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consistent , choose to maintain the former proposition , that thought and consciousness are merely the result of organization , I cannot but ihink that he is still involved in insuperable difficulties .
Matter is divisible , and consists of parts actually distinct . Whatever system of matter can be supposed to be conscious , it is capable of being divided into several
smaller parts , which will be as really distinct when laid or cemented together as when removed from each other . If any sysiem of matter be conscious , it must
either have a distinct consciousness in each smaller particle , or one consciousness resulting from the union of its several parts . There cannot be in each system a number of distinct
consciousnesses , for that would suppose the mind of man to be made up of an almost infinite number of distinct consciousnesses or thinking principles .
An assemblage of various unthinking parts , can never be supposed to make one thinking mass , so that thought should arise from the whole , and yet not exist in any given part . Ct Here , therefore , the advocates of materialism
are involved in a most complete dilemma . Doth perception really and truly inhere in the particles which compose the organical system ? Then is the human mind a
mere assemblage of distinct and infinitel y divisible percipiencies , which is a gross and palpable absurdity . Or , is perception the Property merel y of the system , as such , without inhering in the
component parts ? Then is the Power of the whole absolutely and totall y different from , and llot llle sum or aggregate of the
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powers of all the parts ; which is in express and direct contradiction * . ' There seems to be in man a power of consciousness , which is
incapable of division , and which exists independent of the organs of sensation : a man may 1 > -se his arms , or his legs , or both , and yet be conscious of being the same ' identical being that he was before : does not this very much tend to prove that we possess a power of consciousness which is one and indivisible ; which , though it be present in all parts of the body , is in fact independent of any coiporeal part ; that when any part or parts of the body are destroyed it remains unaffected , and that in the article of death this percipient faculty will remain unhtutand in the full vigour and exercise of its
powers ? Philosophers and medical men tell us , that we do not possess one particle of body that we possessed a few years ago ; yet we know that our consciousness has remained the same . The process of increase and decay is continually going on in us , and the succession
of new matter is accompanied by the destruction of the old , but the principle of consciousness we are certain survives ihat destruction ; therefore may we not infer that it
survives the death of the body altogether ? The destruction oi the body may in no respect injure the thinking principle . We have indeed many instances of such unions or combinations in nature , where the destruction of the one
substance does no way affect the other . For instance , suppose-you ? See Mr Will am Belsham * * Essays , and Doddridere ' s Lectures .
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Against Materialism . —Letter T . 400
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vol . vi . 3 a
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Citation
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Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), July 2, 1811, page 409, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2418/page/25/
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