Current:

Leader (1850-1860), 21st November 1857, Edition 1 of 2, Page 1107, Untitled Article

Page 1107
Page 3
3 of 24

On this page

  • Text (3)

      Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.

    • Untitled Article

      Untitled Article

    • Untitled Article

      Untitled Article

    • Untitled Article

      Untitled Article

  • Transcript

    • Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.

      Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.

      Untitled Article

      " O - . FULL PARTICULARS OF THE FALL OF DELHI , THE RELIEF OF LUCKNOW , &c . Since our last issue , full particulars have been received of tlie reduction of Delhi , of-. the " -. arrival of Havelock ' s forces at Luck now , mid . of--. those events which -were briefly intimated at the close of last weei by the telegraphic wires . The news is of a chequered kind . The stronghold of rebellion is again firmly in our possession , after a loss of life which saddens victory itself , and leaves oar army in that quarter lamentably reduced in number . So far , however , we have been 8 ucce 3 sful ; but Lucknow is still a source of uneasiness , though it is by no means Certain that affairs are in so bad a state as would appear from the Marseilles despatches published last Saturday , whicli assorted that the city was surrounded by 50 , 000 nien , and in danger of being reduced by famine .

      DELHI . A . vast mass of intelligence has been published with reference to the fall of Delhi . Foremost in interest among these documents is the official despatch of General Wilson to the Adjutnnt-Greneral . It will bo seen , however , that this onl y refers to the first two days of the struggle : — " Delhi , September 15 . " Sir , —I have the high satisfaction , of reporting , for the information of the IMajor-Geiieral commanding in * the Upper Provinces , and through him of his Excellency the "'Commander -in-Chief , and of Government , that on the morning of the 14 th hist ., the force under my command successfully assanltod ; the city of Delhi . " Under the present circumstances , Major-General Go-wan-will , I trust , allow me to withhold for a time a full and complete detail of the operations from their Commencement to their close , and to limit myself to a summary of events . • '" ' After six ¦ 'days- of open trenches , during which the Artillery and Engineers , under their respective commanding officers , Major Gaitskell and Lieutenaht-Co-lonelBaird Smith , vied with each other in pressing forward the work , two excellent and most practicable breaches were formed in trie walls of the place , one in the curtain to the right of the Cashmere bastion , Hie other to the left of the " Water bastion , the defences of those bastions and the parapets giving musketry cover to the enemy commanding the breaches having also been , destroyed bv the artillen-.

      " The assmilt wa , s delivered on four points . The Is t column , umler Brigadier J . Nicholson , consisted of lier Majesty ' 75 th Hegiment ( 300 men ) , the 1 st European Bengal Fusiliers ( 2 00 men ) , mid 2 nd Punjab Infantry ( 430 men ) , assaulted , the main breach , their ndvaucc being -admirably covered by the 1 st Battalion , her Majesty ' s 60 tli llifics , under Colonel J . Junes . The operation was crowned with brilliant success , the enemy after severe resistance being driven from the Cashmere bastion , the main guard , and its vicinity , in complete rout . I " The 2 nd column , under Brigadier Jones , of her 31 ajesty ' s Cist Kegiment , consisting of her Majesty ' s 8 th Regiment ( 250 men ) , the 2 nd European Bengal Fusiliers ( 250 men ) , nnd the 4 th Regiment of Sikhs ( 350 nu > n ) , similarly covered by the GOth Killes , advanced on the Water bastion , carried the hreaeh , and drove the enemy from his guns and position , with a determination and spirit which gave me the highest satisfaction . "Tl . ie tfrd coin mil , under Colonel Campbell , of her Majesty ' s 52 nd Light Infantry , consisting of 200 of his own regiment , the Ki-innoon Battalion ( 250 men ) , and the 1 st Punjab Infantry ( 500 'men ) , wan directed against tlie Cashmere gateway . This column was preceded by an explosion purty , under Lieutenants lloim > and Salkuld , of the Engineers , coveivd ¦ by the tJOth Rifles . The demolition of the gatu having been accomplished , the column forced nn entrance , overcoming a strenuous opposition from the enemy ' s infantry , and heavy artillery , which had been brought- to bear ' on the position . I cannot express too warmly mv admiration of the gallantry of nil concerned in Urn difficult operation . * ' The reserve , under Urigmlier Longfiuld , her Majesty ' s 8 th Kcgimcnt , composed of her Majesty ' s Cist Kegimont ( 250 men ) , tbo 4 th Kegiinent Killo * ( 150 rncn ) , tho J 3 olooch Uult alion ( 800 men ) , the . Tlxecnd lv , ftjah ' n . Auxiliaries ( 000 nun ) , and 200 of hor Majesty ' s GOth Rules , who joined after tlu > . assault hud been imnde , awaited the result of tho attack , imd on the columns entering tlie place , took possession of the posts 1 had previously assigned to it . Thin duty was ultimately lierlornu-d to my entire satisfaction . " Tho linn establishment of tho rcHcrvc rendering the assaulting columns free to net in advance , Brigadier-General Nicholson , supported by Brigadier Tones , swept tlu > rampart * of tho place , " from tho Cashmere to tho Ciilml gates , occupying the bastions ami dereucus , capturing ; th . i guns , ami driving ( he i-nomy boforo him . " . During the inlvanco , Briyudior-Gonernl Xieliolson

