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    as far as it will go * but there would be a great absurdity in rejecting this evidence altogether , because it does not amount to certainty ; unless , indeed , the doctrine for which it pleads ' * is already supported by more than sufficient evidence of an indisputable kind . " " In all cases in which human

    nature can feel an interest , would it not be much more easy to learn the truth , independently of the miracle , than to arrive at absolute certainty concerning the miracle , in order to prove the doctrine ? 1 say absolute certainty , because nothing short of this can be of any use in the case we are consider in sr . " " Do the principles are considering . Do the principles

    of natural religion , then , rest upon absolute certainty ? * If not , they can be of no use whatever , and we shall be in danger , for want of certainty , of having np religion at all . But why is this absolute certainty required ? Human belief and human conduct in general are governed by probability , and by probability alone . The conviction , however , which is produced by historical testimony , and that with

    respect to facts of great antiquity , is scarcely to be distinguished from the confidence of certain knowledge . And though " human testimony , " according to our Author , " however credible , may or may not he true , " when upon

    sufficient inquiry we have satisfied ourselves that it is true , we feel persuaded that in this particular case it cannot be false . ** But if any man could persuade me that my eternal salvation were depending upon its truth , he would , at the same moment ,

    fill my mind with doubt and anxiety . " Let me feel the same conviction of the reality of any fact , as I do of the reality of many facts even of ancient date , and my mind would be filled

    with no doubt or anxiety , whatever were depending upon its truth . But to proceed to the subject of a future life ; " what I principally rely wi , says our Author , is the obvious suitableness and propriety of a sequel

    * That they do not , our Author himself acknowledges , when he says , vrith respect to a future life , p . 234 , that " certainty is entirely out of the question . " This concession , indeed , I did not expect , after baring * read in p . 219 , : th « ttit is impossible that human life should terminate in the » Me « ce and darkness of the grave-

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    to our present existence , and the manifest absurdity of supposing the wise and benevolent Creator to have produced so noble a work as man , for the mere purpose of destroying him ; and 1 rely principally on this ,

    because , from its simplicity and force , it appears eminently calculated to affect , and is , in fact , that consideration which has always affected , the mass of mankind , and produced that universal expectation of a future life which we find to prevail in the world ; " * and which he tells us else * VI ^—* » IVi ft U >»*^ . « 11 AJI AV / A Jl « . AVX b V 1 Jl U m ^* fc ^ ^ S * VT ^

    where , has prevailed among the ge * nerality of the human race , " with scarcely the intervention of a doubt . " What has been thus confidently received by the generality of the human race , I am not able to say ; but there are many passages in the ancient authors which satisfactorilv

    demonstrate that the wisest philosophers of Greece and Rome could not advance beyond this alternative , that death would either prove the extinction of

    * But our Author proceeds , u Not indeed that this argument necessarily presents itself to the unassisted understand ing * of every individual of mankind ; or even that a majority of the human race has in any age possessed powers and information to reason correctly in this way ; hut that in every age it has pleased the sovereign Creator and Governor of the universe to

    raise up men of superior discernment and penetration , who , after having explored the paths of science for themselves , have delighted in communicating their discoveries to others . " This does not appear very consistent with what we read in p . 128 , that u the religion of reason and

    nature is intelligible to every human beings who is willing to open his eyes , and to fin them attentively upon its luminous and instructive lessons . * ' But if , as we are informed , there is a manifest absurdity in supposing the wise and henevolent Creator to have produced so noble a work as man

    for the mere purpose of destroying him , I cannot help inquiring how it came to pass that superior discernment and penetration should be necessary for discovering tliis absurdity ? Did the difficulty He in ascertaining the premises , or in drawing the conclusion ? As for the multitude who

    were too dull to discern this absurdity themselves , there is reason to suspect that they took the matter upon trust , and nevtir distinctly apprehended the force of the argument by which they were so much affected .

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    £$ 2 Mr . Cogan ' s Strictures on some of the Arguments in Apeleutherns"

• Citation
  • Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), April 2, 1819, page 222, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct1771/page/10/