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always , followed by j& similar ch ^ iijBb . '' In this definition a necessary connex - ion of cause and effect is not denied ; neither is it affirmed ; and ia the author ' s opinion , the definition is the
fullest which the relation philosophically admits . It is complete without it ; and , consequently , the expression Philosophical Necessity should be dismissed from the language of philosophy ; for if Necessity is not to be admitted in the definition of the
relation of cause jand effect , in what other case can it have a philosophical use or meaning ? If his opinion was right , and it might be difficult to prove it wrong , certainty and universality of
concomitance express fully and completely the relation of cause and effect ; and when we asse ^ &ecessary connexion , nothing inorc ^ ui be meant than certain and univer ^ S ^ aaeurrence , If
we imagine that we perceive something more , a closer bond between the , two events described by the term Necessity , we imagine what is not fact . Our knowledge is bounded by our observation , and constant concomitance is all that is observed . Let this be
granted , and he who fears the consequences or dislikes the name of Philosophical Necessity ascribed to human actions , or to any other natural facts , may be consoled by the legitimate conclusion , —that , to confess that every volition of the mind bf man has a
cause , and that this cause can be nothing else than the state of the mind which immediately preceded it , is not to acknowledge its volitions necessary . " The mere relation of uniform
antecedence appears to me , " saith our Enquirer , " to constitute all that can be philosophically meant in the words power or causation , to whatever objects , material or spiritual , the words jects , material or spiritual , the words
may be applied / ' Every man to whom the same appears , may forthwith dismiss from Jus philosophical vocabulary the name or Necessity . For him that thinks otherwise there is no
alternative , but to maintain that volitions have no cause , or that they are what they are necessarily . JOHN MORELL .
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700 Dr . Morell on fhte Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity .
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Sir , Nov . 6 , 1821 . VARIO US copies of the following extract of a letter in ^ S . haying been at least seven years iitfeirculation ,
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Sir , , « Brighton . r lHAT the question of Philoso JL phical Necessity is a merely ver
bal dispute , was , I believe , long the opinion of the late Dr . Cogan , and it was certainly his last' opinion on that subject . In his volume of Ethical Questions he has stated and defended it with his accustomed clearness and
ability : intentum enim animum velut arcum habebat , nee languescens suecumbebat senectutL If , indeed , the question is , whether what we will is determined by what
we think , it can receive but one answer from all mankind ; and as little can it be questioned , that what we think depends upon a variety of causes of which we are not the authors .
Hence nothing is gained to the side of the freedom of the will by throwing back the difficulty , as your ingenious Correspondent S . [ pp . 59 ft—598 ] appears to do , from the volitions to the views , and looking to the understanding for that independence which was sought for in vain ia the will .
He who is inclined to think that the dispute is solely about a word , and that if the term Necessity were rejected the controversy would be at an end , may be pleased to remark , how well that offensive word can be spared by those who affirm , notwithstanding , that the volitions and the judgments of the mind are related as cftuse and
effect . Dr . Brown , following in the track of Hume , has given the subjoined definition of a cause , in his Enquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect : " A cause , in the fullest definition
which it philosophically admits , may be said to be that which immediately precedes any change , and which , existing at any time in similar circumstances , has been always , and will be
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tiality ,- and rest in the result of such examination . When I say * that wfy ought to do this , I do not now mean morally * , but philosophically . It fs in tms way that we judge of other facts ,
and if we refuse to judge of miracles on the same principle , we shall be in danger of rejecting what , to say the least , may be true , and what , if true , must be most interesting and important . E . COG AN ,
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Citation
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Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Dec. 2, 1821, page 700, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2507/page/4/
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