      was , to the grief of myself and the whole army , dangerously wounded . The command conseq « ently devolved on Brigadier Jones , who , finding the enemy in great force , occupying and pouring a destructive ftre from th-a roofs of strong ami commanding houses in the cJty on all sides , the ramparts themselves being enfiladed by guns , prudently resolved on retaining possession of the Cabul gate , which his troops had so gallantly won , in which he firmly established himself , awaiting the result of the operations of the other columns of occupation . * Colonel Campbell , with the column under his command , advanced successfully from the Cashmere gate by one of the main streets beyond the Chandnee Chouk , the central and principal street of the city , towards the Jumna . Musjid , with the intention of occupying that important post . The opposition , however , which he met from the great concentration of the enemy , at the Jumna TVIusjiil and the houses in the neighbourhood , he him-self , I regret to state , being wounded , satisfied him that his most prudent course was not to maintain so advanced a position with the comparatively limited force at his disposal , and he accordingly withdrew the head of his column and placed himself in communication with the reserve , a measure which liad my entire approval ; I having previously determined that , in the event of serious opposition being encountered hi the town itself , it would be most inexpedient to commit my small force to a succession of street fights , in which their gallantry , discipline , and organization could avail them so little . : " 3 Ey present position , therefore , ia that which , under such a contingency , I had resolved to occupy and establish myself in firmly , as the base of my systematic operations for the complete possession of the city . This embraces the magazine on one side , and the Cabul gate on the other , with the Moree , Cashmere , and Water Bastions , and strong- intermediate posts with , secure communication along the front and to the rear . " IVom this base I am now cautiously pressing- the enemy on all points , with a view to establishing myself in a second ad van . position , and I trust before many days to ha . . it in ray pnvrer to announce to the Supreme Government , that the enemy have been driven from their last stronghold in the palace , fort , and streets of-. the city of Delhi . " Simultaneously with the operations above detailed , an attack was made on the enemy's strong position outside the city , in the suburbs of Kissengunge and Pahareeporc . with a view of driving in the rebels , and supporting the main attack , by ¦ effecting an entrance at the Cabxil gate nfter it should be taken . " The force employed on this difficult duty I entrusted to that admirable officer , Major C . Heid , commanding the Sirmoor battalion , whose distinguished conduct I have already had occasion to bring prominently to the notice of superior authority , and who was , I much regret , severely Wounded on this occasion . His column consisted of his own battalion , the Guides , and the men on duty at Hindoo Rao ' s ( the main picket ) , numbering in all about 1000 , supported by the auxiliary troops of his highness the Maharajah Kunbheer Singh , under Captain K . Lawrence . " The strength of the positions , however , and tho desperate resistance ottered'by the enemy , withstood for a time the efforts of our troops , gallant though they were , and the combination was imablo to be effected . The delay , I am happy to say , has only been temporary , for the enemy have subsequently abandoned their positions , leaving their guns in our hands . "In this attack I found it necessary to support Major Reid with Cavalry and Horse Artillery , both of which nrma were admirably handled respectively by Brigadier Hope Grant of her Majesty ' s Oth Lancers , commanding the Cavalry Brigade , and Major II . Tombs , of the Horse Artillery , who inflicted severe punishment on the enemy , though I regTet their own loss was vcrv heavy .

      The resistance of the rebels up to this time has been that of desperate men , and to this must be attributed the severe loss we have sustained , nmounting proximatcly , so fur as I am able to judge , in the absence of casualty returns , to forty-six officers killed and wounded , and about 800 men . Amongst those of whose services the state has been deprived are many officers of distinction « ind merit , holding superior commands , whose places cannot be supplied ; and I have specially to lament the loss -which has been sustained by that " splendid corps , the Engineers , nine officers of tlmt arm having fallen in tho gnllnnt performance of their duty . " Until 1 am in possession of reports from bi-igndiers and other commanding officers , ! shall be wnable to enter more fully into the details of these operations , and I trcist tho circumstances under which I write will excuse nny slight inaccuracies or imperfections which my despatch may exhibit . " Tho absence of such reports also prevents my bringing to notice the namra of those officors and men who have specially distinguished themselves . This will be my grateful duty hereafter . But I cannot defer tho expression of my admiration for tlio Intrepidity , coolness , and determination of all engaged , Europeans and natives , of nil anna of the service . " General Chamberlain remarks in his report , dated September 18 : — " The usual licence which invariably accompanies i \ n assault of u largo city bus somewhat retarded our advance ; but order is being fast restored . " To this spirit of 'licence' we suppose we

