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    rides not by- political institutions , but by bayonets ; and as to the other conterminous states of Russia , they are all bound up with the fate of Turkey , waiting their turn to be devoured bit by bit . C this be so , howtttterly vain and foolish is this newrfashioned doetrine ot consideration for your enemy—an enemy that is sapping towards Germany—Iotbo * in wait for Denmark , cutting off Sweden in detail—the open , the 2 row « d foe of Turkey , and not less of Persia— the only power capable , if any be capable , of carrying the double-headed eagle to the left bank of the Indus , ajnd at least to the left bank of the Rhine—the only power , in short , that ¦ threatens to bringr Europe under domi n ion , and to take Asia Minor as an appanage—why tenderness , consideration , for her ? If this war be a just war , let us mete out full measure to the culprit ; since we have caught him in the lap of conquest , let us clip his locks and bind him whensoever and ¦ wheresoever we find him ; take material guarantees as he took Finland ; and not make peace until we have in hand the actual stipulations we

    re-* fl 1111 *^ The conquest of Finland was one of the results of the treaty of Tilsit . It -was covenanted on the fatal raft that Alexander should take Finland and France the Danish fleet . Europe , with the exception of England , was at the feet of Napoleon , and wherever he could march legions there he dictated $ erms of peace . As Napoleon dealt with the powers of Germany , so Alexander dealt with the Scandinavian kings—he looked upon them as superior vassals ; and further , as Alexander seized Finland , and Europe let her go by default , Gustavus , like Abdul Medjid , resisting all he could , so , fcadtbe Western Powers permitted , Nicholas would have taken the Pnnci-. palities , and—kept them . IJayina- obtained leave from the master of those days , the Emperor ot ' Russia was not long in finding a pretext—the ostensible ground of quarrel is of no consequence ; and early in 1808 Count Bouxhoevden was ordered to seize Finland as a material guarantee that Sweden would obey the behests of Alexander ; but he was also ordered , as we have said , to keep the

    guarantee . jj > pr , eading alarming reports of the magnitude of the army of invasion , reports that went before the columns and prepared the way for success , Count jSpuxhoevden assembled his troops in the river Kymen , while the ice yet , « Oi » ered the waters of the Gulf of Finland and the rivers and lakes of the iOOuntry . ; The light infantry were provided with snow shoes , and the artillery were mounted en sledges . Two days before crossing the Kymen , Count 53 © Bxh © e « rden prepared a proclamation to the inhabitants and the army of i FitolsBniJ , in which we find England described as " the enemy of tranquillity ^ n < 4 neace . " and the Kinsr of Sweden denounced to his own subjects as the

    afliv of that enemy ; for which reason , the Fins are informed the Emperor Alexander thinks it necessary to take their country under his protection , , saye it fjspm the horrors of war , and obtain due satisfaction , unless Sweden shpnld abandon . England , and accept the alliance cf France and Russia . ** We do not come as enemies , " said the sentimental invader , " but as your friends and protectors , to render you more prosperous and happy , and to avert ironi you the calamities which , if war should become indispensable , must j » gQessarily hefal you . " Why , no power but Russia could invade Finland , * pnd , rtherefpre no > power but Russia inflict on her people the calamities of war . , * Sa * re us from our friends . The spectacle of Russia protecting the people of ; JTi « Ja © d from Russia , and taking credit for her magnanimity , is sublime in its way . In like manner the people axe informed that their la-ws and customs shall

    not be altered ; that their institutions shall remain unchanged ; that everything consumed by the Russian soldiers shall be paid for , and the indigent ¦ supplied from the Russian magazines . Upon such pretexts the Russians flrofiged the Kypaen on the 20 th February , 1608 , Count Bouxhoevden , at iiffit ,. proposed to . enter Swedish territory without opposition , and in the -ttbanacter of guardian of her safety ; but the Swedish outposts fired on his Sag of truce—the first shot in the war . Lulled by . a ittlse security , the Swedish army was still in cantonments , the frontier simply guarded by a -chain of weak posts , and nowhere that preparation for resistance which can j alone spr ing from a knowledge of the extent of the danger incurred . The "King of Sweden did not believe in a war of conquest , in Finland—and from the Cpnperyatiye Emperor of Russia top !—hence the rapid success of the policy of surprise .

