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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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bijghiiig tl ^ fffaJkOitf ^ t a » ifi ^ n * ^ l ^ i )^ t ? S « ritei fi ^ evidence - from cfcher > $ inaTtBi 3 vtj ; j -An * - , A-iu ^ r-do - * j . i' > Mbno ' j ii ' jn % jxntMi-: -u ¦ ¦ » .. ¦» ,. ¦¦¦ -.- ; M * , Jevotis commences his pf ( k ^ 6 f * th ^ being ^ iwijfiprdvidence of God by examining the tfell-krtown obj ^ ctifbii of ^ N ^ tfd ^ ii ^ 'fr ^ Ms . doctrine of causation . This objection , by fyhichtidt £ ! fewi o ^ rlctoktri g the fallacy on which it is founded , have been puzzled , thBtigri not convinced , he en- » deavours , and in our opinion very successfully , to shew is altogether
groundless . It proceeds upon an alleged analogy between matter and mind which cannot possibly be admitted . It may be allowed that what we call physical causes are m $ ieM efficients , but only uniform and invariable antecedents ^* - the occasion * ia connexion with which some other power or agent really produces ; the efieety without affording any place for the inference that this & after ail A \ & only notion we can attach to the term cause * The notion ^{^^ f tj ^ si ^ ted ' ^ an attribute of mind , and that which we commonl y ^ ctlt ^ W- 'lJ ^ ai ^ mate obj ects , are totally different and independent of each ^ iJi e ^ r ^ ^ e J / Sne ; arises merely from observing the uniform conjunction rkg ^ G&ft j antecedents and consequences , the other is the result of pur own
^ n ^^ usne . s ^ , , . d * e If ^ e tafcei such effects as evince contrivance or design , and coMder that Contrivance abstractedly , it will surely be allowed , that between : tHe mintl of the agent , and so much of the effect as consists in the itotittfttdnce Sjj'iiself considered , there is a necessary connexion , a real causation .: Thte ' artist ; for instance , who contrives and puts together an ingeniouspiecebf mech 8 iBism , is hot , it is admitted , the cause of the whole effect | ifoducea ' * : h ^ dM not create the materials which he employs ; nor is he , strictly apeakiirfif ; tl ^ e cause of tHose motions of his limbs or fingers by whicl ; he ojperat ^ s ; fot he knows not even how they are produced ; but so far as regardsrthfe desfgn , of the raeclianism abstractedly considered , of that he is 'ihefcauKe' in th ^ s'tnctest possible sense . Between that , and the idea 'which jptteVibttsly existed hi ^^ his li ^ ind as the model of the work , thefe is sufefy something more than a rriere arbitrary succession ; there is a necessary itid do ^ e c&nhe , xioh . The one is the very transcript of the other . The' cwtH ^ atic ^ of the mechatnis m corresponds exactl y with the ingenuity of the artist ; Valid tkUnbi eveh be cortceived to have existed independently of iir . Tlie ^ fe , iahriOt , therefore , be a more legitimate inference , than that which * leads ^ us , trom ! tie observation of in
means skilfully adjusted to certain ends ^ rto ^ e , belief , of a ^ i telhgent mind as the cause of tjiat adjustment . "—Vol , II . jjp , 1 ^ I , J 62 . , . If then we are justified in deducing from the adaptation of means to ends in human works the existence of a designing intelligent cause , the appearance of a similar adaptation in the works of nature cannot'
but'authorize a similar inference in regard to their author . This argument , tawever , it is urged , ( pw 174 , ) will hardly be considered aa complete witboiA some evidence of a higher and more extensive design thari the mere support bf our present existence . Our reason refuses to set any limits to the ! powevrbr wisdom ascribed to the Divine character ; such a being * must be incapable 1
of error , and cannot be supposed to act from malevolence orcapticd . <>) But , it is asked , independently of the supposition of a future stat ^ l docs iexperience answer to all this ? kour existence , considered as finally tebaiinahng tit death , a boon worthy of such an author as we suppose ? To thisitjueition JVta illevons hesitateainot ; to answer in the negative . Without ] & ffoturei state , hevaamnot reconcile ^ dlQritwesaiof life , the evils to / which it is / liable , ; the
j eag « r , bnging i after limritMairtaljty j which . « eems . necesaaarily to arisen inrtfie Jiiiridao : mwdjwithAhe ; tcfootoions ; jwhidbithe admirable ^ jfranaie ; « o £ natureogv ^ fts > s ^ Ills ) tam ( m v& ! t ytoiWQ » W » ppjedr , ^ h « fcj AheserueviteuiwN ! f ui ^ re tkm bu
Untitled Article
tfgftl nmm * ttJ # vm& 9 > $ / Memtiti rM * mU t ^ . & § f
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Citation
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Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Dec. 2, 1827, page 897, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct1803/page/41/
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