      must ascribe the bayoneting of the civilians found within the walls of Delhi . An eye-witness ( evidently a military man ) , has communicated to the papers an account of the siege operations preceding the assault , and of the assault itself . We here read : — " The north face being the side to be attacked it was resolved to hold the right in check as far as possible and to push the main attack on the left first , as the river would completely protect our flank as ' -we advanced ; second , as there was better cover on that side * third , as after the assault the troops would not find themselves immediately in . narrow streets , but in comparatively open ground . " The front to be attacked consisted of the Moree , Cashmere , and Water Bastions , with the curtain walls connecting them . These bastions had been greatly altered and improved by our own engineers many years ago , and presented regular faces and flanks of masonry with properly cut embrasures ; the height of the wall was twenty-four feet above the ground level , of which , however , eight feet was a mere parapet three feet thick , the remainder being about four times that thickness ; outside the wall was a very wide berm and then a ditch sixteen feet deep and twenty feet wide at bottom , escarp and counterscarp steep , and the latter unriveted , and the former riveted with stone and eight feet in height . A good sloping glacis covered the lower ten feet of the wall from all attempts of distant batteries . " On the evening of the 7 th of September , No . 1 advanced battery , in two portions , was traced about seven hundred yards from the Moree Bastion , the riglit portion , for live 18-pounders and one 8-inch howitzer was to silence the Moree and prevent its interfering with the attack on the left . The left portion four 24-pounders ¦ was intended to hold the Cashmere Bastion partially in . check . The working parties were very little disturbed during the night ; the covering parties in front kept the musketry at a distance , and except three well-aimed showers of grape thrown from the Moree , which knocked over some workmen , we received no further annoyance . By the morning , the two portions of the battery were

      finished and armed , though not ready to fire until nearly sunrise . A trench -was also made connecting the two portions , and extending a little to the "right and left , so as to give communication : with a wide and deep ravine which , extending ^ ery nearly Up to our left attack , formed a sort of first parallel , and gave good cover to the guard of the trenches , the doolies , &c . For some time ' we were well pounded from the Moree with round shot and grape , but as our guns in the new battery got graduall y into J > 1 ay , the enemy ' s fire grew less and less , and was at length completely overpowered . This battery became known as Brind ' s , being worked by that officer with great effect till the end ' of the siege . " On the evening of the 8 th and 9 th , No . 2 batterywas traced and commenced . To our surprise , we had been allowed to seize this advanced position at Ludlow Castle within six hundred yards of the city , without even a fight for it on the previous day . Infact , there is little doubt the enemy still thought tlie attack was to be on the right , where all the fighting had hitherto been , and where all our old batteries were located . Lndlow Castle and the Koodsee Bagli were now occupied by strong detachments , and formed our chief supports to the left attack . During the 9 th , a sharp fire of musketry , shot , and shells was opened on these positions by the enemy from tlia jiuigle in front , and from the Cashmere and "Water Bastions and the SeHmghur , but no great damage - \ vas done . " During the nights or the 9 th and 10 th , No . 2 battery was completed and partially armed , but not vet unmasked . It was in two portions . One immediately in " rout of "Ludlow Castle for nine 24- ]> oundors , to open a broach in the curtain between the Cashmere and Water Bastions immediately to the loft of the former , nnd to knock off tho parapet lo the right and left for some distance , so as to > give no'cover to musketry . The other portion , some two hundred yards to the right , consisting of seven 8-iucli howitzers and two 18-pounders , was to aid the fust portion , and work with it to the same cncl . No . 3 battery -was also commenced on tlie left , and No . I battery for tea heavy mortals completed in the Koodsee Bagh , but not yet -unmasked . Major Tombs was in charge of this battery . The light mortars under Captain Blunt were afterwards worked from the rear of the Custom-house . "During the night of the 10 th and 11 th , No . 2 battery was strengthened , armed , and unmnsked , nut No . 3 battery completed . This Inst was nindo in tin boldest manner within one hundred and eighty yards ol tlie Water Bastion , behiud a small ruined houisc in tin Custom .-house compound—and under such a fu-o ol musketry us few batteries have ever been exposed t <>; it Avas for six 18-pomiders which vero to open n seo < wi < l broach in the Water Bastion , nnd was worked by Mnjar Scott . Tho enemy also wont to . work to-night andmnrto an ndvnnced trench parallel to our left attack , nnd about throe hundred and fifty yards from it , from whi < -h nt < liiybronk they opened u very hot llro of musketry , which was maintained throughout tlie rest of tho fiioffo . 1 hey had previously got some light K » n « nnrt » iw heavy gun out into the open on our riK lit , which caused considerable nwioynimi bv their i-nlilado lire . " ( In tho 111 h , our batteries opened fire , n salvo from the nine 21-pounders opening the bull , and allowing , by

      Untitled Article

      THE IffD-I . AH . 'REVOLT .

      Untitled Article

      No . 400 , November 21 , 1857 . ] T HE LEADE R . 11 O 7

  • Citation
    • Leader (1850-1860), Nov. 21, 1857, page 1107, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2218/page/3/