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J » oial > Gblig&tiOiw It is to a want of ^ ufficitint ftttentlon to the distinction between > these > two very different questions , that the paradoxes and controversies whichhave disgusted many ^ th thte bretach of ethical science , may , in a great measure , be ascribed . The question , " what is that common quality which belongs , or is supposed to belong , to whatever is called virtuous , ** has received various answers , most of which , when attentively examined , will be found ultimately to coincide ; and all of them , when fairl y applied , will be found to indicate the same or nearly the same objects . They differ , however , materially in distinctness , precision and facility of application . Conformity with the will of God , wherever that will can be clearly ascertained , must evidently supersede all others ; and here the believer in revelation enjoys tbe unspeakable advantage of a guide in which he feels that he can repose implicit and unhesitating confidence . But to the moralist who
confines himself to natural religion only , or even to the Christian , in those cases , if there be any such , to which the gospel rule does not immediately and ) precisely apply , the will of God cannot serve as a criterion of virtue , In < suefa ) cases , we must learn what is virtuous by the application of some otkeu test , and then its acknowledged conformity to the will of God will furnish the decisive motive or obligation to practise it . Such a test Mr .
Jevons finds in the utility of virtue , or its tendency to promote the general happiness . The principal objection to this doctrine is the alleged difficulty of applying in practice the criterion recommended ; a difficulty , however , which * though its existence must be admitted , has ¦ . certainly been exaggerated beyound all truth or reason by several very eminent writers . The manner in which it has been misunderstood by some , and
perverted or misapplied by others , has exposed this doctrine to no small portion of undeserved suspicion and prejudice ; which have been occasionally increased by the unfortunate ambiguity of several terms frequently employed by its supporters , in a sense to which the bulk of mankind are less accustomed * It is justly observed by our author > . ¦> that no other criterion can be considered as altogether free from the same objection , because no other in its detailed application by different persona has ever ; led them invariably to the same results . , , >
The inquiry into the nature of moral obligation has been more perplexed by theoretical reasoners than any other in ethical sciende . The obscurity which sometimes appears to hang over that subject , perhaps arises in a great measure from the circumstance that the obligation has almost always been considered with relation to tbe beings on whom it is imposed , and not to the source or authority from which it emanates . The distinction between an inducement ^ as a matter of prudence , and an obligation , as a matter of
dittyy is obvious on the slightest reflection ; but no intelligible account can be given of this distinction without an immediate reference to the idea bi dependence on some superior being , who is enabled to connect the observe ance of his laws with the attainment of some object of essential importance to the agent . This object , in the case of moral obligation , can be no other than the greatest present or future happiness of the agent , connected with the practice of virtue by the declared will of God , or ( what comes * in fact to the same thing ) b y the course of nature or of providence . ' ' j ' ¦ ¦ !' [ " The necessity of a reference to a futwe state in order to a perfectly skls ^ factory account of this subject is distinctly admitted by Mr . Jevbns in the following passage : " The sum , then , of our ar ^ tiniehi is this , —that no given course of conduct canb pronounced either cottdUdta # t WdVferse to the present happiness of an
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RmMm ~^ € S wntf $ ! ptenffik Morality . & 95
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Citation
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Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Dec. 2, 1827, page 893, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct1803/page/37/
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