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    ~ 0gO ^ T H E I>E APES. [Saturday ,

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    Russian Conquest Op Finland. Narrative Q...

    rides not by political institutions , but by bayonets ; and as to the other conterminous states of Russia , they are all bound up -with the fate of Turkey , waiting their turn to be devoured bit by bit . ijf this be so , hovrutterly vain and foolish is this new-fesbioned doctrine of consideration for your enemy—an enemy that i & sapping towards Germany—Iyino- in -wait for Denmark , cutting off Sweden in detail—the open , the jevtrwedfoe of Turkey , and hot less of Persia—the only power capable , if any foe capable , of carrying the double-headed eagle to the left bank of the Indus , and at least to the left bank of the " Rhine—the only power , in short , that threatens to brinsr Europe under dominion , and to take Asia Minor as an appanage—why tenderness , consideration , for her ? If this war be a just -war , let us mete out full measure to the culprit ; since we have caught him in the lap of conquest , let us clip his locks and bind him whensoever and ¦ wheresoever we find him ; take material guarantees as lie took Finland ; . ami not make peace until we have in hand the actual stipulations we

    re-- . . The conquest of Finland was one of the results of the treaty of Tilsit . It -was covenanted on the fatal raft that Alexander should take Finland and France the Danish fleet . Europe , with the exception of England , was at the feet of Napoleon , and wherever he could march legions there he dictated terms of peace . As Napoleon dealt with the powers of Germany , so Alexander dealt with the Scandinavian kings—he looked upon them as superior vassals ; and further , as Alexander seized Finland , and Europe let her go by default , Gustavus , like Ahdul Medjid , resisting all he could , so , Irad the Western Powers permitted , Nicholas would have taken the PrinciaaU ' ties ,. and—kept tbexn . lHaving obtained leave from the master of those days , the Emperor of Russia was not long in finding a pretext—the ostensible ground of quarrel is of no consequence ; and early in 1808 Count Bouxhoevden was ordered to seize Finland as a material guarantee that Sweden would obey the behests of Alexander ; but he was also ordered , as we have said , to keep the

    ^ guarantee . Spreading alarming reports of tire magnitude of the army of invasion , reporta that went before the columns and prepared the way for success , Count £ ou _ hoevden assembled his troops in the river Kymen , while the ice yet cowered the waters of the Gulf of Finland and the rivers and lakes of the jTOimtry . The light infantry were provided with- snow shoes , and the artillery * vere mounted on sledges . Two days before crossing tbe Kymen , Count Boaihoevden prepared a proclamation to the inhabitants and the arm y of Fin-latfd , In which we ftnd England described as " the enemy of tranquillity -and peace , " and the King of Sweden denounced to his own subjects as the ally of that enemy ; for which reason , the Fins are informed the Emperor Alexander thinks it necessary to take their country under his protection , save it from the horrors of war , and obtain due satisfaction , unless Sweden

    should abandon England , and accept the alliance cf France and Russia . ¦ " We do not come as enemies , '' said the sentimental invader , " but as your friends and protectorsT to render you more prosperous and haj > pyy and to avert from you the calamities which , if . war should become indispensable , must ajeoessaxily befaL you . " Why , no power but Russia could invade Finland , ^ nd therefore no power but Russia inflict on her people the calamities of war . / Save « 8 ; from our friends- The spectacle of Russia protecting the people of IRialand from Russia , and taking credit for her magnanimity , is sublime in its way . In like manner the people are informed that their laws and customs shall not be altered ; that their institutions shall remain unchanged ; that everything consumed by the Russian soldiers shall be paid for , and the indigent

    . supplied from the Russian magazines . Upon such pretexts the Russians creased the Kymen on the 20 th February , 1808 . Count Bouxhoevden , at first , proposed to enter Swedish territory without opposition , and in the -character of guardian , of her safety ; but the Swedish outposts fired on his # ag of truce—the first shot in the war . Lulled by a false security , the Swedish army was still in cantonments , the frontier simply guarded by a chain of weak posts , and nowhere that preparation for resistance which can ^ tone . spring from a knowledge of the extent of the danger incurred . The King of Sweden did not believe in a war of conquest in Finland—and from tbe Conservative Emperor of Russia too!—hence the rapid success of the policy of surprise .

