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ternal circumstances that he was prepared to propose a reconstruction of this House ; and when the Chancellor of the Exchequer , when called upon in his official capacity to propose the first vote for the carrying on of the war , anticipated , not merely the expenditure necessary for the transport of troops , hut the expenditure necessary for th « return of those troops to this country all in the course of the year . I think , therefore , sir , it is necessary for us to consider the great importance of this phrase . Last year the noble lord said that he did not consider even a war with Russia was a
circumstance which ought to prevent a reform in Parliament , if the country thought a reform of Parliament was necessary . The noble lord now has found out that this is a great and not an insignificant war . The Chancellor of the Exchequer , when he was of such , a sanguine complexion that on his first proposition of expenditure lie anticipated , in the very language of his speech , that the troops would rettirn to this country in the course of the year , proved to the House that the war would not be a war really , hut a demonstration . ( Cheers . * ) I am not now imputing it to tee Government as matter of blame ; at the sam& time I reserve to myself the right to > impute it to them as matter of blame ( laughter ); but I say it is quite clear that the Ministers of this country , at the
'Commencement of last session , had no conception what- ^ « ver of the position in which they were , or of the magnitude of the circumstances which they had to encounter . { Chfsers . y ¦¦ My right hon . friend the member for Droitwieh has , . 1 think , indicated , under these- circumstances , the course ^ hidi a Conservative Opposition ^ rightly distinguished from other Oppositions to which lie has re--ferred , ris justifiedin taking . When her Majesty appeals for support- —when her Majesty tells us that she is in-VfciyecTui a great war , and asks us for our assistanceit fe bur duty , tinder those circumstances , to express to *«* Majesty that there are no means at our command 4 hat we will not place at her disposal ; but surely , if it is so eyidentjiso demonstrative , so transparent that her
Majesty's advisers fina themselves in a position which ^ hey did not anticipate—which they had not the prescience or sagacity to suppose would occur—it surely is not an unreasonable or factious course that , while we say we are prepared to support her Majesty in this great strqggle by every means in our power , we reserve to ourselves the right of expressing an opinion on the feonduct of the Ooyernment in respect to this war in the iiltervaL . and to judge from that conduct of the manner iii- whith they may spend the resources which we may Iplace at then * disposal . ( Cheers . ) We have had a . sjpeech from tie only Minister who has condescended 'to ^ address the House of Commons thus suddenly summoned . We lave had a speech of detail—I may
say of statistics—adverting to subjects which never Ixaye' been introduced into our discussions , and which * ave really in . no sense met the great objection " which has been urged by my right honourable < hend . The Secretary-at-War has proved to us , according to his view , tbat the hospitals at Scutari at this moment are admirably attended to and regulated . I lope they are . I am willing to believe , upon the statement of the right hon . gentleman , that they are in that position . The right hon . gentleman has endeavoured to persuade us that the medical assistance which the army enjoys is sufficient , or , at least , as great as any Ministerial ability could have supplied . I hope that it is so . All that the right hon . gentleman says I entirely
believe . But , were it otherwise—if it were true that there had been this cruel suffering and apparent neglect ^—if it were true that the commissariat ( which no one has attacked , "but which the right hon . gentleman has so elaborately vindicated ) had been so deficient—if there had been too few servants , ' too few nurses , and a meagre commissariat , I am sure that I should not have been one who would have attempted , from such a circumstance , to bring a charge against the Administration of this country . I remember—and I may refer to the words , for 1 dare say no one else remembers them—that ,
having last year to touch on this subject , I Baid to myself that at tho beginning of war , after a peace so prolonged as that which we were so blessed by Providence to enjoy , the difficulties of inexperience must bo so great that it would bo most unwise and unbecoming for the House of Commons critically to examine tho conduct of individuals who , after all , must be animated by sentiments aa humane and influenced by responsibility much greater than to ourselves can fool . And to night , Sir , I have not heard any expressions used in this liouse impugning tho arrangements of tho commissariat or
arrangements of a similar kind to which I havo adverted ; but tc * accusations that may have appeared in anonymous quarters tho right hon . gentleman h « n found timo to make an elaborate answer , though no mombcr of tho < Jovernment has found timo to make an answer to charges brought in debate against tho Administration by . a member of this House , expressed with a knowledge of tho subject , and convoyed with ability , and in a Bpirit doserving , ire my opinion , tho thought ami attontbn of this assembly . ( Cheers . ) I will advert in a momont to what was tho oharg « brought forward by my right hon . friend—a charge , let mo again impress on thin House , not brought forward In tho way of ostentatious accusation a « tho foundation of motions against tho Governmentnot brought forward with any anxiety to damage tho character , tho position , or tho conduct of tho Government , but brought forward noeoasarily from
