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Leader (1850-1860), 15th March 1856, Edition 1 of 2, Page 252

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    • Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.

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      Untitled Article

      neglected to obtain from the Pobte the high rank in the Turkish service promised by Lord Clarendon . For this conduct Lord Stratford deserves severe censure ; but undoubtedly , -when we look to his peculiar position and influence in Turkey , to his energy and acuteness , we must admit that on the -whole Lord" Stratfokd has well served his country and the cause of the alliance . Nevertheless , we fear that what General Williams trul y called , a " golden opportunity" for retrieving the fortunes . of Turkey in Asia was lost b y the

      I sons ; and we look hopelessly for them in the pages of the Kars Blue Book . For what we do find there , however , we are thankful , and will communicate the essence of the thick volume to our readers . It may be remembered that the Turkish army in Asia suffered a severe defeat in the open field , in the summer of 1854 , and that the troops fell into great disorder . The British Government , in the interests of the alliance , sent Colonel Williams as Commissioner to the

      Turkish head quarters . He was instructed to communicate constantly with Lord Raglan , Lord Stratford de Redcliffe , and Lord Clarendon , and it was his business to keep them well informed respecting the state of the army of Anatolia . But , as the object of sending him was to revive that army , it was soon felt that Colonel Williams would require high rank in the Turkish service , and such power

      THE KA . BS PAPEES . * Bluh Books , after all , are not contemporary Ijistory ; tiiey are only materials for contempbrary history ; resolve but few questions , remove but few doubts , and aain . oxvkincL They raise larger questions , and more serious doubts than those they solve and remove . They present you tvith a series of

      unconnected facts , linksof a chain of evidence , isolated texts sadly in need of eOmmentary . We have no desire , in making ; these remarks , to depreciate the value of Blue Books ; we « nijr wish ; to point out that when they have yieldedall their evidencej there still remains behind a mass of testimony and fact , which are necessary to a full comprehension of the vital questions at issue .

      These papers relating to Kars furnish a strildng exemplification of tile meaning we yyisli to convey . What is it that all are burning to know ? How it came to pass that the Russians were permitted to take ] £ ars . But the solution of that problem is not to be fo ^ d in the PapersA-ionly bints towards a solutioii , only particular f acts bearing on special branches of the subject—notting more . The papers conclusively prove that the hero of the ¦ w hole adventure was the unyielding British Coxnnrissioner , * General Williams : that Lord

      Clarendon , on behalf of the Home Government , heartily and continuousl y supported and encouraged the gallant soldier ; that Lord Stjratsokd , at the outset of his career , treated General Wjlliams in a mattgr utterly " indefensible , in « , manner that was cruel , if not criminal , and extremely injurious to the ? general interests of the alliance ; , the papers show that the Turkish officials in Asia were iii the last degree corrupt ; that Omar Pacha and the Porte , the British Ambassador and the British JQovernanent , were desirous of doing something to relieve Kara : tibat the French Government

      -snared that desire in a less degree , and that the French . Marshal stood in . the way of its executipn : these things the papers show us , but t ^ se things axe a very small part of the question ; its larger branches still remain unsolved . Why did not the Allies afford the Forte the assistance of European troops ? and w 3 m when it was agreed that Omar Paoha to

      should i ^ ake a powerful diversion relieve &&rs ,, did , it happen that Marshal Pelissier retained the Turkish soldiers in the Crimea ? To these . yitol questions we can imagine very 6 W answers ; but in matters of such moment ^ ft ^ jnot trust to our imagination for yea' ^^^ Affd ira of AHati o x-raemecttoitQtft , Howe * of Pairlwment .

      as would enable Mm to do what was expected from him . It would therefore seem natural that the British Ambassador should obtain both , especially as he lcnew the nature of Turkish officials , and could readily have guessed the kind of treatment our envoy would meet with if he frjistrated the Turkish functionari es and stood between them and their unjust gains . But what did Lord Stbatford do ? Kemernber it was of the last

      importance that Colonel Williams should be armed with authority at once , not only that he might make a powerful impression on the minds of the swindlers he had to encounter , but that he might be obeyed , and be able to reorganise the army , and place Kars and Erzeroum in an adequate state of defence . Well ; Colonel Williams landed at Trebizond early in September , without any credentials , without any rank . He found the state of the army , the amount of fraudulent dealing on the part of

      the Pachas * almost incredible . He found that , in order to cheat the Government , they drew rations in two instances for upwards of 33 , 000 and 27 , 000 men , when , in point of fact , there were only 14 , 000 present under arms . When he reached the camp he found Zarif Mustapha , the runaway , at Kurukdere , still at the head of the establishment ; lie was compelled to see Shukri Pacha , a man quite as bad as Zarip , appointed to the command . Looking closely into everything , he found everything in confusion , and in the worst possible condition .