    On the 20 th of February Count Bouxhoevden was at Aberfors ; on the J ^ Sth , fighting once or twice , but ; mainly proceeding by turning the strong positions . o ^ fche . Swedes on the ice , ho bad reached Bqrgo , one of the most « acient towns in Finland ; while Prince Bagration , acting further inland , was already close upon Tavaabheua , one of the great strategic positions of the . epuntoy ; the point of junction foe uia , ny roads . Bouxhoevden pressed OStwArd , and by a rapid movement plao-ed himself between Tavastheus and jjelsingfors , seized the latter , suuvqujidcd Sweaborg , and still speeding onwards , was actually in possession , pf Tavaetheus on the 6 th of Marchfourteen days after he began the campaign—and the Swedes had been driven backward along their whole line of defence . Why had the Russian general gained this unlooked-for result ? Because he had taken his foe by surprise ; because he had created the impression tl \( it he . commanded troops in

    overwhelming numbers ; and because the Icing interfered in the war . The erders of Gustayus were that Count JKlingsporr , his general , should retire before the enemy , and not endanger the safety of Finland by r ' lHking a ( battle . This was all that the Russian could have wished , and to this may undoubtedly be traced his success . For if at first he was in superior nmnfcers , lie was soon actually inferior at the point of contact , and had Klingsporr-stood and fought at Tavastheus , he might have regained communication 'With < Sweafoorg , recovered the greut const road to St . Petersburg , possibly fMure compelled the invader to retire from the country . But Klingsporr fought . under / the shadow of rigid instructions , framed in ignorance of the reaLsjtate of affairs , and of a council of war . Defeat became inevitable . Toutmerfors , on which ho had at first retreated , was untenable , as a position ; and ho eoon abandoned the south altogether , and took post in the north , baiting not until he had passed Brahostudt , followed rapidly by the Russian columns . Here be turned upon his foe , fought aud won the battle off R / eveiax , and ia-ilicted aovere losses ; but the JLiusaians by thia tiizio were in

    possession of every place of importance in the south of Finland , and had already begun the siege of Sweaborg . It was upon this siege that so much depended , and as the whole operation was most remarkable in . itself , the reader may like to read a Russian account of it . This fortress is built upon five islands , or rather rocks , in the Gulf of Finland . Three of these islands , Wester-Svvarto , Lilla-Oster-Swartii , and Stora-Oster-Swar to are situated in sight of the city of Helsingfors , and even within long range of can non ^ shot . On that side they mask the island of Wargon , which is considered as the citadel of the place ; Langorn is a detached fortress upon a sixth island , nearer the coast than the others ; and Gustavsw&rd , at the opposite extremity , has a citadel which sweeps the channel from a triple row of batteries .

    All these islands are bristling with cannon , and the works are principally constructed of granite , and for the most part as massive as the foundation on which they are built . It would serve no purpose to describe all these constructions , many of which have been raised without any definite plan , and are whimsical , defective , and useless ; but which , as a whole , render the fortification , a work of the first order . The sea by which it is surrounded serves instead of a ditch , and where in some places artificial ditches have been necessary , they are cut in the rock . Wargon is almost entirely bomb-proof . Basins and spacious docks were construc ted by Chappman and Tunberg , and these imperishable trophies of their geuius surrou nd the monument of the founder , Marshal Ehrenswardt , -who lies buried in the fort of Wargon , Siveaborg has cost Sweden immense sums of money , and the construction of the fortifications occupied half a century . The defence of this place was entrusted to Admiral Count Cronstedt , a veteran officer of the Swedish navy . The garrison amounted to above 7000 men , partly Swedes , partly natives of Finland ; 721 among them were seamen . The numerical strength of the Russians employed on tlie siege varied greatly , according as the demand for troops elsewhere was more or less urgent .

    At first it was hardly a third as considerable as the garrison , but it was gradually augmented . In the beginning of March the besiegers had eleven battalions , four squadrons , four field-batteries , two companies of pioneers , and one of artillerymen , without gun s to serve the batteries . The heavy artillery was brought with extreme difficulty on sledges to Sweaborg from Russian Finland . It was successively posted on the Cape of llel .-ingfors , the island of Skandetlandet , and the surrounding rocks , by General Suchtdon , who directed the engineer department . During the whole time hostilities were carried on against Sweaborg , the number of artillery never exceeded forty-six pieces o cannon , of whi-ch sixteen were mortars .

