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    STJKYEY OF THE WAR . The Allied Armies have now been . five months in the Crimea , and upwards of four months before Sebastopol . The sanguine hopes entertained by the British people at the brilliant opening of the campaign in September—the successful landing , the battle of the Alma , the flank march and seizure of Balaklavahave been disappointed , and the wild exultation of a moment has been turned into anxiety , nay , almost despondency . England lost much of her

    has in those four months prestige as a military power , not by any failure in the bravery of her troops , but by the complete catastrophe of the whole of her war establishment . It is now universally felt that the war was undertaken with the inadequate means bequeathed by a long peace ; it is now clear to all that the power and resources of the European foe were underrated at the outset , not only by the ruling authorit ies of England , but the ruling authorities of /

    Jbrance . rue army seuTvu vuv vruuca w » a thought to be adequate to storm Sebastopol by a coup de main ; it failed in achieving that \ it has been proved inadequate , it is still inadequate , to form a complete investment of the place . Military authorities tell us that the works on the northern side of the harbour should first have been reduced , and that was the original plan of the Allies . "Why was not that plan foUowed ? Because the force at the disposal of the commander was not

    adequate to its execution . Hence , the primary plan was abandoned ; -the allied army turned the head of Sebastopol , and lef t its communications with Russia open to the enemy ; and the army sat down before a p portion of the place , still with a force inadequate to perform the work of the siege > even of that portion , and at the same time to cover its own positions . The attack in October was a total failure ; the enemy grew stronger every day ; on the 25 th of October he seized the main road from

    Balaklava- —the British base—to the British camp on the heights ; on the 5 th of November he attempted to storm the key of the British position by throwing 40 , 000 or 50 , 000 men upon our undefended flank at Inkerman ; ^ then ^ c am e the hurricane of the 14 th of November ; and the suspension of the bombardment , until it became obvious that the Allies would be compelled to winter in that exposed corner of the Crimea . The terrible incidents of the last three months

    the horrible sufferings of our troops ; the heartrending spectacle of an army of heroes perishing within six miles of a d 6 pdt filled to overflowing with stores of all kinds ; the utter break-down of the whole army administration—transport , commissariat , and medical —are facts , alas ! with which the public are only too familiar . They have been strong enough to break up one of the strongest administrations of our day ; to awaken the people to a true sense of the momentous character of the war in which we are

    ongaged ; and we trust strong enough to compel a radical reform of that system of which they are the ghostly results . But if we know the . British people , these recent and tragic failur 6 s will rather rouse than numb their spirit ; , and they will force whatever Goverment may be in power to obey the national command to carry on the war in future with adequate means and ndequnto instruments . If we may trust recent accounts , there ia already a slight improvement in the military position of affairs . During # the months of Buffering much hns been donej it would seem , to enable the commanders to . renew their

    operations ; with what chance of jmccess remains to be seen . ' Whatever may be the amount of the British army on the scene of action , whether 12 , 000 or 25 , 000 , it is clear

    that the French army has been largely reinforced , and now musters something like 70 , 000 men . The French works of attack cover miles of ground , and have been pushed within . less than 100 yards of that salient head , of the Russian defences known as . Flagstaff battery . The lines have been newly mounted with heavier guns , including many mortars , and the determination of the French to push their approaches has caused the enemy to redouble the force and frequency of his sorties , so that the troops in the

    the number that will be required for a successful war , unless operations beyond the Crimea should disable the Czar from sending reinforcements to that peninsula . At present the war has not actually extended beyond the Crimea ; but should it break out on the Pruth , in Transylvania , or in Gallicia , should the powerful Austrian army on the frontier be reinforced by a French contingent | should the Scandinavian . Powers follow the example of Sardinia ; should the three Allies resolve to restore Poland—a contingency which , however remote , Prussia evidentl y fears- —it is clear that the allied armies in the Crimea would be

    by means of a bridge and . even against this formidable defence , we are told , our wor ks have been newly armed , and fresh batteries , calculated to command the shipping as well as the earthworks , have been constructed ; while the rear is now entirely defended by a long line of entrenchments and redoubts , stretching from Balaklava to the head of the Tchernaya . Relief has been given to the exhausted British armjr by _ placing French troops on our extreme right . The general position of the Allies may be of the

    relieved from aome of the weight which now oppresses them , and disconcerts their operations . In the event of a failure in any of these contingencies , France , England , and Turkey will be forced to double the number of their troops in the Crimea , accept the battle on that ground , send capable commanders , take care that the stomach , that real base of operations , be well supplied , and adopt the most vigorous measures , by land and sea , to prevent the and to de

    further ingress of Russian troops , - stroy , take , or rout those that are now there . A survey of the war leads only to this conclusion , that in spite of hardships , the winter , and the enemy , the Allies have been able to maintain themselves in the territory of the Czar ; but , except for the purpose of throwing shot and shell into Sebastopol , they have not yet placed themselves in such-a position , relatively to the enemy , as will enable them to commence that series of operations which alone can lead to victory .

