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4 ¦ . . September 24, 1853.] THE LEADER....
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THE GOVERNING CLASSES. No, IV.—THE DUKE ...
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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Russia And Turkey. (To The Editor Of The...
% . aa scrambled to the Czar not onl y with indecorous haste , but bearing undignified and illdio-esfced propositions . Had the Porte been conulted by the Four Powers ere the last protocol was transmitted to St . Petersburg , the modifications afterwards inserted would have formed part of its text as recommended by the Allies , and the absurd contretemps which Europe has fallen into would have been effectively obviated . The sense of this Note had , it is true , been communicated to Russia beforehand , and it must ever remain an uncertain , question whether
if these subsequent alterations had then formed part of the proposals , Russia would have given her adhesion with equal readiness . This course , however , would have reduced the question to the most perfect simplicity ; for the alterations suggested by the Porte were , and are , thoroughly in accordance with the views of two , at least , of the Allies ; and the Allies having thus embodied them in their Note , it would have only remained for Russia to accept or to reject them . The Allies now stand somewhat committed to the proposition so hurriedly presented ; and / the
question has become one of interpretation . Austria is stated to have already interpreted this Note in her own way , and to have seceded from joint action with the European Powers , specially on the grounds above mentioned . Whether this retrogression be owing to the cause alleged is , indeed , problematical j but the Vienna Note , whether nursed in falsehood or in food faith , for honest or for deceptive purposes , as proved a failure . It is the last of the consecutive blunders made by Europe , solely , perhaps , because it is the last thing Europe has
attempted . The principle involved , however , and the question of right , remain unaltered . The duplicity of ' Russia has become bared to the world , and her object better understood and more distinctly defined . The substance of the despatch addressed by Count Ness ' elrode to , Baron Meyendorf , separated from its insolence , and its bombastic and insupportable self-sufficiency , flatly rejects the Turkish emendations ; and a second despatch , proceeding from the same source , is found to amount to a declaratory act , that the interpretation given by Russia to
the meaning of the Vienna Note is diametrically opposed to that intended by the mediating Powers , and that thus the question is no longer one of mere phrases , but of vital substance . The words of every agreement , however , are of vital importance , else why so much care expended upon their preparation ? In this case , the welfare of a nation is involved ; in others , perhaps the question of a property , or of a creed—that is the only difference . The question , however , is now more distinct , more important , more menacing . Secured in her position , Russia no longer needs the subterfuges of diplomatic phraseology : it is no more , therefoi * e , a confirmation of old rights , but a demand
for fresh privileges . Upon what principle of law or iustieo does Russia base her preferential claims P Confessedly unable to produce tho cases of oppression which constitute the vaguo pretexts of her demands , Russia cites tho privileges conferrod by former treaties , as establishing her right to additional favours . This absurd and unprecedented pretension she has supported by the forciblo occupation of Turkish territory , ft will now bo my purpose to review , in a few words , tho events which preceded this reprehensible proceeding , and the falsehoods and docopfcions which have characterized her policy , from the appoaranee of Prince- McnschikofF , to tho Neaaolrodo declaration .
