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      Untitled Article

      MR . GLADSTONE'S . . ' MANIFESTO . India may" not be able to rejoice at finding herself subjected to Sir Charles Wood , but it is some comfort for England , condemned to an immense expenditure for national defences , and dreading the imposition of new taxes , to have escaped the honourable baronet ' s re-appearance as Chancellor of the Exchequer , and the consequent exhibition of his " supercilious knowledge in accounts . " With Mr . Gladstone in . that important office we have some guarantee for the enforcement of economy , and the preparation of a budget that ivill press as lightly uponjndustry as public requirements will permit : but we wait with curiosity to see how the super-subtle mind of the member for Oxford will deal with other questions upon which he must come to a joint decision with his very heterogeneous colleagues .

      Palmerston and Russell differ widely from those of Lord Derby , it is still moi'C remarkable that Mr . Gladstone should have supported the late administration in opposition to the men with whom he declares himself agreed . It is a characteristic of Mr . Gladstone ' s intellect that it can always furnish a reason for acting in . opposition to any principle which it recognises , and hence , neither respect for his integrity , nor' admii * ation of his talents , can remove him from the category of doubtful men .

      As a reason for joining Lord Palmerston ' s cabinet , he refers to its probable ability to deal with parliamentary reform , and after alluding to the incapacity of the late Government , he exclaims : — "l therefore naturally turn to the hope of its being settled by a cabinet mainly constituted and led by the men together with whom I was responsible for framing and preparing a Reform Bill in 1854 , " and following this paragraph comes a sort of apology for consenting to sit beside Messrs . Cobden and Gibson .

      A prominent feature of the Bill of 1854 was the extent of its disfranchisement of rotten boroughs , of which nineteen were to cease to return any members at all . Moreover , thirty-three boroughs returning two members each , were to be reduced to one . In striki / ig contrast to this bold scheme was that proposed by Lord Derby ' s Government , in which every rotten borough was to be preserved , but fifteen small places were to surrender one member each . In the discussion . which took place in March , Lord Palmerston alluded favourably to this portion of the Tory bill , and Mr . Gladstone made the following remarks : — "I confess I agree with the noble lord the member for Tiverton on that portion of the bill which has reference to the re-distribution

      of seats . I think myself that very scant justice has been done to that portion of the bill , which I cannot help thinking a great improvement on the measure of 1854 . The measure has been framed wisely in this respect , and is vastly superior in this respect to the measure of 1854 . " Some observers of Mr . Gladstone may expect , that having demonstrated to his own satisfaction the beauty arid pre-eminence of rotten boroughs , he will become the more willing to offer them up in sacrifice ; and that , having proved the superiority of certain parts of the Derby-Disraeli Bill of 1859 over the measure which he helped to frame in 1854 , he may consider the former as too good for this world , an content to revert

      to the principles of tbe latter . For our parts , we wonder at Mr . Gladstone ' s mental conjuring as much as the Arabs did at the prestidigitation of Robert-Houdin—not that we mean a comparison , for we are aware that " hone but himself can be his parellel , " and we hope for his own sake to see him emerge safely from his many-winding ways of thought . Mr . Bright ' s friends are very angry that he was not invited to take a seat in the Cabinet , but we can easily imagine he would not have contributed to make it a " happy family , " especially as Mr . Gladstone , when alWing to his own benevolence in consenting to sit with Messrs . Gibson and Cobden , reminds the Frovost of Oriel , that " among the faults which luive at any time been found with him , has never been that of undue subserviency to the opinions of others . "

      Thus upon parliamentary reform Mr . Gladstone is as obscure as a conjuror in his smoke , while upon foreign atfiiirs liig utterances are Delphic doubts , for lie tells us he is in favour ofusin" the influence of England on behalf of the " stability and justice of political arrangements abroad , " a sentiment which the late Prince Metternich might have pronounced to be without fault . That the friend of Poerio means well to Italv we do not doubt , lmt—Mr . Gladstone ! is a dweller in cobwebs—wo like to stand on solid earth .

      It often happens to scholars to find a commentary more puzzling than . the text , and Mr . Gladstone ' s explanation of himself to the Provost of Oriel is scarcely more luminous than the " Asian mystery , " on which Mr . Disraeli delighted to discant . lie condemns the conduct of Lord Derby ' s Government in rejecting the counsels of Mr . Walpole and Mr . Henley , when preparing their Heform Bill ; he blames them for dissolving Parliament , and thiaks it " undeniable that the return of an adverse and no longer indulgent majority rendered the settlement of this question ( reform ) by the late

      ministers impossible . " An ordinary man , who regarded reform as a " p aramount interest and duty of the period , " would have esteemed the nonability of the late cabinet to deal with it as a good cause for declaring that they did not possess the confidence of the House of Commons . JS ot so Mr . Gladstone ; he was unwilling to support the motion of Lord Ilartington because " . it appeared to imply a previous course of opposition . " Of all curious reasons for not doing that which lie thought in itself desirable this is the strangest , and we doubt whether the famous casuists of the Jesuits ever invented so singular a pretext . Translated into plainer language Mr . Gladstone ' s phraseology would run tliua— "I thought Lord Derby wrong in principle ; I regarded him ns incapable of

      dealing with the weightiest question of the day , but I would not say so , because that would have implied that I hail boon previously opposed to him . " IT Mr . Gladstone means that by supporting Lord Uartington ' a motion he would have made himself responsible for the provious opposition of the Whig party , wo must observe thatno one else could have imagined ft connexion between matters so palpably separata ; and if the principle were admittod It should have prevented his joining Lord Pnlmerston at all , lost it should imply an abandonment oi" the course of . " previous opposition" to that minister , in -which he reminds us lie took apart . Upon the Italian , question Mr . Gladstone says—* ' over eiiico my mind was turned io the caso of Italy my views and c 6 nvictions have Ixsen'jm unison with those of the statesmen who will now bo chiefly charged with our foreign affairs . " If 80 , and' if , as we imagine , the views of Lords

