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No. 275, June 30, 1855.] THE LEADEE. * 6...
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THE GERMAN LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RUSSIAN Q...
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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How To Organise An Army . The Following ...
that if his career be not cut short , he will attack you—he will attack you seriously . It will not be to burn London , but to dictate a peace there . u The Egyptian expedition , " continued M . Th s , was the rashest attempt that history records ; rasher even than Moscow . It contained the germ of Napoleon's subsequent life . It showed his marvellous powers of combination and execution , and the wildness with which his imagination led him to despise moral and p hysical obstacles . No one would compare the political and military ability of Turenne with that of Napoleon ; but I have often thought that if we had had the former in 1796 instead of the latter , we should have preserved the Rhine and the Alps . We should have been the first Power in Europe instead of one of the five Powers .
" Now we have no one to form an army except those who are in exile . Vaillant is good in his own line , but not as a general or an administrator-We have , indeed , the largest materiel in Europe . I myself had 3500 cannon cast ; and as I knew that in our next war we should have to rouse the people of Itaty and Germany against their sovereigns , I provided for them , as well as for ourselves . But while this man retains his power our personnel will be inferior . " C . W .
No. 275, June 30, 1855.] The Leadee. * 6...
No . 275 , June 30 , 1855 . ] THE LEADEE . * 625
The German Liberal View Of The Russian Q...
THE GERMAN LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RUSSIAN QUESTION . ( From a Berlin Correspondent . ") Since the breaking up of the Vienna Conferences , public attention has once more concentrated itself upon the events of war alone . " While the total failure of those conferences produced a general disgust for diplomatic transactions of every kind , the revived activity in the camp before Sebastopol , the progress , howsoever slow , of that siege , and the news of the Kertch expedition , could not fail to revive the
interest every liberal heart takes m the present crisis . At the same time a new and equally great arena of war has been opened in the Baltic Sea , where the allied fleets again are threatening the northern coasts of the enemy . It is quite natural , therefore , that towards this gigantic theatre every eye should be turned , that public expectation should cling to the sails of your ships , and to the folds of your soldiers' tents , and that from . Sebastopol especially we should be induced to hope for the solution of the great European Question .
But , while rejoicing in the revived energy of your warlike preparations , we must beware not to anticipate too great a result , and while looking with pride on this year ' s expedition , we must be careful not to be blinded by the brilliant prospects it offers . The solution of the great European Question does not lie in Sebastopol ; only the solution of momentary difficulties lies there , nothing more . As far as your military honour—yours and that of France—is concerned , so far , but so far only , the result to be expected from Sebastopol is a decisive one , but the destruction of the Russian fleet , the de facto annihilation
of the Russian preponderance in the Black Sea , will not settle the question of that preponderance dejure , in any way satisfactory to the claims of the Western Powers , to the future tranquillity of Turkey , and to the interests of Europe . Those who hope that the taking of Sebastopol will be sufficient to secure such a lasting political result , undervalue far too much the pertinacity of Russian policy , and have too soon forgotten the answer Prince Gortchakoff gave to Lord John Russell—and , no doubt , it was one of the few true words he said at Vienna—that before submitting to any limitation of her rights of sovereignty , Russia must undergo a succession of heavy defeats .
Now , important as the military point of view must bo to the people of England and France , still it needs not to be proved that it is far from bein g the highest one , far from being the point of view we must take , if we would do justice to the present emergency . For such has been the nature of thia Eastern Question , that by degrees the depth of its importance has disclosed itself even to the most short-sighted eye , that from seeming at first the more trifling question of a pawnbroker ' s pledge , it now manifests itself as the greatest question put to the statesmen of Europe since the davs of Napoleon I . —that , in a word , it has
shown itself to be nothing less than the reverse ot that enormous strugg le in the beginning of tins century , with inverted names , and , unfortunately , with lessoned wisdom and energy on the side of the defenders of Europe . Of this European meaning ot the Eastern Question even Lord Pulmerston has lately seemed to catch a glimpse , and sinco he , never over discerning in anything concerning Russia , has been compelled to confess that a t present the whole political position of England and Franco is at stake , we may without further notice pass over those Gladstonea and their like , who wasto their timo and tho keennesp of their wit in splitting differences between a defensive and . offensive war , and may take it tor granted that that European point of view is tho right
one , which the instinctive judgment of popular feeling has taken long before our statesmen thought of admitting and adopting it . From this European point of view we deny , as I said before , that the solution of the Eastern Question lies in Sebastopol . Where , then , does it lie ? Exactly where it lay in the contest of Europe against French preponderance : the solution rests with Germany . The conquest of Sebastopol may be as glorious a success as your battles of the Nile and Trafalgar were in their turn , but it will be as little decisive against Russia as Nelson ' s victories were against Napoleon . The Russian Waterloo still remains to be fought ; it must be fought on the Russian-German frontier .
