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    celestial events at any period whatever , made from a very small number of direct observations , our foresight h ere is quite limited in its range , and , when certainty is desired , scarcely ever admitting of our leaving present circumstances out of view . For similar reasons , the speculative superiority of physics over the rest of natural philosophy , is equally incontestable . It has also to be observed that the philosophical study of physics , regarded as a general means of intellectual education , ' possesses a special utility , not to be found elsewhere to the same extent ; it enables us completely to apprehend the fundamental art of experimenting , which we have seen is particularly adopted to

    physics . It is there that true philosophers , whatever the peculiar object of their habitual pursuits , must always go , to understand what constitutes the true experimental spirit , to learn the characteristic conditions requisite in experiments that are capable of showing unequivocally the actual laws of phenomena , and finally to form a just conception of the ingenious precautions by which we may prevent any interference with the results of a process of such delicacy . Every one of the fundamental sciences presents the essential characteristics of the positive method , which are necessarily manifested in them in a degree more or less decided ; but besjdes this ,

    each of them as naturally shows some philosophical indications belonging peculiarly to itself , as we have already remarked in the case of astronomy ; and it is always at their source that such conceptions of universal logic ought to be examined , under pain of forming an imperfect estimate of . them . It is to Mathematics alone that we are indebted for our knowledge of the elementary conditions of positivism : Astronomy characterises with precision the true study of nature ; Physics specially presents us with the theory of experiment ; it is from Chemistry that we must borrow the general art of Nomenclature ; and finally , the science of Organized Bodies can alone unfold to us the true theory of Classifications .

    Newton ' s assertion * Hypotheses non flngor—rl xaaike no hypothesis , has been incessantly repeated by men who fancy themselves Baconian thinkers when they restrict their incompetence to what they call " facts . " I need tell no reader of these papers th at such ideas of science are utterly irrational . Newton himself gives it no countenance . His own great discovery was an Hypothesis at first , and only became a Theory after verification . Kepler made nineteen hypotheses respecting the form of the plane ? tary orbits , and abandoned them one by one till he settled on the elliptical form , which , on verification , proved correct , and then was no longer an hypothesis . ~ '

    Every one who has made any original scientific researches , must have a vivid sense of the indispensable utility of Hypothesis as an artificial aid , accompanied by an equally vivid sense of the necessity of distinctly understanding its purpose and limits ; and to this end I emphatically urge the reader to study what Comte and John Stuart Mill { Logic , Book iii . ch . xiv . ) have written on the subject ; the more so , as Dr . Whewell in this , and indeed in so many other respects , betrays the essentially metaphysical condition of his mind . Mill ' s Logic the reader has , or ought to have , at hand . Comte teaches thus : —r-A law of nature can only be discovered by Induction or Deduction . Often , however , neither method is of itself sufficient

    without our previously making temporary suppositions regarding some of the very facts of which we are in search . This indispensable mode of proceeding has been most fruitful in its results , but from neglect of the condition on which it can be rightly used the progress pf true science has been much obstructed . This condition , but vaguely analyzed as yet , may be thus stated : —that we must never imagine any hypotheses which are not by nature susceptible of a positive verification sooner or later , and which shall have exactly that degree of precision ascertainable in the study of the corresponding phenomena . In other words , truly philosophical hypotheses must always present the character of simple anticipations of what experience and reasoning are capable of at once discovering if the circumstances of the

    problem were more favourable . But if we would pretend to attain , by means of an hypothesis , anything that is in its nature altogether inaccessible to observation and to reason , we should overlook the fundamental condition of all hypothesis , and our supposition , transcending the real sphere of science , would become misleading and dangerous . It would become dangerous because every positive thinker agrees that qur scientific enquiries arc restricted to the analysis of phenomena to discover their Laws , and in no sense to discover their Causes , essential or final . And how should a pure supposition , such as an Hypothesis , have a deeper plummet line to fathom the unfathomable ? Therefore every hypothesis which traverses the limit of positive science can only lead to interminable

    discussion , novcr to solid agreement . The different hypotheses still employed by natural philosophers are olewly distinguishable into two classes : the one , as yet smal l in extent , simply refer to the laws of the phenomena : the other , which plays a much more extended part , relate to the determination of the general agents supposed to produce the different kinds of phenomena . Now , according to the rule just laid down , the first class is alone admissible ; the second , essentially chimerical , ham an anti-scientific character , and can only obstruct the reid progress of physics . In astronomy , the firBt kind of hypothesis is alone employed j the use of the second was long ago exploded- We no longer suppose ) the existence of' chimerical fluids to explain the movement of-the heavenly bodies . Why , then , in physics use hypotheses without the requisite precautions , and imagine fluids and ethers , invisible , intangible ,

    imponderable , and inseparable from the substances tp ^ hiph they imptut their virtues / in order to explain the phenomena of heat , ligfrt , efectricuT magnetisnv ? The very fact that ; the existence of these pre ^ eijded fluids S * froin their nature , incapable of negatu > n or animation , shows that they are beyond thereach of positivecontroL ^ ou might , as well admit the existence of the elementary s pirits of Paracelsus ^ of angels > and of genii ! The assumption of these entities in science , so far from helping to explain phenomena , has the very reverse effect ) it increases the nuintter of things requiring explanation , Fqr whence come the properties of these fluids ? On

    what do they depend ? It is evident that they demand emanation as much as the phenomena they are introduced to expjaiii ; they are the tortoise-back upon which the vvorld is supposed to rest . Newton could not conceive attraction otherwise than through the agency of an ether No one believes in that attracting medium now ; yet men of sciepce , especially in England , will be lip in arms at the heresy of supposing that light , heat or electricity , can be robbed of their mysterious fluid , Because it will sound heretical , I strengthen Comte ' s position by the following passage from John Mill : —