      Untitled Article

      the fetters which the House of llapsburg has imposed , nor ought he to regard the depression of Austria in any other light than that of a necessary condition which must precede , the union and regeneration of bis own fatherland . ' We know that a large portion of the German people are mad on the subject of a possible French invasion ; but as a precautionary measure nothing could be worse than entangling themselves in alliance with Austria , and forcing the French into a collision , in which moral justice would be on their side . There is no evidence * save that supplied by the phantasmagoria of fear , that the French Enrperor has any

      desire to risk a . repetition of the aggressive conduct that sent his uncle to a solitary- rock in the Atlantic ; but if he should wish to make the Rhino the boundary of France , no folly could be more fatal than for the Germans to place themselves in . a position in which a war would be inevitable , and a defeat richly deserved . To fight for the . slavery of ¦ the Italians , for the oppression of Hungary , and for the dominance of the worst form of ultramontane Popery , would be an accumulation of disgrace and crime that Germany-would have to expiate by years of suffering ; and all this and more would be involved if the sword of Prussia should be drawn in the Austrian cause . It is said that when Louis

      Napoleon has conquered Austria , in Italy , it will be easier for him to assail the German States , and that it is better for them to make common cause with the Hapsburgs now than to wait until the most powerful member of their Confederation is humbled and torn . Setting aside for a moment the immense disadvantage to Germany of making her cause morally wrong , by allying it with the " crimes of tlie House of llapsburg , " let us examine the physical considerations involved in the calculatibn . An alliance with Austria means a partnership v-ith a fraudulent bankrupt , to . carry on an expensive business ; and surely tlie Germans must Lave imbibed very much beer , and smoked an unusual quantity of tobacco , before that can be looked upon as an eligible move .

      As a numerical question of disposable forces the matter is still worse . By fighting against the independence of Italy the Germans would bring against them the military power -of twenty-six millions of Italian people ; for in such a crisis Louis 2 v " ai > oleon would become the virtual sovereign of hearts , as well as of territory , from the Alps to the last rock which Sicily opposes to the blue waves of the sea . Again , they would compel fourteen millions of Hungarians to fight against them , and a larger nuinber of Gorman troops would be neutralised by the concentration of a Russian force on their frontiers than could be replaced by all the soldiers that ( what remained of ) Austria could bring .

      It is understood that the recent invitation to Kossuth to proceed immediately to Italy is not unconnected with the threatening conduct of Prussia ; and Avhatever may happen under other circumstances , it is tolerably certain that Louw Napoleon would assist the Hungarians—who are ready for revolt—the moment he saw himself likely to be attacked by tlie German Powers . The Prince of Prussia is , unfortunately , no statesman , and vacillates between ambition to wear the imperial crownof Germany and dread of constitutional , or , as he calls them , " revolutionary " movements . Under ordinal / circumstances France would help unionbut

      Austrian intrigues to prevent German , there is reason to believe Louis Napoleon would '" reatl y prefer it to an enlargement of the war , which ia already sufficiently costly in men and money to be a matter of serious consideration . T his union is ot far more importance to Germany than the nonsense about ( Mending of the Rhine or the Mmcio , which Lord Mulmesbury looked upon uh Huftoiont to induce Prussia tu commence hostilities . XJio passage we refer to occurs in the " Jfwrthor correspondence respecting the afiairs of Italy , recently presented to Parliament . The late Foreign Secretary , writing to Sir James Hudson ,

      observed—THE RHINE AND THE MINCXO . Thb expected battle on the Minoio does not create so much anxiety as the attitude of Prussia , which constitutes a puzzle to friends as well as foes . To any statesman who desires tho welfare of the Germans , tho duty of their great Protestant power admits of no doubt . Towards France the position of Prussia should be , like that of England , one of sympathy , so long oa the acts of Louis Napoleon correspond wjth tho solemn declarations Which ho 1 ms matlo . No true German ought to fool tho blightost desire to provont either tho Italians or the Hungarians ii-om breaking wmndur

      <• It ia fult that success in Italy , followed as it would bo by tlie breaking up of thosu great fortresses which form a bulwark to all Gprmany on tlio Tyroloso frontier , and of tho territorial arrangements of 1815 , askable to that country , will bo but an jnducomont to Franco to make a furthor attempt to subvert those nrrangomonts on tho Hhlno } and that tho probability of success in tho latter course wm bo uroutly iu favour of Franco , If she does not

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      OFFICE , NO . , CATHERINE-STREET , STRAND , W . C .

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      Untitled Article

      SATURDAY , JUNE 25 , 1859 .

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      There is nothing so revolutionary , because tlierc is nothing so unnatural and convulsive , as the strain to keep things fixed when all the world is by the very law of its creation iu eternal progress . —Dr . Arnold . - * -

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      SUBSCRIPTION TO " THE LEADER . " ONE GUINEA PER YEAR , UNSTAMPED , PREPAID . ( Delivered Gratis . )

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      Public Affairs . ] THE LEADER . 769

  • Citation
    • Leader (1850-1860), June 25, 1859, page 769, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2300/page/13/