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more assistance to those of her commercial friends there who might be endangered . When France has carried out free trade thoroughly , then her position might become the same as our own , and she would be one of the most effective partners in the vast joint-stock company of the world . But she lias much to do before that day .
CANDIDATES FOR ITALY . DiPLOMAcr is the safety-valve of despotism . King Bomba had worked his police-machine at high pressure , until Austria feared the effect of an explosion upon her Lombard provinces . Thereupon , three powers intervened —and the Bourbon dismissed his accomplice . Naples , for the present , is at peace . The British squadrons , hovering off the Bay of Beauty , "will not enter , lest the people should accept the event as the signal of revolution . Ferdinand , meanwhile , unable to employ Mazza as a minister , trusts to him as a private advisor . There has been onlv one
reform in Naples : the King was a ferocious bravo ; he is now a ferocious hypocrite . To Italians , therefore , the situation appears unchanged . The Neapolitans remain the victims of an abasing tyranny . The Lombard provinces , drained by Austrian avarice and scourged bv Austrian brutality , only await
an opportunity to detach themselves from the Hnpsbnrg Empire . Rome is repeating the days of 1 S 47 . But in Naples especially , all parties regard the dynasty of the Bourbons as clfete , and look anxiously for its successor . At this point the Muratists present their idea . They propose to seat on the throne of Bom ha . a man whose sole claim is that his
uncle was a usurper , false , mean , and tyrannical . But contempt does not suffice to extinguish contemptible pretensions . Murat , indolent and weak , is a desperate egotist ; necessarily , because he is of the Bonaparte blood , and has , perhaps , a star . It is , therefore , important to quench his faction before the final moment arrives . Indeed , to accomplish this , it is onlv necessary that the unite 1
patriotic Italians should . hey represent all that is intelligent , independent , manly , in the peninsula . The Napoleonic section ia composed only of unscrupulous or infatuated adventurers , scheming upon a contingency , with not a chance of success except through the disunion and infirmity of purpose upon which they rely to deprive the real Italian party of ita hold upon tho disaffected nation .
The recent acts of Manibt and his friends have produced great consternation among the Muratists in France and Naples . It was imagined that the Venetian president and the Republicans throughout Italy , by dis * avowing the constitutionalism of Piedmont ^ would divide the ranks of the Italian nationality , and open , the way to a Bbnapartist pretender . Maniit , however , with a patriotism in harmony with his character , has chosen the better part . He knows that it would be impossible , and unwise were it possible , to disaffect the Piedmontese towards their
throne . Our readers have already seen the letter , published first in the Opinione of Turin , in which he prefers an alliance between the democratic and constitutionalist parties . In that letter it is well said that the Piedmontese , in order to deserve the support of Italy , must entertain national , and not municipal feelings . If the rallying of the Italians round the Sardinian flag be viewed merely as aa aggrandisement of their King , or as a tribute to their importance , the [ Republicans can offer
no countenance to a policy so selfish ; but if Victor Emmanuel ' s subjects , loyally valuing the independence of the Italian nation , put aside all considerations of egotism and the indolence of apathy to assert the principle of a free national life , they will draw to themselves the sympathy , the respect , and the aid of every mail who has the liberties of Italy afc heart . JVJaxin , referring to the Muratist intrigues , and to the declaration of Ricciahdj , has addressed to the editor of the Siecle the following letter : —
" A pn . pos of a pamphlet about to appear under the title , The Italian Question—Murat and the Bourbons , you have published the declaration of M . J . Ricciardi . Be good enough to add mine , which is this : — " Faithful to my principle—Italian Independence and Unity—I repel every scheme that assails it . I € regenerated Italy must have a king , she can have only one , and that one must be the King of Piedmont . "
Without passion , without personal antipathy , there is enough to condemn the idea of a Muratist kingdom in Naples . In the first place , it would vitiate essentially the principle of an Italian revolution . War against Austria , against the Bourbons , against the Port :, against the despicable Duke of Tuscany , would be illogical and fruitless , unless it were a war of independence . To vindicate and to preserve that must be united
independence ,-the Italians , which can never "be the case while rival governments rule the peninsula—especially If one of them should be an alien , with tho traditions of a disgraceful period , identified with conquest , usurpation , treachery . Muratism , not mad enough to propose itself as the sole successor of the Austrians , priests , and Bourbous , tends to establish a political dualism , fatal of course to the idea of Italian unity , and dangerous to
the integrity of the peninsula . A regiou quartered in small divisions among various governments is a murk for military aggression . Such has Italy been . Such would Muratism compel it to continue . But its patriots have other aims : they desire to root out those foreign influences which have converted the loveliest land in Europe into an arena for conflicting armies of occupation , for reckless pretenders , for Austrian ^ , Bourbons , and