    " The prevailing hypothesis of a luminiferpus ether I cannot but consider , with M . Comte , to be tainted with the same vice . It can never be brought tp the test of observation , because the ether is supposed wanting in all the properties by means of which pur senses take cognizance of external phenomena . It can neither be seen , heard , smelt , tasted , nor touched , the possibility of deducing front its supposed laws a considerable number of the p henomena of light , is the isole evidence of its existence that we have ever to hope for ; and this evidence cannot be of the smallest value , because we cannot have , in the case of such an hypothesis , the assurance that if the hypothesis be false it must lead to results at variance with , the true facts . "

    " Accordingly , most thinkers of any degree of sobriety allow , that an hypothesis of this kind is liot to be received 'a ^ " probably true because it accounts for all the known phenomena ; since this is a condition often fulfilled equally well by two conflicting hypotheses ; and if we give ourselves the license of inventing the causes themselves as well as their laws , a person of fertile imagination might devise a hundred modes of accounting for any given fact , while there are probably a thousand more which are equally possible , but which , for want of anything analogous in our experience , our minds are unfitted to conceive . But it seems to be thought that ait hypothesis of the sort in question is entitled to a more favourable reception , if besides accounting for all the facts previously known , it has led to the anticipation and prediction of others which experience afterwards verified ; aa the undulatbry

    theory of light led to the prediction , subsequently realized by experiment , that two luminous rays might meet each other in such a manner as to produce darkness . Such predictions and their fulfilment are , indeed , well calculated to strike the ignorant vulgar , whose faith in science rests eplely on similar coincidences between its prophecies and what comes to pass . But it is ptrange th ^ t any considerable stress should be laid upon such a coincidence by scientific thinkers . If the laws of the propagation of light accord with those of the vibrations of an ; elastiq fluid in as many respects as is necessary to make the hypothesis a plausible fcxplanatipn Qf all or most of the phenomena known at the time , it is nptbjpg styange thftt they should accord with each other in one respect more . Though twenty such coincidences should occur , they would not prove the rea-lity pf the , undulatpry ether j it would not follow that the phenomena of light were result pf the Jaws of elastic

    fluids , but at most that they are governed by laws in some , measure anajogpus t 9 these ; which , we . may observe , is already certain , from the fact tj ^ t the hypptljQflia in question could be for a moment tenable . There are many such harmonies run * ning through the laws of phenomena in other respects radically distinet . The re » markable resemblance between the laws of light and many pf th «! laws , of hea { j ( while others are as remarkably different , ) is a case in point- There is an extraordinary similarity running through the properties , considered generally , of certain substances , as chlorine , iodine , and brome , or sulphur and phosphorus ; so mubh so that when chemists discover any new property of the one , they not only are not surprise ^ , but expect , to find that the other pr others have » property analogous to it , But the hypothesis that chlorine , iodine , and brome , or that sulphur and phosphorusaro tho same substanceswouldno doubtbe quite inadmissible .

    , , , , " I do not , like M . Comte , altogether condemn those who employ themselves in working out intp detail this sort of hypotheses ; it is useful to ascertain what are tho known phenomena to the laws of which those of the subject pf inquiry bear the greatest , or even a great analogy , Bince this may suggest ( as in the caae of the luminiferous ether it actually did ) experiments to determine whether the analogy which goqs so far does jipt extend still further . But that in doing thw , n » an should imagine themselves to bo seriously inquiring whether tho hypothesis of aft ether , an electric fluid , or tho liko , is true ; that they should fanpy it posetbleto obtain the assurance that the phenomena are produced in that way ajnd no w ™* * ' seems to mo , I confess , as unworthy of tho present improved conceptions ot * W methods of physical science , as it does to M . Comte , An , 4 at * hp risk of boing > 4 IU ^ 1 > VUU VJL Mil f IjlVw * h / V ^**^»* V \^« %% * J * % i v « v < VM V + * * m-m t «_/ V"f »• ^< W ^ T ^ TT ™ — > 1 * tliat

    charged with want of mocleBty , I ciuinot help expressing astonishment a pm * loHophor of tho extraordinary attainments pf Mr . Whewoll should have WMjten an elaborate treatise on tho philosophy of induction , in which ho recogni ^ a absor lutely no mode of induction oxcopt that of trying hypothesis * ftfter h ypothesis unHj ono is found which fits tho phenomena ; which one , when found , is to be aafwnw aB true , with no other roworvation tjian that if on re-examination it should appear to assumo moro than is needful for explaining tho phenomena , the superfluous pare of tho assumption should bo cut off . It is no exaggeration to say that the prOccp ? which wo have described in those few words , is tjio beginning , middle , ana onaoj tho philosophy of induction iia Mr . Wliowell conceives it . And this witluw ? _ w » slightest distinction botweon the cosoa in which it may bp known beforehand V « w two diflbront hypothoHos cannot load to tho same result , and those in W * M ? , / i ^ auirbt wo can ever know , tho range of BuppouitiohB , all equally consistent with

    phenomena , may bo infinite . " Comte clearly shows how this conception of Ethers is only a remnant of the Metaphysical stage , and remarks that the metaphysical origin <» **" false method of proceeding cannot but be easily detected by every imp ^ W mind who will consider the fluids as having taken the place of the m ™?* the tranaformation of tho latter being simply by mqitvialimg thm > ™ Mh

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• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), June 5, 1852, page 544, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct1938/page/20/