Russia is a continental power ; the attacks against her have the sea for their basis , and it cannot be denied that even with the best success , both in the Baltic and in the Black Sea , you will not be able to cleave asunder her vital nerve . Besides , those two attacks can never be combined , as between your two bases there is a distance of about 1500 miles . This line of distance is the Russian-German frontier ; it is , therefore , protected against any attack by land by Prussia and Austria when neutral or allied to Russia , and open to their attacks when hostile to her . Russia has never to fear any decisive military defeat , as long as she is not defeated on this side , and , for the same reason , the political contest of Western and
Russian preponderance will never be brought to an end , as long as the Western Powers have not succeeded in striking the enemy at this vital point . Of this circumstance the contending powers on both sides have been well aware ; Russia lias put into full play all her influence to secure either the alliance or the neutrality of the German States , and the very fact that , on the other side , England and France have allowed Austria to play them her tricks for so long a time , proves—so to say — officially that vie are not now claiming a greater importance for the military and political position of Germany than the Governments of England and France themselves have done for some time past . But Russia won the
diplomatic game in Germany completely . Very soon , that is , nearly a year ago , you gave up every hope as to the smaller kingdoms , as well as to Prussia- In Austria alone you set all your confidence . But there , also , has a change lately taken place . Austria has dropped her mask ; your " faithful ally " turns out to be as false as those who knew her prophesied from the beginning . Her friends in your country—and very numerous indeed they are ^ -and of high standing , too—are disappointed and vexed , and , in order to liide the defeat of their unfounded confidence , they all of a sudden tell us that you don ' t want Austria , that you can do as well without Germany , that you had better " put her aside . " Why ? If you stood in want of Austria , while you still undervalued the difficulties of a war with Russia , do you not want her now , when you have become aware of
those difficulties in rather an unexpected manner , and feel , by your deep scars , how heavy are the blows she is able to deal ? And even if you make the most of your success in the Crimea , are you masters of the war to such a degree as to " put aside" the greatest military powers on . the Continent ? Put aside Germany , indeed ! Put aside a country that is the very barrier and shield of your enemy ' s territory ; take no notice in your political combinations of governments of first rank ; leave out of your military calculations a group of states which command a million of well-disciplined , highly-finished soldiers ! It is as easily said as -any folly-erer was , and , if acted upon , it would be as heavily punished too . The increasing dimensions of the -war and , at the same time , of your demands on Russia , point rather to the contrary policy . In that " saying old and
true , " If that you will France win , Then with Scotland first begin , the names only need be altered , and it is as true now as it was of yore . The question then arises , have you already tried the right means for securing this necessary alliance of Germany , or are they still to be tried ? In other words , is it without your fault that you miss tho cooperation of Germany ; and , if not , can these faults bo amended ? It is a remarkablo fact that to this point no serious attention , worthy of its importance , has yet been given , and that , while into the management of the war in the East , where , after all , you can
boast of some success , the strictest inquiry has been made , nobody has inquired into tho management of your diplomatic campaign in Germany , where , after all , you arc most completely defeated . And yet , for such an inquiry there was room enough here quite as well as there , and hero not less than there an astonishing amount of mismanagement would have be en brought to light . To 1 ) 0 just , you must admit that on your side the diplomatic battlo was half lost wheu only begun . Since 1818 your polioy towards Germany had as much been against your own interest as that of Russia was prudent and well calculated . Tho natural allies in Germany , of llussia , are absolutism and aristocracy ; towards Russia as their natural protector look all those potty
princes who delight in despotism , on how small a scale whatever—all those ministers , as Manteuffel , Hassenpflug , Beust , Pfordten , whose ambition it is to be the wilful instruments for breaking down constitutions and liberties—all the members of that feudal party , who know of no fatherland than their estates , and of no rights than their egotistical privileges . Your allies , on the other hand , are constitutionalism and liberalism ; towards the alliance with you lean in Germany all members of the popular , liberal , national , and free-trade party . When , in 1848 , a fierce contest between those two opposite principles broke out , Russia , on her part , assisted as much the powers friendly to her as you neglected
