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    November 26, 1853.] THE LEADER, 1147

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    THE GEOUJSDS OF BELIEF. Westminster Bevi...

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    Schools Of Poets Y. Poems. By Matthew Ar...

    helping him forward on his road towards this aim . Such a guide the English writer at the present day will nowhere find . " Shakspeare he considers a dangerous model ( but indeed all models are dangerous to minds that " copy" them ) , and he prefers the Greeks . If his counsel be rightly interpreted , it will be useful to that large class of Amateurs who write verse but who are not " born Singers ; " but , if rigidly interpreted , it will lead the despairing classicists to exclaim with Charles Lamb , " Hang the critics , Til write for antiquity /"

    Uur own behei is , that scJioois or poetry are the changing fashions of one eternal spirit ; and that good poetry is everywhere the same in its essential conditions , everywhere fluctuating with the fluctuating modes of thought and language . Further our belief is , that all conscious imitation is weakness , and that " models" produce no real good , though little harm , because the servile mind is one which if emancipated would not be strong . To study models with a view to emulate them is not the same as to study them with a view to imitate them ; the one is an invigorating—the other an enervating study . We have tarried so long over Mr . Arnold ' s preface that we must defer till next week all attempt to characterise his poems .

    November 26, 1853.] The Leader, 1147

    November 26 , 1853 . ] THE LEADER , 1147

    The Geoujsds Of Belief. Westminster Bevi...

    THE GEOUJSDS OF BELIEF . Westminster Bevieio . ITeio Series . No . VIII . October * 1853 . Art . VII . The Universal Postulate . John Chapman . According to promise we return to this number of the Westminster Review , for the purpose of considering a little more nearly the very remarkable article with the very unpromising title of The Universal Postulate . ^ It is an inquiry into the grounds of our belief in an external worldy an endeavour to reconcile Philosophy with Common Sense , not as Heid did b y the incessant assertion that Common Sense was right , but by a profound elucidation of the psychological process through which , it and all other beliefs are possible and valid . There is so much compact matter in this article that any attempt to reproduce it in the extremely abridged form necessary in , a journal like ours , runs the risk of being unreadably abstract , or else of doing the argument injustice by omissions . Let us urge the student , therefore , to read the article itself with severe attention , taking our notice as a sort of fingerpost .

    Every logical act of the intellect is the assertion that something is . This is what we call belief . Each major premiss is a belief ; each minor premiss a belief ; each conclusion a belief . An argument is a series of dependent beliefs . Belief , then , is the ultimate psychological fact which we can never transcend . But it appears that there are beliefs of two kinds—some of them irresistible , indestructible ; others doubtful , untrustworthy . What is the sign by which we distinguish them ? How are we to settle , beyond cavil , the beliefs which are trustworthy , irresistible , true ? The sign is their invariablehess , in other words , the inconceivableness of the contrary . ——

    " If we assign as a reason for any belief the belief on which it rests , and then assign for that belief an anterior one , and so on continuously , it is clear that we must eventually come to the end of the series—must arrive at some primordial belief of whicli no proof can be given . This remains true , whatever theory we hold respecting the origin of our knowledge . For if we say that all knowledge is organized experience , and that , in assigning one belief in proof of another , we are simply assigning a wider experience in proof of a narrower , it is clear that we cannot continue to assign wider and wider experiences in proof of each other , without arriving finally at the widest . As our experience had a beginning , it follows that ,

    in tracing it backwards , we must ultimately come to our first or deepest experience —an experience which has no other to rest upon . Similarly with the hypothesis of fundamental ideas . An analytical examination of beliefs must eventually bring us down to theso ; and for these the hypothesis itself implies that no reason is assignable . Hence , whether our lowest beliefs be innate , or derived from experience , it is equally clear that , as they do not admit of proof , we can but say that they invariably exist . And whilst this fact of their invariable existence is alono our warrant for them , it at the same time expresses the necessity we are under of holding- them .

