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• " I would observe , " says Dr . Prfesftlfey , iri the very beginning of his Illustrations " df the Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity , p . 2 , "that I alloxv to * meri all the liberty or power that is possible in itself , and to which the ideas of mankind in general ever go , which is the power of doing whatever they will or please , hoth with respect to the operations of their minds and the motions of their
bodies , uncontrolled by any foreign principle or cause . Thus every man is at liberty to turn his thoughts to whatever subject he pleases , to consider the reasons for or against any scheme or proposition , and to reflect upon them as long as he shall think proper , as well as to walk wherever he pleases , and to dd whatever his hands and other limbs
are capable of doing . —All the liberty or ' rather power that I say a man has not , Ts thai of doing several things when all the j previous circumstances ( incJucUrig . the sta ) % # f his mind , and his views of things , )^ are precisely the same .
\ # That I contend for is , that with the same state of mind , ;( the same strength of any particular passion , for example ) and the same views of things , ( as any particular object appearing equally desirable , ) he would always , voluntarily , make the same choice ahcf come to the
same determination . For instance , if I make any particular choice to-cjay , I shou } d have done the same yesterday , and shall dp the same to-morrow , pro * vided there be no change in the state of my mind respecting the object of the choice ., Io other words I maintain ,
that there is some jioaed law of nature respecting the willy . as well as the other powers of the mind , and every thing else in the constitution of nature ; and consequently that it is never determined without some real or apparent cause , foreign to itself ; that is , without some motive of choice , or that motives
in-Jluence in isome defimte and invariable manner £$ 0 that every volition or choice is constantly regulated and determined by what precedes it . And this constant determination of mind , according to
the motiveslpresented to it , is all that I mean by its necessary determination . " But \ he fact is , Or . Brown is himself a believer in , this very doctrine , as far a £ { i is possibje to judge of his belief on the subject .
** Wbat , " pays be , pp . 298 , 299 , " do we signify by willing our chqosing any thing fc ^ t * Ji £ t of judging . < & preiVrable . The
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human will is always inclined to pTefer eo if to evil , and among goods to prefer that which appears to afford the greatest som of happiness , and among evils to ayqid that which appears to bring the greatest sum of misery . This is its constant and invarinblt
detwmtnatton . But in order to enable H to make this election , the understanding must carefully scrutinize the respective rfo , tures of the objects presented , and decide on their tendencies to happiness or
misers-When this decision , just or erroneous , ii once made , election or reprobation immediately ensues . The determination of the will towards agreeable and blissful objects and its aversion from those which are productive of pain and misery , are uni / onh
and invariable . " " Modern opponents of liberty have directed their principal efforts to prove that human action , as influenced by motive , always follows a certain and definitive course . This is readily granted "* —P . 304 . . And this being granted , all is granted for which Dr . Priestley , or any other advocate of the doctrine of
Philosophical Necessity , who understood the subject , ever contended : but such is the looseness with which Dr . Brown allows himself to think and write , that he absolutely confounds with thiswhich is his own opinion and the opinion of Dr . Priestley arid of all other modern necessarians , the doctrine of fate , or as
he terms it absolute necessity , fatal necessity , Sec . ( p . 304 ) : a doctrine which no one as far as we know has pretended to maintain in modern times . Having discussed in this clear and erudite manner the great question between the necessarians and the
libertarians , Dr . Brown applies his doctrine of free agency to trie removal of the difficulties which p ress on the , Divine character and administration from the existence of natural and moral evil . He argues that moral evil is the result latter
of free agency ; that where the exists the permission of the former i * unavoidable ; that since it is consistent with the Divine wisdom and goodness to create free agents , the permission of moral evil cannot be inconsistent with those perfections , because the one infers
the other . P . 316 . .. Should this reasoning be capable 0 removing from any mind the snghtes difficulty which appeared to it to involve the Divine admihistratiaB , *? should despair of being ahle to-be *" it by any thing which we " ^ ^ 2 ^ nor should we have much greatcf o ° r
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608 2 Zevici 6 .- *~ &rown $ Pftze Essay .
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Citation
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Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Oct. 2, 1816, page 608, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2457/page/44/
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