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    follows , ^ feoiirse , that unerring perfection , absolute freedom from evil , and invariability of condition , caa nevcr . be the portion of any created iateJligeace * At the same time , I wish M express my thorough

    coavictioa , ths& the perfection an < J felicity of the righteous in a future state of bliss , will be all , and eirea much more than all , we can now conceive of even infinite perfection and happiness , because our ideas , so far from reaching to any just idea of infinity , must fall far short even of the real extent of

    the future perfection and happiness of finite beings , however short of infinity that may be # I cannot quit Mr . Eatoa without acknowledging the very liberal and Christianlike manner in which he has conducted the controversy .

    In replying * to JVIn Johnston * his remarks upon the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity first claim my at ^ tention ; but after the able statements aud illustrations of this enlightened doctrine , by Dr , Priestley , Mr . BeU sham , Dr . Southwood Smith , and others , in tkeir publications , and the admirable and incontrovertible

    effusions of Mr . Cogan and others , in your valuable pages , it cannot be necessary far me to enter upon its general statement or defence ; but in justification of the hint I threw out

    upon this subject in my last communication , I shall merely set forth the inference , which I then stated to be one , of the suppressed inferences I had drawn from my hypothesis , ( i . e . )

    " 5 thly . The foregoing- hypothesis demonstrably proves , that as there can l > e but one Being , possessed of infinite or unlimited attributes , and vyho controuls the universe and all its causes

    all other beings must be , in all respects , dependent upon him and his laws , and , therefore ; that it was , and is , beyond the power of Infinity itself to make aa independent being or a free agent , * since an independent

    * Though I have used this term for want of a n * 0 re 'definite one , I consider the Necessarian' equally as much a free agent as the Libertarian ; as I do ntft see any thhig 'in * the doctrine ef Philosophical Necessity at ulI hostile to banmn Iwerty : for what idea have we of Jibeity more than tluB-rtto do , as we will ? , and the

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    being- c&nuot be less thsm Deity ^ -orttcti a being must necessarily ^ equal witl * God ; but the hypothesis proves that the Deity himself could not cre& ^ e IU £ equal . The whole universe * therefore , being under the sole controul of him

    whose eye , unconfined to spaced s 4 ze > or proportion , perceives as 4 him 9 ottf an atom as a world ; 'to whom no high , no lo * vv no great , no sifKitt ? who fills , who bounds , connects , at&l equals all : ' and withput whose de ^

    sign * we are assured , that not evea a sparrow can fall , all other beings having only limited attributes , can have neither power to con troul surrounding causes , nor prescience to foresee future events $ and consequently they must be continually

    wader the influence of those causes , over which they have no controuU These causes , therefore , constantly give motive and produce volition ; aud consequently beings , with limited attributes , can no more controul either their motives or their volitipn , than they can the causes which originate

    them : and hence , it is a certain truth * that if they could produce volition , or controul their own motives , even in the smallest matters , independently of these causes , they could as well eontroul the universe , and usurp the place of . the Deity Himself . I am indeed , always shocked when X consider the bold and awfully impious tendency of the freeagency or Libertarian scheme , which shuts the Deity out from the

    managedoctrine of Philosophical Necessity secures this liberty , by asSertihg , that we cannot do otherwise than as we will , since we must ever obey our own will ; or , philosophically shaking , that volition which is produced by the strongest motive . We are , therefore , certainly freewill actors as far a $ respects this volition ; but as far as respects tbe motives , aud the causes ipluqh dictate thoae motives , there can be bqit one free or independent agent—that is Gpd .

    ? Matt . x . 29 . The Gommpw Ver ^ ph has * without your Father ;** l > ut what can we understand by this , when referring to a Being whose attributes are altipexradiag , but t& implyiiig

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    Mr . Hintonon kis Hypothesis of thR inevitable Hxiteem&of-Eiyit * p&&

• Citation
  • Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Dec. 2, 1823, page 709, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct1791/page/29/