculation of the Allies in the original plan of the expedition . One daring and rapid blow , even at a heavy sacrifice , might still in the present state of affairs have led to a favourable issue and if the Allies had not had determination enough at once to have recourse to . such ' an extreme expedient , they ought immediately to have returned to their vessels . Pelissier the present French commander-in-chief , would in all probability have been the very ' man for such a contingency ; both Canrobert and Lord Raglan were wanting in energy . They thought such an act of daring did not tally with their conscience and the responsibility devolving upon them . How incomparably more victims has the winter campaign cost the Allies , than a bold assault under the protection of some ; easily constructed b atteries at the end of September . While the Allies prepared to attack , the enemy recovered from hia surprise and from his fear , and the artillery duel before Sebastopol commenced The first bombardment failed ; the action at Balaklava was a misfortune : and after the battle of Inkerman , according to Klapka , the Allies should have raised the siege . After the " horrible and heartrending winter a second cannonade took place , which also failed , . the subsequent operations of General Pelissier and General Simpson are criticised in an equally sceptical spirit , and the result is presented thus : — The worst is yet to come . Everything betokens a most determined defence on tlxo part of the Russians . According to their prisoners , the larger worka of Sebastopol hava as vet scavcely suffered , and the Allies themselves may see from their camps thousand * or Russians actively employed in strengthening their defences , and constructing new ones behind thorn . Moreover , the command of the attacked fronts , is entrus ted to the most export and resolute officers , who will doubtless strain every nerve to dispute the advance inch by inch . Yet we do not deny that the Allies may not obtain apartal success for example , against the . bastions and numerous batteries crowning the mm in front of Karabclnaia . If they can secure a firm footing upon one of those commanding points , tho fatoof that part of Sebastopol would soon be dec ided ; for the arsenal and the barrackB could not offer any aerious resistance , and the besieged would bo compelled to retire into Fort Paul , at tho entrance of the military harbour . But thou the sole advuntago gained would bo an insight into one part of the po * t * the AUiea would still have to clear a way into tho city proper , ™* moanwh lo « , o Russian vessels could alway s find sufficient shelter against t'olr pnycto " aonw . Corner of tho groat bay . Supposing , however , tUat the Allies ah ouW , i n * ° ° id , w at the cost of half their army , obtain posaeaaion of tho south side of Bobastopoi , w then ? _ , „_ ; The reply , though read by tho light of victory , b ™[ 2 ZZT ?* tUor t » The Allies , when onco master of the tow .., \* vo l J ° "" embarkation of then * content themselves with what they have do ^ e , and order ^ ^ Bnccaiw troops , or to decide upon a continuation ^ of opojallom , in . dockyard * , of the enterprise would only bo partial , for if tlw' v ™» ° ^ th uiiic , the northernarsenals , forte , tho whole oity , everything destroyed on

  • Citation
    • Leader (1850-1860), Sept. 15, 1855, page 17, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_15091855/page/17/