When that formidable embassy reached Constantinople , and was recoivod with such 6 clat » . y the Greek population , the first uneasy feeling that had been created considerably diminished ° n tho announcement of tho object which this diplomatic invasion had in view . Tho Emperor onl y desired satisfaction upon the- question of tho Holy Places whoro undue preferences l » a . d boen accorded to Franco . Tho French Government quietly and unostentatiously withdrew
] claims ; certain privileges wore eonforrod upon tho "ifcuHsian Church , and Prince- 'MenschikofF declared thai ; ho wan " perfectly Batiafiod . " But ' ho rebellion in Montenegro , tho Austrian do-*» iuu 1 h for compensation , tho disturbances rumour Po inted to in various parts of tho Turkish Ern-P 'o , | , ho distractod and uncertain councils of : ' - < H-Hia , were scarcely to pass over without an l udiioemon t for tjioir " inoron . no , and 00 favourable
an opportunity was not to be ( it never has been ) lost by Russia . When , according to the full belief of Europe and the satisfaction of the bewildered and beleaguered Porte , Prince MenseMkoff had expressed his satisfaction with the advantages accorded to the Greet community , the question was deemed terminated , the Russian Ambassador , in direct contravention of all diplomatic usage , and in complete outrage of all principles of justice , delivered a second series of demands , and retired to Buyukdere , there to await the final decision of the Divan . This
building of cupolas and custody of keys had only indeed served to mask the true object of Russian diplomacy . This new ultimatum—for such it was —demanded a de facto and de jure right of protectorship over the Christian Greek population of the Turkish Empire , and that these uncivilized and semi-barbarous subjects of the Porte should be placed " upon the footing of the most favoured nation . " To have accorded this would have been
to constitute them virtually independent , for Russia interprets this clause as conferring equal privileges with those accorded to the embassies of Europe in the Turkish capital , and as inducing a train of other consequences at which she alone would have cause to rejoice . Apart from the unauthorized nature of these requirements , they were couched in the most insolent terms , and demanded a categorical and instant reply . Alarmed by such threatening demonstrations , Europe proffered its aid to extricate the Porte from its dilemma ; the aid proffered was accepted ,
and negotiations followed , JLncouraged by the evident alarm of Europe , and its infelicitous councils , the threats of Russia were followed by speedy fulfilment ; her troops crossed the Pruth , invaded Moldavia and WaUachia , seized the reins of Government , demanded tribute , appointed their own agents , occupied the frontier upon-Turkey , and virtually incorporated the Provinces . The fleets , whose advance into the Black Sea and the Baltic would doubtless have sufficed to stay this
aggression , remainly idly and ignormmousl y at their anchorages , and henceforth having acquired without striking a single blow the advantages of a successful campaign , Russia contrived at once to negotiate and to continually advance fresh troops into the Principalities . Fortified at length in her military position , and assured , as it appears , of Austria ' s support , Russia throws off the mask and deliberately asserts claims , compliance with which would abolish Turkish sovereignty in Europe . But whence does Russia derive her right ?
The treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople contain clauses securing certain privileges to tho Greek communities under the guarantee of Russia . It was originally asserted that these treaties had boen violated by the Porte , and that Russia had therefore just grounds of complaint . This would , indeed , have authorised Russia to insist upon the due execution of those treaties or to demand their confirmation . The first of these
courses would have been preferable , since the latter would appear to call into question the validity of the documents themselves . Russia at first favoured both these plans , and tho Porte offered to confirm , and did confirm , tho privileges insisted upon . But this was not what Russia required . She knew that no remissness in carrying into effect tho provisions of a contract would enable tho holder of that contract to demand fresh and additional advantages . Ho could indeed legally and justly insist upon tho duo performance of tho provisions of that agreement , and that too to tho fullest extent , but unless with
the uncoorced assent of tho othor contracting party , no alterations could bo made and no claim to any such alteration could bo enforced . Dallying , thorcforc , with tho first demands , creating a war of words , transferring the negotiations from point to point , and at length gaining time sufficient , Russia points to her military position and requires stipulations unauthorised b y her agreements ; "to wlu ' eh bIio has not tho shadow of a claim , which aro not contained in any ono of her and
treaties ^ which avo decidedly opposed to the desires of the . European powers . Tho first glimmer of light upon tho gravo nature of tho fresh obligation sought _ to bo fixed upon hor is afforded by Turkey . Europo understands for the first fcimo tho true nature of tho demands , and oflora to support Turkey by a separate declaratory roading oi' tho Vionna note . Austria objects to this , and doolinoa to guarantoe Turkey against future aggresBion , Vqv tho profient tho matter remains thus .