the position which we all occupy at this moment , prise . What were the expectation ' s which these speakers from the sudden summoning of Parliament , which permitted the country to indul ge in ? We are at this calls upon as , by the motion of the hon . gen- moment entirely engrossed in the important affairs tleman ^ opposite , in a certain sense—I admit in which have taken place in the Black Sea . For more a restricted and limited degree—to express our than two months the feelings of every hearth in this
opinion on public affairs . Before I advert to > what was the distinct and really the only charge , yet so important that no other was necessary , which has been made by my right hon . friend , let me for a moment take this great question out of that cloud of the details of office with which it has been conveniently encumbered by the Secretary-at-War , and place it in its true and rude simplicity before the consideration of the House of Commons and of the country . It is some nine or ten months ago , after an agitating year of warning , that her Majesty was advised by her Ministers to send a message to Parliament to announce a declaration of war against Russia . I Say that no Ministers ever gave such important advice to their Sovereign under such favourable
circumstances as my Lord Aberdeen and his colleagues . Why , look at the facts ! They had a unanimous Parliament , and a unanimous people . The war was popular . This House had expressed its willingness to vote any supplies , without any reference to party confidence whatever , which her Majesty ' s Ministers might propose . They had an overflowing Exchequer . They had a prosperous people . In addition to all these advantages , they had the most powerful ally in the world . ( Cheers from both sides of the House . ) Let it be understood , you entered upon war under these circumstances . These circumstances are forgotten in the petty views and the petty details and the petty consequences which steal into our debates on this subject . We hear of the
inconvenience of free Government jo powerful political action . It is said that , although the public spirit under a despotic Government may not be equal to the spirit of a free people— -that , although the conscript ( not too adroitly mentioned by the Secretary-at-War ) may not fight as the militiaman who has been voluntarily enlisted , a despotism has still the advantages of unity of design , of singleness of purpose , and of that decision , vigour , and effect which is the consequence of such antecedents . But her Majesty ' s Ministers had all the unity of despotism and all the spirit of a free people on their side . What they wanted they might have had as readily as the Emperor of Russia when he signs a ukase . There was no number of men , no amount of treasure , which
they might not have commanded , and the money was given freely by a free people , and the men were animated by that immortal spirit which has rendered their achievements the mark for the approbation of an admiring world , ( Cheers . ) They have , they say , an overflowing purse , prosperous people , and a popular war . They have the most powerful ally in the world . They have this combination of circumstances in their favour , on entering into this war , which no Minister at any period ever enjoyed before . I now ask the House for a moment to turn round and consider not whether there were sufficient nurses or surgeons at Scutari—not what should be the amount of pots of marmalade which
should be sent out towards the support of our starving troops—but I ask this House to consider what has been the effect which this Ministry , with these enormous and ever-increasing advantages , have obtained . ( Opposition cheers . ) You determined to attack the powerful ruler of a country against whom you bad declared war in two opposite quarters of the -world— the extremities almost of his vast dominions ; you fitted out armadas to attack him in two seas ; you sent out an army which was to attack him in the most important fortress in Europe . What have you done ? Tho Secretary-at-War sneers at the notice which my right hon . friend had taken of the achievements in tho Baltic . If the ideas of the
Snorfitary-at-War , that the national success is a sufficient return for the efforts of this country , are correct , and tbat our success is to be mcnsiiTed by our achievements in tho Baltic , then I confess I have little hope , and I shall hare loss hope than I at present possess of tho successful conduct of the war , if carried on by tho present Government . Why , sir , let mo recal to tho House the strength of tho united fleet that entered tbo Baltic . It was greater than any armada that ever figured in tho history of our times ; it was " greater than tlie united fleets of Franco and Spain that mot Nelson at Trafalgar . Lot mo recal to tho House the circumstances under which that important fleet was inaugurated . It occasioned a debate in tho House of Commons , and therefore I have no ' doubt it will bo in tho recollection of every one present . Tho head of tho Admiralty of this
country , tho profound statesman and experienced senator ¦ who had so long presided , at various periods , over that department himself , was a guest at « , public dinner ¦ which was given to tho commander of that important enterprise . A moat experienced statesman of tho country , one who had presided ho long over tho foreign affair e of the nation , a department which , it is supposed , imparts a peculiar character of discretion to human conduct—that noble lord was alao present upon that occasion , and in tho fneo of Europe , and before an admiring , an applauding ISnglaud—these , two of tho men of whom , in thi » House , wo « ro moat proud , two of tho statesmen to whom Europe looks up with tho most respect , the most dread , tho most awethono two statesmen woro present aa tho principal jruofltfl of a public banquet given at a political club , in order to inaugurate tho captaincy of this groat
