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happiness . We have also shewn that our love of good , and our hatred of whatever appears to be an evil , ens tamps a value upon every thing which contributes to good ; and we approve of the intentional agent : whereas we hate whatever we deem injurious in its tendency , and severely censure a designing agent . We
have shewn , moreover , that the degrees of our approbation or censure , are always proportionate to the perception of degrees in the merit or demerit of an action , connected with the extent of good or of evil produced . These pleasant or unpleasant sensations may rise to very strong emotions ; from simple approbation , which seems to be the decision of the judgment , connected with a certain sentiment of
feeling of the heart , they may swell to enthusiastic applause ; and from the mildest censure they may become indignation and horror . Thus we commend prudence and discretion ; we applaud incorruptible integrity ; and we admire with raptures the extraordinary exertions
or sacrifices of benevolence . We disapprove of imprudence , condemn injustice , and hold acts of cruelty in detestation . There are , in like manner , the nicest gradations observable in our complacential affections . A certain degree of worth attracts our esteem ; we say the character is estimable . The characteis of others
call forth respect and veneration ; and of others our warmest admiration . On the contrary , displacency , at some actions , if they be niore strongly marked with foll y than with vice , will produce the not
unpleasant , but the satirical and corrective emotion of irrision ; while others create disrespect , contempt , disdain , &c . according to our perceptions of meanness , or peculiar baseness of character and conduct . We have remarked that in
these affections a bad opinion of the agent is inspired by the love of virtue , united with an inward consciousness that we are superior to these vices . "—Pp . 123—125 . The fourth Speculation is on the long contested JDoctrfne of Philosophical Necessity . What especially
demands notice in this Kssay is the author ' s opinion , that the opposite hypotheses might he in some sort reconciled , if their advocates would agree in the rejection of certain terms , such as ' must / and * necessary , * and in the substitution of others less liable to he
mistaken . " It ( the word Necessity ) has a tendency to confound two things which d iff or essentially . It places mechanical or physical agency , ovtr which the will may not , have any power , upon the same line
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with moral agency , where the agent f < re ? & that he has a will in the action ; and it leads the opponent , or the libertine , into conclusions which are erroneous or immoral . " The phrase which is sometimes used to distinguish the necessity for which it is contended , from the others , is in itself
an acknowledgment that there is a difference ; but it does not state in what the difference specifically consists . It is termed philosophical necessity . If philosophical were thought to be the same as pht / siral necessity , the epithet would not
have been prefixed . But this phrase is not explicit or peculiarly appropriate . Strictly speaking , physical necessity re as philosophical as the other ; although the moral philosopher claims an exclusive right to it , without informing us on what this claim is founded . Should he
allege that moral conduct is of a superior character to physical impulse , and deserves an honourable distinction , the answer is , that this superiority consists in the possession of a will , and a power to act according to this will . It is this prerogative which characterizes human agency ; constitutes the excellency , dignity , and importance of moral conduct , and ought to place it at a due distance
from a word which insinuates the reverse , every time it is uttered . *'—Pp . 164 , 165 . " If the necessarian will not be so
very tenacious of the words must , cannot act otherways , &c . &c . when be speaks of any particular or specific act of the will , the advocate for free agency -will be disposed to admit the grand principle , that no man has ever acted without a motive ; that the strongest inducement became the
motive ; that it became the strongest at the time , by appearing to be most adapted to his purpose ; that this purpose consisted in the possession of some good . He will acknowledge that no man can desire greater freedom , than that of following- his own inclinations . " - —Pp . 165 , KiG .
" Nor are the design * of the necessarian so well answered by the pertinacious and partial use of the favourite expressimi . It is the professed object to enforce the doctrine of an extensive and invariable
concatenation . But as the human will forms so important a link in trie chain , it ought to be perpetually noticed and respected ; and its powers of choice should be carefully distinguished from every species of physical agency . "—P . 166 .
If the two hypotheses differed but in words ; or if a change of terms could change the nature of the facts , or prove that the difference has been only in words * we should rejoice to see a con-
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V 2 & Review . — Cogaris Ethical Questions .
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Citation
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Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), April 2, 1817, page 228, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2463/page/36/
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