      He tried to introduce reforms , to force the Pachas to be honest ; -to get the men drilled , clothed , and fed ; to lay up stores in the fortresses , and to restore the army to a condition fit for the field . Of course he kept the noble Lords above referred to fully informed of all that occurred ; in fact he did his duty . How did they do theirs ? Far from gaining him the required authority and rank in the Turkish service , although Colonel Williams landed in Asia in September , yet Lord Stratford suffered the Colonel to write him

      fifty-four despatches between that date and December 8 , without deigning to answer or acknowledge one . He did not obtain for him the rank of lieutenant-general in the Turkish service until several months after he had been in Armenia . Meanwhile Lord Clarendon had paid the most scrupulous attention to the despatches of General Williams ; and when he became aware of the silence of the British ambassador , he forwarded to him a letter

      containing a just and severe rebuke . Lord Stratford ' s reply was , that he did not neglect the substantial complaints of General Williams , although he neglected to write to the General ; and that we believe to have been the fact . The ambassador further urged that he did not know distinctly what was the position of General Wiijliams ; but he admitted that it was by an " inadvertence " that ho had

      omission of the British ambassador to act in the spirit and letter of the instructions of his Government , and give its officer the necessary powers . And , at the root of the causes of the loss of Kars , we find this , that General Williams , by the negligence , if not ill-will , of Lord Stratford , was rendered almost powerless , just at the time when he could have exerted himself most effectually in storing Kars with ammunition and provisions sufficient to supply its garrison through every possible blockade in 185 & .

      The next branch of the subject inviting attention is that relating to the measures taken for the relief of- Kars . When , the Porte found that the fortress was invested , they became very anxious for its relief . They propounded a plan for a diversion in the rear of the Russian army as early as July . The proposal was that General Vivian should take the chief command , and with a very mixed force , including the Contingent , land at Redout Kaleh and march on Tiflis . Tie plan

      would not " bear examination . The Contingent was in a most inefficient state ; no commissariat was provided—it was doubtful -whether the troops could be collected . The British Government extinguished the proposal by declining to permit General Vivian and his half-organised battalions to engage in any such enterprise ; So far as the views of the JBritish Government were concerned , the plan in favour was an advance by Trebizond upon Erzeroum . The views of the French

      Government do not come out very fully in these papers , and we are left to guess them—at best a poor substitute for the facts . Soon after the first plan was broached at Constantinople , Omar Pacha called together the generals and admirals in the Crimea , and asked permission to withdraw his own troops from the lines before Sebastopol , and take them to Asia . He , too , concurred with the Porte in thinking that it would be better to land at Kedout Kaleh than

      at Trebizond . But all the naval and military authorities , French , English , and Sardinian , were at that time decidedly opposed to the withdrawal of any troops from the Crimea . It is due to Lord Clarendon to say that he made no objection , and that he proposed to fill up the gap in the lines with the Contingent , or other Turkish troops—n proposal which Simpson and Pelissier energetically

      opposed . Lord , Clarendon , disappointed , applied to the French Government . He found the same unwillingness to part with the Turkish troops . The Emperor , with characteristic caution , at length assented , however , to their withdrawal , if adequate substitutes were provided . But he threw the responsibility upon Pexissier ;^ and the French marshal hesitated . But it was now too late . While these

      complicated negotiations were in progress—these perpetual references from Court to Court , and Capital to Capital , and from the Courts and Capitals to the Camp—the propitious time for action had fled . It was actually close on , to the end of September before Marshal Pjslissieic consented to the departure of the first thxee battalions d ' elite ! Omar Paoila did the best he could ; formed the boat plans he oould ; and , once on the ground , exerted

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      3 * 2 T « E LEAD-BIB . [ No . 312 , Saturday

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      ,. SATURDAY , MAECH 15 , 1856 .

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      TfivhWi SffntrB .

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      here is nothing ao revolutionary t because there is nothing so -unnatural and con . Vulsi . vej aa the strain to fceep things fixed-when all the world iahj the very law of its creatidain eternal ' -progress : —Da . Abhold .

      Untitled Article

      - ¦ ¦ NOTICES TO CORRESPONDENTS , Nonotice caul be taken -of anonymous communications . 5 *« atever is . intended for insertion must be authenticated 27 fcne nanie and address of the writer ; not necessarily _ * y rFoblication but as a guarantee of his good faith . Xt is impossible to acknowledge the mass of letters we receive . Their insertion is often delayed , owtngto a pres 3 of matter ; and when omitted , it is frequently from reasons quite independent of the merits of the communication . ¦ ¦ ¦ ' ' -- ¦ ¦ " . ¦ ¦ ¦ ¦* : ¦' ¦ ¦ ¦¦¦ - ¦ We cannot undertake to return rejected communications . Daring the Session of Parliament it is often impossible to find room for correspondence , even the briefest .

  • Citation
    • Leader (1850-1860), March 15, 1856, page 252, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2132/page/12/