entercountry lave been absorbed ; but at that moment no one thought of the Black Sea or of Sebastopol . They were of minor importance , and of diminutive proportions as compared with those vust preparations , and tbat enormous armament which was draughted from our shores under the blessings and the benison of our most experienced statesmen , and it had the advantage , moreover , of being commanded by a true Eeformer . ( jLattghter . ) Well , the Secretary-at-War pretended that the capture of Bomarsund was all tha t was intended or thought of for the moment . E will not say whether the Secretary-at-War never heard of Bomarsund , because he is a well-informed gentleman , and it might be personal , but this I do know , that I have read , in a
very authoritative document , that * it was not only projected , but at one time it was settled , that Bomarsund and the fortifications in the Baltic should be destroyed , preparatory to the entrance of our fleets into that sea , and therefore , under those circumstances , and remembering the policy which was afterwards partially followed , I hardly think it was worth while to send for a Marshal of France and 10 , 000 Trench troops to destroy that -which a company of marines would have finished in a few hours , and which , at all events , was not accomplished by that vast armada which had been seSt out . Surely , then , my right bon . friend was not irregular in alluding to the expedition to the Baltic , and saying that , although one of our greatest enterprises , it has
not been attended by any results at all commensurate -with the expectations of the country . Why did not the noble lord the President of the Council propose a vote of thanks to those who were concerned in that enterprise ? ( Cheers from * the Opposition . ) Had the noble lord proposed such a "vote , I should have been glad ,-fox we should have been enabled to make inquiries , and the Ministers might have been able to throw some light on that perplexed and obscure subject , and might have afforded some satisfaction to the public mind . Then , sir , I come to the second-rate scene in which the Government are concerned—the Government which , let me impress upon you , entered upon this with advantages which no other Ministry ever yet experienced , and with a combination of circumstances in their favour which
never can occur again probably in the history of this country . What did you do -with the army which you sent ? You explained your conduct , and you explained their course ; but your explanations do not affect the result , and you cannot deny that they have accomplished nothings—that the plans which you . had devised were barren and fruitless . The Secretary-at-War tells you that you were watching all that time the course of events , and that such troops as might have been shared by the pest , which was not contemplated , would have influenced the conduct of the Russian forces ; but he has not told us that if it was necessary to move those troops they would have been moved . Whatever might have been the fate of Silistria—whatever might havo been
the conduct of the Turkish army on the Danube—you havo not answered the question whether you had sufficient means to assist them ; and I think the member for Aylcsbury has fully demonstrated that you could not . Then , -what do you do ? Tou attack with a force of 20 , 000 or 30 , 000 men a fortress probably as strong as Gibraltar . And under what circumstances did you undertake this enterprise ? The Secretary-at-War tells you that ho did not expect tho reserve , but he tells you that his object was to strike at tho heart of Russia and the power of Russia in , tho south ; and therefore they attacked Sebastopol . Bravo -words , these ! But if you attack tho place at the -wrong time , and with ineffective means , you havo no excuse for your conduct .
That "brings mo to tho point which has been raised by the right honourable gentleman the member for Droitwich . My right honourable friend the member for Droitwich happened to make an observation that our army were embarked without tents , upon which the Secretary-at-War dilated immensely upon tho question of tents . What was the question of tents , the question of surgeons , tho question « f nurses , tho question of lint , and other questions of tliat kind with which the Secrotary-at-War for nn hour and a half occupied tho House , compared with tho general policy of tho Ministry , which had undertaken -war with tho greatest mili " tary l'ower perhaps in tho world , with the greatest means , and under tho most favourable circumstances . Why , Sir , with respect to tho question of tents , that was
satisfactorily answered by tho member for Aylosbury , But I will not argue tho quontion on » uch miserable dotaila an this i but I will ro ' or to the charge which has been jnado by my right hon . friend , arid which has never boon answered . Why , when you undertook so rash an ontorprbo n » the invasion of Russia with 25 , 000 mon , < li < l you not Immodiatoly make duo preparations to inorcano , to support , and to austnin your forco ? ( Opposition dicers . ) What unswoT has tho Soerotary-at-War made V Tho Seorotary-at-War roads us a catalogue of roinforcoinont » went after tho event . ( Jtenewod Opposition ofteera . ) Tho vory evidence which tho Secretaryat-W « r brings forward proven tho justice of tbo charge of my right hon . friend . If , indeed , It wore necessary to demonstrate tho juotlco of that charge , tho etoru events
Untitled Article
1180 ' THE LEADER , [ Saturday ,
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Dec. 16, 1854, page 1180, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2069/page/4/
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