those to support which ought to have been your duty One question there was in that struggle which brought the national movement of Germany into direct contact with the foreign policy of the European Powers . It was the Danish or Schleswig-Holstein question . With regard to it , the policy of England has been a long succession of the grossest blunders . England acted throughout as the champion of Russia . Her interest was to support the Danes . England did so likewise- England helped her , as best she could , to put down the opposition of the German Duchies against Danish oppression . England helped her to get by the London treaty of May , 1852 , the acknowledgment of her eventual hereditary right to the Danish crown ,
and thus brought to a temporary conclusion , moat favourable to Russia , a question of whose European importance few at that time had an idea , and ¦ which , perhaps , now at last , in the middle and under the influence of the present crisis , some few people perceive to have been nothing less than the first act of that great drama , of whose bloody catastrophe you now are witnesses and partners . The same policy was pursued by llussia in the interior affairs of Germany . While England remained stranger to the defeats German liberalism underwent since 1849 , Russia , with most eager attention , watched the
proceedings of German politics , and took a large share in the progress of her allies , the reactionary party ; every triumph of absolutism in Germany was a triumph of Russian influence , and thus , by means of an indefatigable and highly circumspect policy , Russia had succeeded , at the time when the present crisis broke out , in securing in every German court and government her ascendancy over the dipiouiacy of England . But , unfavourable as the state of things in Germany appeared , still England was by no means destitute of resources by which she might have brought Germany over to her side . I need not here enter into the intricate details of the constitution of
the German Confederation , nor pass in review all the little states of which unhappy Germany is composed ; it is sufficient to speak of Austria and Prussia ; for , although the other German states retain the forms of sovereignty and independence , still the decision of every great question rests entirely with Austria and Prussia ; and , in case of war , the other states have no choice but to follow the two great powers . For either of them there were , a year ago , many circumstances which , notwithstanding the mighty influence of Russia , might have given to the turn in favour
diplomatic game a decisive your . Austria felt the necessity of getting out of the dependence she stood in towards Russia since the suppression of the Hungarian revolution ; her traditional policy , moreover , has always put her in opposition , to Russia in every question concerning the Lower Danube ; the invasion by the Russians of the Principalities threatened totally to destroy the Austrian influence in those parts , and an insurrection in Servia in favour of Russia might have become as fatal to Austriji herself as to Turkey . Prussia did not take such a direct interest in the Eastern Question ; noitlier
the fantastical king nor his court have that feeling for the interest of their country which is felt so keenly by the Austrian statesmen ; but in Prussia the hoir of tho crown , the king ' s brother , and all Ins followers , men of high standing and in high office , were m favour of the Western Alliance ; the whole liberal party in that country most strongly hoped and worked for it , because it would have effected the complete ruin of the anti-constitutional Russian party . And , indeed , Austria as well as Prussia joined tho Western Powers . Most eagerly did tho young Emperor of Austria catch tho opportunity to prove himself master in his own house ; and so strongly were the injustice and danger of the proceedings otRuss a that the king and his court were
feU in Prussia obLed to comply with public opinion Austria and Kil signed the Vienna protocols , where , in words at east , the policy of Russia was so severely condeinncd Russia was utterly disappointed . 'Hie Western influence was on tho best way to gainnnun-. iLmited ascendancy . Then was tho moment to bind K £ German Powers to the ™ » l ™ * f «^ words , and to the condemning by deeds of tho policy c 7 l ussia . But that moment unfcrtunatcg ¦ was lost ; and from that timo date blunders and defeats , iwo means there were by which Knglancl and France IStalVt have put tho German Power * into active co-Sation against ltussia . Theeo means were hope aid fear You might have cither ind , uce 4 them by
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), June 30, 1855, page 13, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_30061855/page/13/
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