On this page
-
Text (1)
-
Untitled Article
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
-
-
Transcript
-
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.
Untitled Article
tioii , and simply to declare , that no ease has existed , and . we have a © reason to expect that any case shall ever exist , in which an error of belief shall be found , on full experiment , taken in all its connexion , and traced through all its consequences of moral
advantage and beneficial tendency . Till such a case is , not merely imagined , but made out in fact , the maxim , whether it be proved or not , certainly is not exploded , that the cause of truth and of virtue is the same . And if the case were fully established , it would no more
destroy the practical maxim resting on the basis of utility , that truth ( by which must be meant the diffusion of truth ) tends to good , than the production of a single instance in
which a departure from a moral rule had a happy issue , can destroy the obligation of that moral rule upon human practice . The obligation of the rule and the truth of the maxim
must be determined by general application , and if that shall confirm them , utility requires that tfie evil of a particular case of exception should exist , rather than the authorit y of the maxim and the obligation of the rule should be made liable to be questioned by
« my man on every emergency . The appeal to consequences is often made to deter ntfen from the free use of their understanding . It is in frequent use with the deciaimer , whose object is not to enlighten but" persuade , and whose address is therefore directed
rather to the passions than the reason of mankind . In questions of utility , however , the appeal is necessary and just , since they can only be determined by the consideration of
consequences , either apprehended or experienced . On this ground the moralit y of truth has been attacked in Jhe article from which we have cited . Un the same ground the opposite opinion ought to be examined , name'y > the morality of error . If the prince that truth is favourable to virtue 18 to be given up , we must substitute 10 place , that falsehood may be
fa-Jmiable to virtue ; and if virtue , can er some of its necessary supports ^ ° m falsehood , falsehood may make JJJ * ^ constitution and conduct me divine government . Suppose , 'en , revelation made to mankind , tW ? ? tterted *> y undeniable miracles ; re * 9 longer any certainty in the
Untitled Article
conclusion that those miracles were wrought in confirmation of what is true . It may be a revelation of lies , and the promise of our future
existence may be one of the number . On the principle of " the moral advantage of erroneous belief , " the impossibility of a revelation entitled to human confidence , is established in a
manner in which it never appears to have occurred to the mind of Hume . It is unnecessary to pursue this consequence any farther : if it be not a refutation of the nrin circle . be not a refutation of the principle
, it may be allowed to be a presumption against it of some weight . If the new moral maxim be admitted , the base of confidential intercourse
betwixt man and man will be narrowed to a point far too small for the safety of the superstructure . In the old school of morality , the persuasion that any man was governed by the principles of virtue was reason enough for reliance in his veracity . But if
the new moral code be substituted , the virtuous man may deceive me on the principles of virtue , and I may fairly question the truth of his most solemn declarations , because , " though he love truth much , he loves virtue more . " He believes that men must
be cheated into virtue and happiness , and therefore my apprehension that he may deceive me will be in proportion to the strength of my conviction that he is governed by virtuous principles . If I confide in his veracity at
all , my confidence must proceed from the opinion , that he has some little remaining prejudice in favour of truth ; or that his understanding is of a cast too plain and simple to discern the moral advantages that flow from dissimulation and falsehood with sufficient
clearness , to make a practical application of his own maxim . A system of moral philosophy , which should give the sanction of its authority to & principle involving such consequences as these , would not > it is hoped , make many proselytes in England 3 and in the North it will have to contend with
powerful " instincts , " and with names of great authority both of the living and the dead . The following- passage is quoted from Dr . Reid ' s Essays on the Intellectual Powers of man . " We need not be afraid that the interest of
virtue may suffer by a free and candid examination of any question whatever , for the interests of truth and of
Untitled Article
Dr . Morell , on the Connexion between Truth and Morality . S 41
-
-
Citation
-
Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), June 2, 1815, page 341, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct1761/page/13/
-