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' ';-'- a ;" '" " CASH AND C6RN. 'Mb 'th...
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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Drifting. The Nation Is Perplexed. It Ha...
Bwfeed ; unless peace be concluded before the spring 6 $ 1856 j we foresee no contingencies that cax £ save the ^ Russian frontier on the l ^ ath ; firoto ia combined attack . The successful bombardment of Odessa , perhaps , would be a sine qu & non to the consummaiaoll of such an enterprise ; but it must be xeinembered that we are considering the idea from a political and nbfc a military point of be
fiew . Given , however , that a campaign - yond the Danube resulted in signal triumphs on the part of the Allies , how far could they impenetrate the Russian Empire without attenuating their line , and how far could they provide for the exigencies of an inland war ? Similar criticisms apply to the proposed Baltic campaign . "With the experience of Sevastopol in view , it would be rash to pronounce against the possibility of reaching from Bi
St . Petersburg . But a campaign ga southwards is the ideal of the revolutionary party throughout Europe—especially of those whp i dentify the cause of all the fettered iat ^ ons with the cause of the Poles . English military men believe , as far as we can learn , that half a million soldiers would be required to undertake this enterprise with ^ ny chja ^ i ce of success . On the other hand , ¦ the Poles , who ought to know Poland , maintain that a moderate force only is required as the nucleus of an insurrection , which would isolate the Bussian fortresses . It
would certainly be desirable to increase our fcttowledge of the military situation of Poland ; but if it be true that every fortress wijiiin . its borders has all the appurtenances o £ ^ a Ciiadel iland is provisioned for eight years , any ^ Minister is justified in declining to risk the perils of invading a territory encased in mail . Yet , with ,. all these considerations in view , some . course must be adopted , and , after , the Prirqea , all courses seem equally dangerous . " Vfie are in this perplexity " ,- —that we desire to iajure the , ftead ^ of despotism without touchina . tlxe .. limbs . The British „ Government , er or not it acts in
5 jif ^ et ! h perfedpharmony mi } t that of France , seeks to reconcile the violence of warfare with the reserve of diplomacy . % t was diverted from a Danubian campaign by sentiments of delicacy towards Austria . It relaxes the principle of a naval blockade out of deference to Prussia . It sacrifices important alliances with the Northern Powers , because it will not be pledged to enforce restitution of . their territories seized in fornier wars by Bussia . Thus have our perplexities arisen . "We assail the chief of the despots ; but in all directions lesser tyrannies interpose , so that wherever a distinct object could be attained , some neutral " interest" prevents
our attaining it . i , Tlie winter comes to give to all engaged i \ me for , negotiation . Austria , still expectant , adheres to her version of the Four Points , and , once more offers them to . Germany . JPjcusaia , resq ^ yed to counteract Austria , b a ffles ijtfeiae , ' ,. '; pa $ ifift . monceuyres , and the Central Piet remains faithful to the policy of Prussia , Russia herself , whiqh seemB at present to be in +. n « Vinnrlia t \ f +. Ti « -ixrn-i * V » n . i > +. ir f : TiiWttra r » nf . T » o
^ uj ^ sj ^ on . of a . co mpromise ., At t | nV stage of , affairs , the . Allied governments , seem . absolufejy ,- ^ fflifipft ., jjjpo ^ y . ! tt will be time ' to . upge th , ^ p ^ psopp ^ n cjf the , war , in anew flire ' ctiQm . , wfoeja a , ^ eiBiye , ^ ssuq has beeji reached i ^ , ; tihe' primeuj' b , i } i the naijipni ' —or pfyfy tliinking P , art of it ^ pugh ^ t . tO j Uiatjure a i ^ Qheme pf / pqljcx ehou ^ t tb , ^ nex , t seaj ^ n arrive qnd / jifind , us still at war , and . still driftnig . ; ;
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' '; - ' - a ; " '" " CASH AND C 6 RN . 'Mb ' the'' ^ htump ' advances , it does seem pr 6-raftl ^ ftli ^ ibne people of this c ' oiiritry will be PPe * for'want of cash , while they will warit MS &^' iimBfcnfc ttecause bread will be dear .
