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    the smneil ^ aWe aiid disposition ? If not , it € de # ^ ot possess a self-determinii % ^ ppwer / Wd ^ v ^ conceded "wh ^ h the Necessitarian contends

    for-- If , when the mmd is said to pos- - sess a self ^ determining powers it were meant that- the volitions of the mind originate in itself , and are not forced upon it by extraneous compulsion nothing would be said but what is true , and nothing but what the Necessitarian admits ^ nd maintains . But this will not serve the cause for which this

    power has been devised . In order to set aside the position of the Necessitarian , this faculty must be supposed to be altogether independent of the feelings and dispositions , of the mind , and must , in the strictest sense , determine itself , and govern its own decisions . The advocate of Liberty may say , that this is not what he means , but he will

    hear in reply , that if he does not mean this , he means nothing . But if the mind can form either of two opposite volitions at the same time , then the true and proper cause of definite volitions is the abstract power of willing ; a fit principle , in good truth , to which the government of life ' should be committed :

    Will the advocate of Liberty lay down his proposition in terms to the following effect : that though the state of the mind has a certain influence upon the self-determining power , yet that it does Hot , strictly speaking , cause the volition , which is the f ree act of the power for which he contends ? What , then ,

    is the nature of the influence supposed ? Does it in « ny way effect that the volition should be what it is ? If so , all that the Necessitarian will be solicitous

    to maintain is granted . If not , we must look somewhere else , that is * the self-deteraiining power , for th ^ reason why one ^ volition . takes place rather than another : * tliat is , a power which bears the * same relation to all

    imaginable volitions , contains in itself the sole * cause of every definite and specific ^ olijbi on . And * on this faculty depends " the moral agency of man ! But does th ^ self-deteimining power , in fact , obey the influence which the

    mmd exerts iipo | r it ? Why , then , does it obey it ? Because it chooses . Does it ^ then , reflect and judge , and thus determine ' out ^ th ^ propriety of yielding this obfedience ? No Imejk thing . Reflection land judgment are

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    properties not of * a self-determining poweit , but of intellect and treason .. They are not attributes of the will , feut of the mind . But what , after aUgy can we understand by a self-deterht&ung poorer , considered as tm efficient cause of

    volition ? It is an incontrovertible truth , that tjie act of volition implies a certain inclination or disposition of the mind . Does , then , the self-determining power cause this disposition , or is it acted upon and governed by it ? If the latter , it is not a self-determining power , and the controversy is at an end . If it be said to determine this

    disposition , the question arises , whether it m \ ist be considered as acting independently of every mental feel ing ? If so , it is a manifest nonentity , since a volition cannot take place except in some state and disposition of

    the mind . If it does not act independently of mental feeling , it * will again be asked , does it determine that state of feeling in which it acts ? To-what conclusion this question would lead , it must be needless to remark . \ r

    But let the advocate of Liberty plead for himself in the language of that able metaphysician , Dr . Clarke : t € The true , proper , immediate , physical efficient cause of action , " says he , " is

    the power of self-motion in men , which exerts itself freely , in consequence of the last judgment of the understanding . " If this power always obeys the last * judgment - of the understanding , the Necessitarian will ask no more .

    But can this povyer , at the very time When it exerts itself freely , in consequence of . the last judgment of the understanding , determine without any inducement whatever K ) set this last judgment at defiance , and to act in direct . opposition to it ? This Dr . Clarke Would not have affirmed . If it

    capnot , what is gained , by maintaining , with an appearance at least of contradiction , that it exerts itself freelyy in consequence , of this judgment ?; If it can , then it is in very deed a ppyer of self-motipn , a power which , without any reason , can act against the ^ erjr reason In consequence of which it acts . * * ¦

    s « . iT 1 Dr . Clarke " is disposed to consider the last judgment of the understanding as the same with the act of volition * v . M \ -

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    MK Cogdn ' on the Qtiestfon of Liberty afi& Necessity . . «• ¦ - $ j

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    VOli . XV ^ v * ' . . C

• Citation
  • Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Jan. 2, 1820, page 9, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2484/page/9/