    On the 20 th of February Count Bouxhoevden was at Aberfors ; on the $ 6 tb , fighting once or twice , but mainly proceeding by turning the strong poeition » 4 > f the Swedes on the ice , he hud reached Borgo , one of the most . ancient towns in Finland ; -while Prince Bag-ration , acting further inland , was already close upon Tavaetheus , one of the great strategic positions of the country ; the point of junction for many roads . Bouxhoevden pressed onward , and by a rapid movement placed himself between Tavastheus and Helsingfora , seized the latter , surrounded Sweahorg , and still speeding onwards , was actually in possession of Tavastheus on the 6 th of Marchfourteen days after he began the campaign—and the Swedes had been driven backward along their whole line of defence . Why had the Russian general gained this unlooked-for result ? Because he had taken lus foe by surprise ; ^ because he had created the impression that he commanded troops in over-Vrhelnviner numbers : and because the kinsr interfered in the war . The Vrhelnving numbers , * and because the king interfered in the war . The

    • orders oi Gustavus were that Count Klingsporr , his general , should retire before the enemy , and not endanger the safety of Finland by risking a battle . This- was all that the Russian could have wished , and to this may undoubtedly be traced . his success . For if at first ho was in superior numbers , he was soon Actually inferior At tbe point of contact , and had Klingsporr stood and fought at Tavastheus ^ he might have regained communication wifth iSwoaborg , recovered the great coast road to St . Petersburg , possibly have compelled the invader to retire from the oountry . But Klingsporr fo « ght under the aliadow of rigid instructions , framed in ignorance of the real state of affairs , and of a council of war . Defeat became inevitable . Tajamerforsy on Which he had at first retreated , was untenable , as a position ; jmd he soon abandoned the south altogether , and took post in the north , butting not until ho had- passed Brahesttidt , followed rapidly by the Russian « oiumns . Here be turned upon his foe , fought and ¥ < m the battle of Revoiax , ' and inflicted severe losses ; but the Russians by thiu time were in

    possession of every place of importance in the south of Finland , and had already begun the siege of Sweaborg . It -was upon this siege that so much depended , and as the whole operation was most remarkable in itself the reader may like to . read a Russian account of it . This fortress is built upon five islands , or rather rocks , in the Gulf of Finland . Three of these islands , Wester-Swarti ) , JLilla-Oster-Swarto , and Stora-Oster-Swartii are situated in sight of the city of Helsingfors , and even within long range of cannonshot . On that side they mask the island of Wargon , which is considered as the citadel of the place ; Langorn is a detached fortress upon a sixth island , nearer the coast than the others ; and Gustavswiird , at the opposite extremity , has a ci tadel which sweeps the channel from a triple row of batteries .

    All these islands are bristling with cannon , and the works are principall y constructed of granite , and for the most part as massive as the foundation on which they are built . It would serve no purpose to describe all these constructions , many of which have been raised without aay definite plan , and are whimsical , defective , and useless ; but which , as a whole , render the fortification a work of the first order . The sea by -which it is surrounded serves instead of a ditch , and where in some p laces artificial ditches have been necessary , they are cut in the rock . Wargon is almost entirely bomb-proof . Basins and spacious docks were constructed by Chappman and Tunherg , and these imperishable trophies of their genius surround the monument of the founder , Marshal Ehrenswardt , who lies buried in the fort of Wargon , Sweaborg has cost Sweden immense sums of money , and the construction of the fortifications occupied half a century . The defence of this place was entrusted to Admiral Count Cronstedt , a veteran officer of the Swedish navy . The garrison amounted to above 7000 men , partly Swedes , partly natives of Finland ; 721 among them were seamen . The numerical strength of the Russians employed on the siege varied greatl y , according as the demand for troops elsewhere -was more or less urgent .

    At first it was hardly a third as considerable as the garrison , but it was gradually augmented . In tlie beginning of March the besiegers bad eleven battalions , four squadrons , four field-batteries , two companies of pioneers , and one of artillerymen , without guns to serve the batteries . The heavy artillery was brought with extreme difficulty on sledges to Sweaborg from Russian Finland . It was successively posted on the Cape of llcl .-ingfors , the island of Skandetlandet , and the surrounding rocks , by General Suchtelen , who directed the engineer department . During the whole time hostilities were carried on against Sweaborg , the number of artillery never exceeded forty-six pieces o cannon , of -which sixteen were mortars .