    stated thus : they occupy a corner Crimea bounded on all sides , except the east , by the sea and the waters of the harbour ; but deeply iuto this corner cuts the triangle , of the Russian defences of Sebastopol;—On the other-hand , the Russians are masters of the rest of the country with one exception—Eupatoria . They have withdrawn nearly their whole force from the valley of Balaklava , and appear to be cantoned in divisions from the strong entrenched camp on the north side of Sebastopol to Simpheropol . It is believed that the positions on the Alma and the Belbek have

    been occupied by infantry , while the greater part of the cavalry are in winter quarters . There is , therefore , unlimited access to Sebastopol on the north side ; and accordingly , convoyb of stores and provisions constantly make their way into the plnce . But the allied forces at Eupatoria , on the flank of the Russian communications , growing stronger , numerically , every day , promise to become an inconvenient element in the Russian calculations . Should it be deemed essential , after all , to defeat the

    enemy in the field , and complete the investment of Sebastopol , the forces at Eupatoria may be expected to play an important part in the campaign . The main body of the Allies , therefore , ia between the Russian army in the field and the Russian army in Sebastopol ; while the Russian army in the field ia in its turn menaced by the troops at Eupatoria , who are themselves watched by a cavalry and infantry force of what strength we know not . All these and many other considerations will exeroise a controlling' influence over the campaign of 1855 . Tho present allied force inthe Crimea is far below

    boatsXet yet untouched . Nevertheless , that the French batteries will utterly destroy these defences when next they open fire . Crossing the deep ravine on the French right , we find the British attack advanced much nearer than formerly to the redan line to which it isopposed . Here again the activity of the enemy and his vast resources have enabled him to construct work within work , covering a camp separated from the town hy the Careening Bay , but in communication with it

    it is believed trenches are kept constantly on the alert , and much loss is incurred on either side . It is remarked that the Russians fight with more pertinacity , and meet bayonet with bayonet . The Russian line of defence against the French , with the exception of the Flagstaff battery , seems almost as perfect as when the siege began ; and behind the Flagstaff a new battery of great power has been constructed and armed ; while , extending to its right down to the sea , runs aline of works as

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    THE ROOT _ OF THE EVIL . M- Guizot , addressing the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences on a recent occasion , observed with , marked emphasis , that " in France under the present regime the suppression of thought was severe , but the servility almost exceeded the suppression . ' * In a certain sense we cannot but apply these gloomy words to our own free and enlightened nation . All the world of respectability in Great Britain , after due digestion of its matutinal Times , is awaking to the melancholy conviction that we are the victims of a

    governmental '" system" of aristocratic incompetence . Granted ; but who is to blame ? Certainly not the governing class who do not achieve power , it is true ; who are born to power , it is equally true ; but on whom , let it be confessed , power is thrust by the very classes who are now crying out with all the

    rage of impotence . Many years ago that Sir Edwawd Bulweb Ijytton , whose " commanding abilities" secured by the approachiug Tory Government , observed that the true safeguard of our aristocracy lay in the profound adoration of the people . The City , we are told , is coming round to the Times . "We have seen letters from very

    respectable tradesmen copying with nervous intensity the opinion of the Times that , " it is really time the people (* . e . the middle classes ) should take it into their own hands . Meantime , while this portentous determination is pending , the people (* . e . the middle classes ) are devoutly studying the latest edition of the Peerage , that second Bible ot all Great Britons , who " never , never will be

    slaves . " If such a phenomenon as a Ministry without a single peer can be conceived , how shall -wo conceive the dismay of the Great-British people (* . e . the middle classes ) on . apprehending such a phenomenon . After me tho deluge ! Why the deluge would be a domestic water-butt in comparison to such a catastrophe as a Ministry of Commoners . Let tho aristocracy take heart . No plain Smith in the United Kingdom contemniatefl

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    l Eaaiti 17 , 1855 . ] TEE LEADER , lt > 7

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), Feb. 17, 1855, page 157, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2078/page/13/