    " It results , then , from all that has been said , —first , that the existence of beliefs is the fundamental fact ; and second , that beliefs which invariably exist are those which , both rationally and of necessity , wo must adopt . "

    The writer then criticises Whowell and Mill on " Necessary Truths , " and after landing on the position that the beat warrant we can have for the belief \ in anything is the perfect agreement of all pre-existing experience in support of it , lie deduces the logical conclusion that the " iuconccivablencsaNof its negation" is the truest teat any belief admits of : — "If all our knowledge is derived from experience , then our notions of jtossiblc and impossible are derived from experience Possible means—not at variance with our experience ; impossible means—wholly at " variance with our experience . Olearly , unless we possess fundamental ideas , or can gain a knowledge- of things in themselves , no logical process can give to the notion , impossible , any larger meaning than this . But if , at any time , the inability of men to conceive the negation of a given proposition Himply proves that their experience tip to that

    time , has , without exception , confirmed such proportion ; thon , when they . assert that its untruth if ) impossible , they really assert no inoro than when thoy assert that its negation in inconceivable . If , subsequently , it turn out that tho proposition in untrue ; and if it be , therefore , argued that men should not havo hold its untruth impossible because inconceivable , wo reply , that to say thin in to condemn the uno of tho word impossible altogether . If tho inconceivability of a thing bo eonsidored insufficient warrant for asserting its impossibility , it is implied that thoro ean exist a . sufneiont warrant ; but such warrant , whatever its kind , must bo originally derived from experience ; and if further experience may invalidate * ho warrant of inconcoivablonons , further experience may invalidate anywarrant O 1 » which we assort impossibility . Therefore , we should call nothing impossible . " In favour of this t ; ont it in urged : —

    " What is tho object of any ouch test ? To iriHure a corronpondonoo between "ubjeotivo beliufH and objective facts . Woll , objoetivo facts aro over impressing t'unniHolvoH upon uh ; our experience in a register of thoso objective facts ; and the "iconceivablone . HH of ; i tiling implies that it is wholly at variance with tho register . w -15 v « h wero thin all , it is not dear how , if ovory truth is primarily inductive , ai better tost of truth eould oxint . But it inuwt bo remembered , that whilst '" any of these facts , impressing thomsolvos upon us are- occasional ; whilst others a K « 'un aro very general ; Home are universal and unchanging . These universal JH »< 1 unchanging facia are , by tho hypothotuM , curtain to establish beliefs , of which

    the negations are inconceivable ; whilst the others are not certain to do this ; and if they do , subsequent facts will reverse their action . " _ It seems to us that the obscurity of this question may be somewhat enlightened if we present it under another aspect , and in lieu of considering objects as matters of Belief consider them as matters of Experience . Belief is experience ; experience of a sensation is belief in a sensation ; to have a sensation and to believe it , are not two processes but one . It is clear , therefore , that the invar tab leness ofour experience is anotherphrase for the invariableness of our belief ; and the so-called " Necessary Truths " rest on a basis as wide , but no wider , than that on which particular truths rest . When we say , " This apple is sweet , " we say our experience of this apple is that it is sweet : when we say , " Two parallel lines can . never meet , " we say our experience of two lines in parallel is that that

    cannot meet without ceasing to be parallel . That " fire burns , " and that " the whole is greater than a part , " are two beliefs—two forms of our experience . Now , . as we only know through our experience , and cannot transcend our experience , the distinction between invariable and variable truths is the distinction between invariable and variable experiences . We do not believe all apples to be sweet , because our experience of apples is that some are not sweet , but the child who had never tasted apples other than sweet would believe as firmly in the essential sweetness of apples asiathe truth of a whole being greater than its part . Thus it is with Pain—or any other sensation . We cannot disbelieve in its existence so long as it exists ; no effort of the mind to conceive its negation will negative it ; we believe—ire experience it . In like manner the ever present reality of objects cannot be disbelieved ; we cannot doubfc the pain while it lads ' , and the sensation of an external world is always lasting . From this we return to our author- ' : —

