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    and certain solution . The controversy ifas been embarrassed by « he use of the term motive , which is not essential m it , and which being capable of different interpretations has left rootti for

    misapprehension and subterfuge . The proposition of the Necessitarian is precisely this , that every volition or determination of the mind is the necessary result of the state of the mirid ^ at the time when the determination is

    formed . * Gf the truth of this proposition , in regard to myself , I &m Conscious 5 and presuming that the general constitution of all human minds is the same , I suspect that , were the question closely urged , the consciousness of

    every other man would coincide in this respect with my own . And were it not for certain consequences , which are supposed to follow the admission of this doctrine , I am persuaded that no human being would have been found to doubt its truth .

    But in opposition to this statement the advocate of Liberty maintains , that there is in the human mind a self-determining power , to which , as their proper cause , all the volitions or determinations of the mind are to be referred .

    What , then , is the operation of this self-determining power ? By the very definition , it is not governed in its exercise by the state or disposition of the mind . Does it , then , itself determine the state of mind in which a certain

    volition shall be formed ? Then , as no mental act can be performed except in some certain state of mind , it may fee asked , How caiite the mind to bfe In that state in which the

    self-detejf-* Though I have avoided the use 9 t the term motive , I do not mean to intimate , that motives " have nothing to do tfllfcii Volition . By motive , indeed , the Necessitarian means not only the inducement which is presented to the mind , but the mental disposition in which a given volition is formed . But to use the term

    in its ordinary acceptation , it may be . remarked , that every state of mi | d Jn which a volition ^ akes place , results partly from a former state , an < t partly from the influence of certain motives or considerations which are suggested to the , mind . An £ no truth in the whole circle of intell ^ ctual inquiry seems more self-evident than this , tfyat from a definite state of ir i ^ d , northing Init a definite volition fcan procfe ^ cL

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    mining pov ^ r ^ M # gib #% > Did tfcs power of its ^ m ^ plto ^ sure decree this state W ^ e tnS \ d &lso and before thi ^ a forin ^ bta ^ te , Mid ^ o cm to the first moment of conscious emstehtit , always acting in &' certain state of mind , and always determining thai state ? But In reality , the detfe ^

    mining the state of themind , in which a given volition shall take pfecd , tfrotficl not differ from determining the volition itself . In a givfeii state of mintl Mteri , does it determine tSfce ^ olition ? "If sp ,

    can it determine in opposition to the state of the mind yt the time whea the volition is formed ? If not , it can do nothing that is worth contending f 0 r . If it ean , whenever this case is realized the will inclines one way , and the mind another . But as the will in its

    exercise cannot , even in imagination , be distinguished from the mind in the adt of vnlling , the mind wills against itself , of wills and does not wiB the same thing , at the same time . That this

    reasoning may not be confronted by classical ^ authority , I just remark , that Homer ' s well-kjiown oxymoron , oca > v cjteycoyri y € Srvpiq ) , stands at an immea ^ surable distance from the case which

    is here supposed . But let this setf-determining powei * be examined a little more closely . An | as it is stated to be the faculty of tfte mind which detetthines the volitioiis , and , therefore , the actions of men , it

    is reasonable to ask , whether it possesses the properties of judgment , reflection and other qualities which have always be $ n supposed to have some influence upon the determinations of the will ? If so , it is no longer a

    faculty of the mimj , but the mind itself ; and when we are told that it is , the efficient cause of volition , alt that is meant is , tjiat o ^ lr vdlitaofts aire the volitions Of the mind . ' Tfif' S ! do ^ s not possess these properties , it is nothing

    but the simple powejr of V ^ tipti , which , as it ^ ill not submit trf tfe WOvete ^ d by the state or habit bf thdj riimd ; but insists upon the pri ^ ege < k ' ^ itself , is not distinguiahable from . bliiid caprice , or what w 6 ' usually term chb&ce . / /

    Shall it be said that the mind determines its volitions bjtj means of a selfdetermining pb ^ r . / wW ^ li M ; tohtrenst in it > rind ^ iMmt ib ft ? ^ aii thfe t 3 # id , ti ^ nj ^ Wi ^ Hei ^ iJf } $ H > attpor 8 » fc volitions dt ^ samfe % ker aSf m

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    ^ Mr . CoganoritkeQueMion ^

• Citation
  • Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Jan. 2, 1820, page 8, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2484/page/8/