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    for those powers . Do the generals K thj al-Pfiihafflte ^ ^ ° «^ 3 K . £# » £ fi £ Ca % ed as a diversion . But who that is versed in strategy does not know that , in general , diversions are dwigerous because they weaken the main ^ mv . destroy the forces , and complicate the

    casualties and accidents of war . Who does not know that diversions should be made only so long as a power is possessed of forces superior to those of the enemy , when great difficulties are encountered in a united action , and when one is obliged to distract the attention of the enemy from a formidable position from which he cannot be dislodged without actual force . Now in the case of the Allies none of these conditions exist . They have not numerical forces superior to the in

    enemy . On the contrary , perhaps they are - ferior . They had not found any of those obstacles to their carrying on the combat unitedly , seeing that the defensive line of the Turks is very extended and strongly fortified . They found no obstacles in maintaining their force , or if they found obstacles , certainly they were far inferior to those which they have encountered in the Crimea , and which were easily to be foreseen . Finally , the position of the Russians in the Principalities was not formidable or unattackable , while the army of Omar Pacha alone ventured to

    take the offensive , passing to the left bank ^ of the Danube , and in various encounters defeating the enemy ; and when afterwards the enemy , in his turn , took the offensive , his efforts were rendered weak by the single passive resistance of the Turks . It follows that if the forces of the Allies had been united and directed upon the same object of attack- —Bucharest—the victory would have been theirs . In May , therefore , the French and English should have disembarked at Varna , or rather at Gallipoli , and then have entered in line with

    the Turkish army . No other diversions would then have been necessary , except those menacing Anapa , Eupatoria , and Odessa . For those diversions they ought to have used those forces which they could have spared from the theatre of war . Turkey had , and still has , many troops which would have been an ^ embarrassment on the theatre of the grand operations of war , but which might b . e turned to use for such diversions . For this object the fleets would have had . a larger and more intelligent part in the conflict , and the troops disembarked ( le milizie da shared ) would have the secondary part . ¦

    It is , nevertheless , quite true that in war other species of diversions are executed on a larger scale , such , as operate not only , with detachments drawn from * the army , but with another army . Thus Scipio went to the attack of Carthage in order to oblige Hannibal to abandon Italy . But the Roman general went to strike the enemy at the heart ; whereas the Allies attacking Sebastopol go to strike the foot of the great Colossus . Carthage conquered , Hannibal , who was kept on his guard by Fabius , deprived of succours and of the means of war , would infallibly have been conquered and captured , if he

    had not persevered in fighting within Italy . Now , although Sebastopol were conquered , the army of the Pruth would not on that account be compromised . On the contrary , it would eventually be reinforced by the troops destined for the defence of the Crimea , and for that reason would be in a more effective condition to fight the Turkish army destined to bar the road to Constantinople . Moreover , from having detached to the Crimea the Anglo-Frenoh army , the worst use is made of the forces ; since the French and English arc superior to the Russians in instruction , in intelligence , and in development . The Anglo-French

    army , very confident in its military science nnd in its moral force , might with those advantages beat a Russian army numerically much superior . The battle of Inkerman is an evident proof : here 8000 English , like the Spartans at Thermopylae , have , with unheard-of bravery , withstood the assault of at least 40 , 000 Russians . Nevertheless , the French and English , united to the tflile of the Turkish army , would have been required for the great strategical operations in which intelligence prevails over numbers . They sh 6 uld have taken position upon a vast theatro of war , in the valley , that id , of the Danube , and afterwards upon the , Pruth * and the Dniester . On this chessboard there is space for great tactical

    evolutions and for gre strategical conceptions . The Russians having been beaten on the D anube , on the Pruth , and * the Dniester , the ADwwodd have bee n able to detach an army to occupy Perekop , and thence to besiege Sebastopol , which , deprived . of succours , wanting provisions , and defended by people discouraged through the discomfiture of' the army , must indubitably have surrendered itself af ter a short resistance . Napoleon the Great obtained his finest victories in Italy when he led armies small , but strong through their bravery , instruction , enthusiasm , discipline , and science of war . He i ™ Va 1 to the ffreat obiect of the war , the

    beat-, ing , that is , of the enemy ' s army ; nor did he ever distract his forces by useless and injurious sieges . In the famous campaign of 1800 , Napoleon did not occupy himself directly in liberating his lieutenant shut up in Genoa , nor did he occupy himself by besieging any Piedmontese rampart placed to guard the passes of the Alps , but looked directly to beat the army of Melas . The victory of Marengo , by the French , gave to the French Genoa , Piedmont , and Lombardy ; while the siege of Genoa lost to the Austrians the battle of Marengo , and consequently Italy . It certainly was not the siege that made Wurmser capitulate ,

    when he was shut up in the extremely strong citadel of Mantua , but the famous battle of Rivoli gained by the French . Meanwhile , the Anglo-French army , strong by its numbers , bravery , training , organisation , discipline , and science of war , has not offered to enter in line with the Turkish army to fight the enemy , but has , instead , left the Turkish army , which is the weakest , to bar to the Russians the path to Constantinople , which is the principal object of the war ; to undertake the siege of Sebastopol , which is a secondary

    object of the war , a simple strategical point . The forces thus divided , and scattered without discernment , the campaign is lost with the siege of Sebastopot , and ^ its moral is destroyed or greatly weakened . In fact , in the operation of The siege , there is no necessity for great strategy , nor for great tactical evolutions . The numerical forces were also weakened , because ^ the Turkish troops employed in the Crimea , being incapable of the operations of a regular siege , are rather an embarrassment than an assistance ; and , on