    " Dismissing , however , all psychological explanations , which are allowable here only as being needed to meet a psychological objection , and returning to the purely ^ abstract view of the matter , we see- —first , that belief is fundamental , and that the invariable existence of a belief is our highest warrant for it ; second , that we can ascertain the invariable existence of a belief only as we ascertain the invariable existence of anything else , by observing whether , under any circumstances , it is absent from the place in which it occurs ; third , that the effort to conceive the negation of a belief is , the looking-in the place in which it occurs ( viz ., after its antecedents ) , and observing whether there are any occasions on which it is absent , or can be made absent ; and fourth , that when we fail to find such

    occasions- —when we perceive that the negation of the belief is inconceivable—wehave all possible warrant for asserting the invariability of its existence ; and in asserting this , we express alike our logical justification of it , and the inexorable necessity we axe under of holding it . Mean what we may by the word truth , we have no choice but to hold that a belief which is proved by the inconccivahlcness of its negation , to invariably exist , is t-nie . We have seen that this is the assumption on which every conclusion whatever ultimately rests . We have no other guarantee for the reality of consciousness , of sensations , of personal existence ; we have no other guarantee for any axiom ; we have no other guarantee for any step in a demonstration . Hence , as being taken for granted in every act of the understanding , it must be regarded as the Universal Postulate . "

    He ' anticipates an objection : Beliefs which once were shown by the inconceivableness of their negation to invariably exist , have since been proved untrue ; and our present beliefs may one day share the same fate . Our answer i . s—the beliefs were true ; they represented the experience of mankind , which was the only tost applicable , and they had the only truth possible , viz . relative truth . But having given this answer , let us now give our author ' s : —• " There is , doubtless , force in this argument , though not bo much as at first appears . As we hinted when commenting on his position , the evidence cited by Mr . Mill , to show that inconceivable things may yet be true , is not strictly applicable evidence . There is a wide difference in nature between the cases in which the test has been found fallacious , and those in whicli we may regard it as trustworthy

    —a difference arising from the relative complexities of tho conceptions involved . When , on receiving a sensation , tho subject of it finding himself unable to concoivo that he in not receiving it , asserts that he is receiving it , it is clear that he deals only with one state of consciousness , of which he simply recognises the continued existence . On the other hand , those Greek philosophers referred to bj Mr . Mill , who ' could not credit the existence of antipodes , ' who ' were unable to conceive , in opposition to old association , the force of gravity acting upwards instead of downwards , ' and who , therefore , denied that there could be men on tho other side of the earth—were dealing with many states of consciousness , and with the connexions

    between them . Tlusro entered into their proposition the concepts , Earth , man , distance , position , force , and the various relationn of these to each other . Evidently , then , theso cases differ so widely , that what may bo a , legitimate test in the first , may bo an illegitimate one in the second . We must distinguish between those appeals to tho Universal Poatulato in which the action of thought is decomposable , and those in winch it is ntitlecomposabte . in proportion a » the number of concepts which a proposition involves is groat , and the mental transiLions from concept to concept are numerous , the fallibility of tho tost will increase , and will do this because the formation of the belief it separable into many steps , each of which involves the podulalc .

    " And bore , indeod , wo g « t hold of the clue which leads us out of this logical mam Let it bo granted , that : i belief whioh invariahly exists , though tho inont certain possible to us , in yefc not necessarily true ? . Let it bo granted , that either from insufficient oxporienco , or from non-a ^ recmcnt between the Hubjective and the objective , the inconceivable and the impossible may not correspond even within our mental rango . Let it be granted , that for the validity even of a single undoooinjiOHablo act of thought , the Universal Postulate is an imperfect ' warrant . Let all this , we say , be granted . Still , be the test fallible or not , the probability of error in any inference will increase in proportion to tho liiiinlier of tinioM tho truth

    of the test has been assumed in arriving at . it . . If the postulate be uniformly valid , it must yet happen , that as we aro liable to mental ' / . trji . iii . t , we shall occasionally think wo have its warrant when wo have not , ; ami in each ease tho chances of our having done tluY ; will vary directly as the number of times wo havo claimed its warrant , if tho postulate bo not uniformly valid , thon a further source of error in introduced , the effects of wliieh vary in tho name ratio . Honoo , on either supposition , it follows that that niuiit be the niofifc certain conclusion at which , fitartin / r from the postulate itself , wo arrive by tho fewost asauniptions of the postulate . "

    Tho reader will perhaps havo hooii wliero wo Hoparato from our author ; apparently on a small point , I > ut on n point wliieh grows larger and ltvrgor as Iho argument procoeda in itt » application to Idealism

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Nov. 26, 1853, page 19, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_26111853/page/19/