Count Nesselrode ' s despatch to M . de Meyen dorff , puts the dilemma thus : — " For of these two positions only one is possibleeither the alterations which the Porte requires are important , in which case it is very , simple that we refuse to accede to them ; or they are unimportant , and then the question arises , why should the Porte unnecessarily make its acceptance dependent on them ?"
The alterations here alluded to are already well known . The most important of them is that placing the Greek population upon the same footing as the most favoured subjects of the Porte , instead of upon the same footing as the " most favoured nation . " There is , of course , a wide and irreconcilable difference here , as already previously stated . The Western powers understood the Vienna memorial in the same sense as
the Porte ; the latter desired , not unnaturally , to fix with still greater precision and distinctness the true nature of the most important clauses . Russia has objected to a plainness , which would hereafter render her tergiversation impossible , and Count Nesselrode , in" refusing to accede to these modifications , if they are important , " plainly indicates what was the foul and dishonest intention of the Czar , and the use that would ultimately have been made of the indeterminate language of the allies .
Turkey and "Western Europe , and Russia , then , are now separated by a broad , well defined , and perfectly , understood question . The whole matter has been so plainly exposed that no room for equivocation rem ains . Russia has no claim , either recognised in treaty or arising from position , except such as a successful wrong and a formidable military attitude may command .. Austria , which
appears , consciously or unconsciously , to have carried on the Muscovite conspiracy at Vienna , has plainly inclined to the unjust cause of Nicholas , and , whatever may result from the present question , —whether peace may yet be preserved , or whether the Turkish soldiery precipitately hurl bade the wrongs inflicted upon their country , and which they have borne so long and so patiently , — the guilt will rest with Russia .
It would , perhaps , be ungraceful , at this moment , to point to the realization of fears that the timid conduct of the Allies would provoke the very situation they were most desirous to avoid . A sense of public duty , however , bids me state that a more dignified , a more determined , and a more worthy course of policy would have redeemed a name now dishonoured in the East , and would have been better calculated not only to preserve Turkey from unjust aggression , but to preserve the peace of Europe and the honour and glory of the British name . " Alpha . "
4 ¦ . . September 24, 1853.] The Leader....
4 ¦ . . September 24 , 1853 . ] THE LEADER . 927
The Governing Classes. No, Iv.—The Duke ...
THE GOVERNING CLASSES . No , IV . —THE DUKE OF ARGYLL . * Among tho other benefits conferred upon his country by the late Sir Robert Peel , was tho establishment of a belief in six or seven young men of light hair and sanguino complexions that they wore tho cleverest fellows in the world . Sir Robert was the shyest of men , but ho instituted tho most audacious of political schools . They have all light hair and sanguino
complexions , they nro all fluent , sclf-sufliciont , and pushing-There is tho I ) uko of Newcastle , Mr . Sidney Herbert , Mr . Cardwoll , Mr . Frederick Peel , and the Puko of Argyll , all liko ono another in character and temperament—certainly all of tho snino political class . They aro , par excellence , tho " rising" young men . They were rising young men at sixteen , and they will be rising young men nfc fifty . Fortunate England with such a relay of such consult ) .
Tho Buko of Argyll is a chief governor : ho im a member of tho Cabinet which governs tho Governing-Classes , and arranges British destinies . Can any ono toll why ? oun a self-governing country gnofis why ? Not becauso ho is a Duke , for there aro plenty of othor ¦ Dukes open to Cpalition offers ; not hocnuso ho ib popular , for tho country knows nothing about him ; not becauso ho is wise and experienced , for ho is onlythirty , and very young of his ngo ; not because ho has groat administrative capacity , for ho in put , into an office Privy Seal—whoro fclioro in nothing to do bub toll tho Promior that postorify will appreciate him ; * TJ 10 intention wnn , n « far « H pofluiblo , in thin Horie » , to floloot narnofl in alpliabfltiool ordor ; but it may porhnps bf > wnnidorod pardonable tlmt tho wnlor should . h , avo paefjod , over Mo oubjocf . of tho propvnt okotwr
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Sept. 24, 1853, page 15, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_24091853/page/15/
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