    the other hand , the material force of the enemy receives great \ increase from the fortifications , from the crews and materials of war in his fleet , and from the weakness of his opponent . Moreover , it is to be noted that the diversion is in opposition to the principle of war , which prescribes that the forces should always be reunited ; and it is indispensable , therefore , that the diversion _ should ^^ Jthat the troops may speedily concentrate their forces and direct it consistently with the object of the war . Now , the diversion in the Crimea , having for its object to obtain the mastery of Sebastopol , is for

    that very reason defective , while the siege' of such a place could not be of long duration . A place that presents a long circuit , not so much for the enclosure of the fortifications , as for the topography of the ground , requires , therefore , a small number of defenders proportionably to the number of besiegers . A place with many fronts , almost in a direct line , an'd for that reason not rimbalzabili—which is constructed upon rock and clay , and thence presents great difficulties to the labours of the besiegers—which possesses a great maritime arsenal , and for that a great store of artillery , munition , and transport of war , great

    numbers of workmen , sailors , and marine gunners and artificers ; a place , in short , which is defended by a brave and numerous garrison ; such a place , I say , as Sebastopol , can defend itself for a long time . The breaches and the damage done to the walls and fortifications by the besiegers are soon repaired , and affusti , and cannons injured can soon be replaced . The deficient munitions being got together to besiege such a place , a very strong army is required to

    accomplish the investment ; and another army of observation to secure the operations of the siege , and impede reinforcements of men , ammunition , and provisions . This is as much us to say , that for such a purpose a more numerous army would be required than to fight in union with the Turks , and successfully , on the Pruth . All these military errors have been purchased at a dear price , for the sums that have been expended are gigantic ; the quantity of supplies of all sorts has been prodigious , ana the number of ] men that leave the ranks by death , wounds , and

    sickness of every sort , is frightful . However I believe that these military faults are the consequence of the false poliey of the Government , to which , in a certain sense , it was desired to subordinate the war . _ France and England deluded by the hypocrisies and hesitations of Austria , in the hope of obtaining by that means an honourable peace , and an efficacious support , had lef t their armies for a long time useless * t Galliooli and at Varna : allowed Austria , who ~— TTfriirhtfiil . However ,

    is not allied with . ' them , and who is not at war with Russia , to take possession of the ground which was to have been the theatre of war ;_ and thus has been brought about the necessity either to remain inoperative , and to await the result of the interminable astute diplomatic notes of Austr ia , or to make war in the Crimea , —the only soil left free to their armies . Thus they have preferred , or rather they have bee compelled to fiffht in the Crimea , because public opinion , t

    and in particular their armies , condemn ne numiliating and fatal inaction which cost them more dead than would have been occasioned by the most homicidal war . But then , I say , why not limit the operations of war to a debarkation in the Crimea , and attack upon Odessa , Anapa , &c .: to the battle of the Alma—a great battle gained , the enemy routed and put to flight , it might have been possible to occupy the Isthmus of Perekopto complete the investment of

    be-, bastopol , and to push with zeal the siege of that place ;—a siege which must be difficult , but which would have had imparted to it the hope arising from the moral defeat in which the defending army would have fallen by the defeat of their army without , and by the scarcity of victuals , and by the loss of the hope of succour from without . But the victory of the Alma has not procured any material advantage ; on the

    contrary , it has proportionately enfeebled the Anglo-French army by the losses sustained—losses ^ not so facilely repaired as those ofjthe Russians . The eneniy also did not lose a-single-cannon , a single carriage , nor a single flag , but in perfect order retreated . What , therefore , did it remain for the Allies to do after the battle ? There were three courses to be taken—reither to surround" Sebastopol , occupying Balaklava , where might have been disembarked the siege-train and a retreat given to the ships , whence the siege might be undertaken ; secondly , to follow the enemy , if he had evidently retired , as he did on

    the flank of the Anglo-French army , and by these means to gain a communication with Perekop , and at the same time to menace Sebastopol until it should be decided to attack it . Or thirdly , and finally , to re-embark , in order to take up winter quarters in Turkey , and to cHve *!? e ltuss * from " theT mouths of the DanubeDeciding as ffie Allies did for the first course , they were obliged to risk a bold and per ilous flank march . It is true that this succeeded ; but the end does not justify the means—the Allies have been compelled to leave the road to the p lace free for the communications with the interior of the country , not

    leaving sufficient force to complete the investment ; and finally , they have been compelled to begin the siege , without having secured a . strong basis to guarantee their retreat , and to give them time to embark with their immense material oi war in cose of a reverse . The Allies could not have followed the enemy without running great risks , and without compromising themselves , because they would have withdrawn to a distance

    from the place of debarkation , whence they drew their reinforcements , their munitions of war , and their victual ; and where they relied upon the cannon of their fleet . The further they advanced into the interior of the country , they would have proportionately enfeebled themselves before the enemy ; while ho , on the contrary , in proportion as ho retreated , would the more have concentrated his forces , and would the more have approximated the reinforcements which awaited him from

    Perokop and from the Crimea . The same successes which the Allies might have obtained , opening before them a more extended theatre , would have obliged them to multiply their detachments ; and , offering to the enemy a larger surface , they would have found themselves more lurgely exposed to destructive causes , and would have more rupidly used up their material' means without finding resources to supply themselves combating in a strange and hostile country . In such manner , not being able to receive reinforcements by reason of their losses , they would have found themselves " always growing weaker in proportion as they ad-

    Untitled Article

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• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Jan. 13, 1855, page 40, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2073/page/16/