    The blockade was gradually straitened , according as the augmentation of the Eussian force permitted them to draw it closer and closer round a fortress of that extent . The batteries could only be established by means of the most arduous labour ; the only possible means of constructing them was upon fascines and ttufiVd gabions , which had but little weight or power of resistance , rendering it nece .-sary the parapets should be of very considerable thickness . Earth and turf were alike wanting upon those barren rocks covered with deep snow ; and besides the clilliculty of establishing approaches , and breaching batteries upon the ice , the poverty of the Kus . sians in artillery , in ammunition , in workmen , in tools , and even in soldiers , rendered it perfectly impossible to attempt to conduct the attack upon Sweaborg according to the regular rules of a siege . The possibility of taking it by storm was at one time discussed , but at last the commands of the Emperor Alexander aud the dictates of . sound reason provailed . The Emperor's orders were , gradually to make the blockade closer and closer , according as their augmented means might permit , to bombard the place , and not to venture an assault except as a last resource .

    The first shots were exchanged on the 23 rd of February ( Gth of March ) , the occasion being a Russian battery on a rock in the middle of the harbour aud between the fortress and the city of Helsingfors . A fire was opened by it upon some hundreds of labourers employed by the Swedish commandant to break up the ice before the points he considered the most accessible , and consequently the most exposed to danger . It was vigorously replied to , and the guns being pointed high , every shot told upon the houses in Helsingfors . The city was threatened with total destruction , and in order to avert it a flag of truce was despatched to Admiral Cronstedt , to represent to him the disasters to which he was exposing the inhabitants , most of whom had relations or friends among the garrison , and pointing out to him the danger it involved of reprisals on any Swedish cities that might be reached by the war . Cronsted t coldly replied that the destruction of HeLsingfora was necessary for his own defence ; Uowever , after holding a consultation with his council , he changed hi . iuiuu . 1 , and it was agreed on both sides not to construct any works in that direction , mid . to

    consider that point as neutral ground . The Russians were therefore able to establish their magazines , their military hospitals , and their parks of artillery , at ilefsingfors , with perfect safety . This city afforded the only shelter to be found iu all that neighbourhood for tlie troops and tuu head-quarters . t < | AU the surrounding heights were gradually becoming crowned with the Lussian artillery , and these batteries fired almost at random upon the mills , the magazines , the sailors'huts , and the wooden buildinga left exposed by the ramparts . Kires broke out several times during the ton days this cannonade continued . The iiuiiiUt of projectiles thus thrown amounted to I 6 ( 5 f > , and the fortress fired in return 2 177 nlioLd . Various parleys took place on different occasions , in this course of which General Suchtelen thought ho observed that the moral vigour of sonic of tlie chiefs was hardly the lortress

    what might have been expected from the material strength with which was provided . His plans for accelerating the surrender ol' tho place were bancil upon this hint ; ho considered that ono mouns of succoua would lie in keeping i » i > ll constant anxiety and alarm among tho garrison , composed of good troop . s , but who wero little accustomed to war , and in fatiguing and harassing them by kecking them constantly on the alert , Thia ayatom waa carried out : conatmit ulunnu wore raised , hoiuetunes in tho daytime , but much more often during tho night . Sometimes it was a party oi drums and riflfttuen ; sometimes one or even two iiold-baUcrhss would take advantage of tho { shelter of the rocka to creep along tho ice , even witliin tho range of grupi :- » not . Colonel Argoum , of tho artillery , distinguished himaulf particularly in ihimu expeditions . Ho iv « a a positive rdvoiUon to tho garri « on . llu continually Vlirl , ,. stratagems , < uad tho time and place whore tho attack would bo nmdo nuvor coulu u

    foreseen . A strong , effect was produced by thoao moans . The llimiun . generals very soon became awnro that Admiral Cronatodt , accuutomed to look at everything with l » o a ) of a seaman , felt unnecBHwiry anxiuty ubout uomu poinlH ho eon . sideroU too " j " j posqd , aa well us about bojuio fuultu in tho conatrucUon of b , ia works , anil alm > l . " r t exh , auajto 4 the Btrongth of hia people by keeping thorn inccaaunUy at work wit . noi their b ^ iog flowed sufficient roafc . In fact , ho uppeuroii to regard Swoabortf in i light of a , Bbh > in Oamjor of being boarded . Ho porauudod hiuiHolf , and hit * opinion vw shared by many of hi » oflicore , that tho winter , by wurroun < . li «' K tho iorUxw * idold of aoJUd ico , deprived it pf its principal atrongth , wid ( . hut it would not bo boui from , a qtmp do pm&o ,.

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    - ^ THE LEADER ^ [ Saturday , ^ .. — - —^ - ———^^ i ^»^ i »—iMMw *™* '' —^¦ " ¦ M —"" ^ - M—Ml ^ *^ MMMMM * ' '' ' I ^" MMMM °° * " ^" MMMM * '" ^* ' " *——J ^

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), June 30, 1855, page 630, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2097/page/18/