Bonapnrtists . Even conceding tho possibility , which has not yet been established , that two Inmjs ol the north and south of Italy could co-operato for a time to keep out the Austrian * , it « oovious that causes of nnt « goni > i » woultioxisc from the first . A , a Bonaparte , Mm * must govern upon »^ T nfXmee ever illusion might bo created , to those ea-
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SURVEY OF THE WAR . The immediate operations at the seat of war a ^ ain furnish material for boundless speculation . The question discussed is not only what are the Allies doiug , but what are they going to do ? We cannot follow far in this track ; we cannot pretend to divine the intentions of the commanders ; we can only do , as we have done before , bring under the notice of the reader such new facts , or such old facts confirmed by new evidence , as may enable them to form an opinion as well as ourselves . The first thing to remark , is that the war lias been carried beyond the Crimea . With whatever intent , and that intent has not yet been disclosed , an Allied squadron , consisting of nine linc-of-battle ships , twenty-eight steamers , and nine gunboats , left Kamiesch on the 7 th October and anchored before Odessa the next day . The Ministerial Globe promised us an immediate bombardmeat , but , so far as the public are informed , that event has not yet taken place . Another report , derived from a questionable source , speaks of the fleet as subsequently threatening Otchakof and the estuary of the Dnieper . The next fact to be noticed is the extension of the French positions in the Baidar Valley to the north side of the ridge overlooking Markonl and Koluluz . They were therefore complete masters of the Baidar Valley and the passes leading to the north . Taking a bird ' s-eye view of the positions , we see the advanced posts of the Allies stretching from the right over Markoul , through Ozembash on their left , and thence by the line of the Tchernaya to the plateau of Sevastopol . We shall see the line of the Russians with its extreme right at Port Coustantine , its centre on the Jnkerni&n . . heights , its left behind the Mackenzie ridge , and its extreme left near Markoul . We shall see the outposts of the belligerents facing each other on the right of tho Allies , and engaged in constant skirmished in the valley of the Upper Belbek , and on the banks of tho Upper Tchuliu . Wo shall sec tbe Russian battery at Inkerman firing " pot shots" at the French on the Tchernaya , and the batteries established in Sebastopol engaging those on tho north side . Over the plateau of Sebastopol , in the valley of the Tchernaya and the valley of Baidar , wo shall sec tho soldiers busily " engaged in drilling and roadmalurig . Tho third point attracting attention is Eupatoriu . Here there are possibly -10 , 000 or C 0 , 000 men , with two British cavalry regiments , and a division of French horse-. The activity of tho latter is indicated by their succcbs on the 29 th of September , when General D'AiiLONViiXE defeated General Kohf , and captured six guns ; and by a recent move along tho road to Perokop . Combining theso operations we get this result : tho French have outflanked the enemy ' s left and gained the valley of the Upp « r Belbek . Should this movement be continued , it is reasonable to suppose thnt the Russians would fall back upon the defiles of Mangup-Kaleh and Albat ; nnd thus their left would face to tho oast . and occupy these defiles , which are in fact little more than tho beds of winter torrents , cut deeply in the ranges of oliff-liko hills thnt run from Aitodor in a northerly direction to
Baktcln-Serai . What further movement the French can make in thi 3 direction remains to be seen ; but Prince Gortschakoff reports that he has this week been beaten at Koluluz and Janisala . But we must take this in connexion with the occupation of Eupatoria in force , if we would estimate the pressure thus brought to bear on the enemy . And then we see that while the * Nbrth side is bombarded daily , the left flank of the enemy is menaced , and a strong force is within three days' march of his line of communication with Russia . Simpheropol is now the strategic centre of the Crimea , and he who can hold that wins the victory . The expedition to Odessa is necessarily purely naval ; the bombardment of that town would be a positive gain , as well as a strong diversion : the threatening movements of the fleet on the coast would constitute a diversion solely , but a diversion of considerable importance . The value of Odessa to Southern Russia is almost as great as the value of Sebastopol . Odessa is the commercial capital of Southern Russia , and the emporium of her trade . Founded in 1792 by Catherine , stimulated by many privileges , supplying a great social as well as a great political want in those regions , Odessa has sprung up into a flourishing city , tho pride of the Czar . It is also a great military station . To destroy it , therefore , would be to inflict almost as heavy a blow on the power of Russia in the Euxine as was inflicted by the destruction of Sebastopol . We trust , therefore , that it is not only doomed , but that its doom will usefully affect the operations in the Crimea .
Leader (1850-1860), Oct. 13, 1855, page 985, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2110/page/13/