These few words , notrthe pleasantest for us to writer ' predict for us increased " dulness " in the retail trade . The people of this country , therefore , especially in the middle class , will find business dull , incomings slow , and outgoings increased . Each man will contract his , dealings , and his neighbour will suffer the more . The working classes will , perhaps , not suffer in proportion ; but their trouble will
be worse in fact . The " great commerce , " as they call it in France , will ' still * probably proceed , for reasons which we shall show as we advance , and therefore considerable numbers of the working classes will not be proportionately curtailed in their wages . They will not lose in income proportionately with the middle classes ; but they will have to pay dearer for bread , out of income originally
narrower . It is not out of any internal difficulty that we are threatened with this prospect for the winter . The harvest is now completed , or nearly so , and the most probable accounts of it justify our anticipations , that it will be comparatively little short of the crop of 1854 . There was an early ripening season , a dull sky in the midst of the ripening , but splendid harvest Weather towards the close . " Weight
for weight the crop is not at all equal to that of 1854 , but the grain is mostly in admirable condition ; every kernel ¦ will tell , and the old wheat will not be required to mix up with the new until the wet weather has set in . This is the report of the Agricultural Gazette We have no need of higher prices at home , therefore ; for even if the crop be deficient , the immense surplus of America would cover it over and over again , and prevent us from
knowing the difference ; The trading difficulty dn prospect is not brought on by ^ the war taxes , although the war-has much to do with J . t . We pay to Government nearly double what we did last year , or have undertaken to do so ; but Government spends much of that at home ; and after all , heavy as the impost is , a doubling of taxes does not touch , incomes in the humbler class like a doubling of bread . There is no sign that our productive trade will fall off ; the very demands of the war have stimulated manufactures . Prance is opening her exclusive system to admit corn , and iron , and coal , and many other things , free . America , which will send us considerable amounts of
produce , will take our manufactures in return . The prospects of oux manufacturing districts are , therefore , far from being bad ; and this is why' the " great commerce" is likely to continue its operations , even when the little commerce is contracted . Amongst other indexes of rising price , we have a tabular statement of the prices at which the Guardians of the Poor of Xieeds
contracted for the supply of the workhouse during the month of September in each of the lust eleven years . We find that the best flour declined from 47 s . 6 d . in 1845 , to 26 s . 6 d . in 1851 , and it rose to 55 s . in 1855 . Beef declined from 5 s . lOd . per stone of fourteen pounds to 4 s . 7 d ., and lias riaen to 6 s . lid . In mutton the corresponding figures were 6 s . 5 d . to 5 s . 9 d . and 8 s . Now , we might well expect these latter levels to be the highest point , and followed by a decline , if we looked to ourselves alone—but France confesses to a deficiency of two million quarters 6 f wheat , and stocks are low in moat of'the continental markets . It is true that ,
as in Belgium and Germany , the actual harvest has not been yet ascertained , and thiifc there is that disposition 1 to' profit by rising prices Vvhich lias'kept back supplies , and' dtill keepg th'dni back , to the latest moment . We must , however , reckon that there will be moro than" our own deficiency to make up outoftlje American surplus .
Still there is a steady enhancement of price , a constant drain ' of cash ; and an evident " sensitiveness" of credit . Men feel this personally , in the pressure exercised by those to whom they owe money , while they have a difficulty in getting their own cash in ^ If we look to the Bank of England , we find that its bullion declined from 14 , 916 , 7702 . in the Week ending the 1 st of September to 14 , 368 , 0102 . in the following week ; and to
13 , 368 , 0052 . last week . It is tor this reason that the Bank has raised its discount in two successive weeks to four per cent ., and to four and a half per cent ., and follows this week , first by raising its advances on Government securities to the highest of those rates , and then by raising the general discount to five per cent . . There has been the same process in the Bank of France—a constant drain of bullion ; and that Bank has raised its discount to five per cent .
Where does the cash go to ? This is the important question for us . There is some drain somewhere , some leakage , and perhaps more than one . Financiers have accounted for the drain by the ordinary operations of trade , the demands of the war , and the holding back of Californian and Australian supplies . The Australian supplies , however , have been pretty nearly of the amount to be expected ; and even if they had not been received , under ordinary circumstances the requirements of active trade in this country would have sufficed to maintain the price of gold , and to keep it amongst us . If it is carried
off , it must be because it is more in demand elsewhere ; and so it is . England is not the only country needing money . On the contrary , all the great continental countries are wanting it , and what is more , they are bidding for it . Prussia and Saxony are borrowing countries ; Russia is trying to raise a second loan before the first loan is entirely taken up , and as she is assisted by some of the German Governments , it is probable that she will get her money by her usurious terms . The liabilities that she will incur may be ruinous , the burdens that she drags upon herself may crush her ; but meanwhile she does abstract cash from a
market which ia not divided from the moneymarket of England . It follows that the more extravagant Bussia is , the more obstinate , and the more she is permitted to protract her reckless expenditure in a wicked war , the more she will drain money from the market whence we draw our supplies ; and the more the English people will be pinched in the purse . That is a war tax which we must continue to pay , until the contest be brought to a conclusion . It is one that is much facilitated in the levying by the treacherous neutrality which has been permitted through the diplomatic character of
the contest . There is , perhaps , a still larger and more direct drain in the economical state of France . Notwithstanding the pressure of the war and the necessity for feeding great armies and fleets , the Emperob also holds his throne upon the condition of feeding the French people . The Moniteur has confessed that he cannot do so either by buying up the bread or fixing an artificial price in the market , as he has done before . The want is
too vast for the resources of the Imperial Exchequer ; he proposes , however , to meet the wants of the French people not by keeping bread low , but by letting prices remaui high , in order to draw that surplus from abroad which can only bo brought by ordinary attractions . In the meanwhile , ho promisee to send it about the country flt a cheaper rate , by < railway , and to supply thb people with the means of purchase by paying them wages for works > or causing them to bo
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Sept. 29, 1855, page 12, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_29091855/page/12/
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