    The blockade was gradually straitened , according as the augmentation of the Eussian force permitted them to draw it closer and closer round a fortress of that extent . The batteries could only be established by means of the most arduous labour ; the only possible means of constructing them was upon fascines and s-tufied gabions , which had but little weight or power of resistance , rendering it necessary tin- parapets should be of very considerable thickness . Earth and turf were alike wanting upon those barren rocks covered with deep snow ; and besides the difficulty of establishing approaches , and breaching batteries upon , the ice , the poverty of the Russian * in artillery , in ammunition , in workmen , in tools , and even in soldiers , rendered it pcrfectly impossible to attempt to conduct the attack upon Sweaborg according to the regular rules of a siege . The possibility of taking it by storm was at one time discussed , but at last the commands of the Emperor Alexander and the dictates of sound reason prevailed . The Emperor ' s orders were , gradually to make the blockade closer and closer , according as their augmented means might permit , to bombard the place , and not to venture an assault except as a last resource .

    The first shots were exchanged on the 23 rd of February ( Gth of March ) , the occasion being a Russian battery on a rock in the middle of the harbour and between , the fortress and the city of Helsingfors . A fire was opened by it upon some hundreds of labourers employed by the Swedish commandant to break up the ice before the points he considered the most accessible , and consequently the most exposed to danger . It was vigorously replied to , and the guns being pointed high , every shot told upon the houses in Helsingfors . The city was threatened with total destruction , and in order to avert it a flag of truce was despatched to Admiral Cronstedt , to represent to him the disasters to which he was exposing the inhabitants , most of whom had relations or friends among the garrison , and pointing out to him the danger it involved of reprisals on any Swedish cities that might be reached by the war . Cronstedt coldly replied that the destruction of llolsingfors was necessary for his ovvu defence ; however , after holding a consultation with his council , he changed his mind , and it was agreed on both sides not to construct uny works in that direction , and to consider that point as neutral ground .

    The Russians were therefore able to establish their magazines , their military hospitals , and their parks of artillery , at Ik'ldingforfl , with perfect snl ' ety . This city afforded the only shelter to be found in all that neighbourhood for the troops and tbe hond-quarters . I ( AH the surrounding" heights were gradually becoming crowned with the Russian artillery , and these batteries fired almost at random upon the mills , the magazines , the sailors * huta , and tho wooden buildings left exposed by the ramparts . Kirea broke out several times during the ten daya this cannonade continued . The number at projectiles thus thrown amounted to 1565 , and the fortress fired iu return 2177 shots . Various parleys took place on different occasions ) , in tho course of which tioncral Suchtelen thought he observed that the moral vigour of Home of the chiefs was hardly what might have been expected from tho material strength with which tbe fortress l

    was provided . His plans for accelerating the surrender of th « p lace were bawd » l )) n this hint ; ho considered that one means of bucccms would lie in keeping up 'i constant anxiety and alurin among the garrison , composed of good troops , but who wen ; lilUe accustomed to war , mid in fatiguing and hnruasing them by keeping them constantly on the alert . This syntcm was carried out : constant alarms were raised , tioinetiiues in tho daytimo , but much more often during tho night . Sometimes it was a party ot drums and riflemen ; sometimes one or even two field-batteries would take advantage of the Bholtor of the rocks to creep ulong tho ice , even within tho range of grape-shot . Ccdonol Argoum , of tho artillery , distinguished hiinsolf particularly in those expeditions , lie was a powitivo rew ' dlon to the garrison . Jio continually vanoil Im * stratagems , and the time and place where the attack would bo made never could W foreseen .

    A strong oflfeet was produced by these means . Tito Uuhmuui genuralw very soon becam © aware that Admiral Cronutedt , accustomed to look at everything with thu «)^ of rt seaman , folt unnecessary anxiety about 001110 points ho considered too much opposed , aa well au about some faults in tho construction of hi * works , and also that irexhumated the strength of hit * people by keeping them ineoaaantly at work wl . ° thoir bping allowed sufficient reat . Jin fact , he appeared to regard SweuboiK > u l » light of , a . skip in danger of being boarded . JJe peruuaded himself , and hi * opinion ww shared by many of hia oUiceru , that tho winter , by Humnuxling th < J fc » rtruMH " flold of solid ice , deprived it of ita principal atrongth , and that it would not bo soum from a , eaun da nmm .

    ~ 0go ^ T H E I>E Apes. [Saturday ,

    ~ 0 gO ^ T H E I > E APES . [ Saturday ,

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), June 30, 1855, page 18, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_30061855/page/18/