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    facts , htm without facts she can do nothing . In her * purest and most conclusive exercise , on mathematical truths facts are her sine qu& non . With the liberty of human agency , therefore , reason has nothing to do previously to the establishment of the fa ) ct 8 of the case . Whence do we

    collect evidence of the existence of this liberty ? Only by consciousness . If , therefore , it exist , it is a mere fact , in the establishment or overthrow of which reason has nothing to do . Othello ' s occupation is gone . As to the evidence of this freedom , as a fact 9 tO each individual his own

    consciousness is the first and best evidence , and then the testimony of others , as to their consciousness . Look at this testimony . Is it not nearly universal ? The feeling of remorse in men , in all agess is conclusive . We do not feel remorse because we catch a cold or a

    fever , though such as are fond of life may feel sorrow on such an occasion ; but who does not know that remorse and sorrow are two very different feelings ? It is of the essence of remorse that he who feels it thinks that a

    clifferent determination , concerning certain actions , was in his power ; and I think every one who reflects upon the nature of remorse must admit this . Dr . Priestley seems to admit that even Necessarians , from former association ,

    feel remorse , but suggests , that a pure Necessarian , acting up to his principles , would feel none ; but all his remarks shew , that , even in his opinion , no speculations can destroy the feeling of remorse . So strong- and so universal is the consciousness of

    freedom ! I am well aware of the subtile argument of Jonathan Edwards , that every present volition mu . st either be determined by the existing motives , or by a previous volition ; going back in an indissoluble cfyain of " connexion to the first volition . But until we know

    something more of the human mind , this cannot be admitted to be a demonstration . For why should any volition be determined by motives ? The . mind in determining is not destitute

    of consideration 5 but that motives de-Ermine it , and not its own agency in the survey of many considerations , ought to be proved . I reject the term motives , a * applied to the considerations under the survey of the human

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    mind . Motive is something thai moves ; and to apply it to the considerations in the view of the human mind in action , is to take the very matter in dispute for granted . The imagination immediately plays tricks with the word , and converts the motive into the

    agent . In point of fact , does not this argument of Mr . Edwards * ( far the most powerfiil assertor of Necessity ) take for granted , that we are able to analyze all the operations of the

    human mind ? If it do , I think it is not entitled to onr confidence ; and he thought it demonstration , as he entitled the chapter containing it , the impossibility of Free Will . Now it is evident that this assertion implies no less than that vie know that it is

    impossible for God to create a free agent . Do we , indeed , know this ? Now nothing seems more clear to me than this , that it has been the belief of the freedom of human aetions , that has laid the foundation of

    the belief of a future state in every age and country ; and that this belief alone preserves the expectation of such a state amongst mankind . I say this with the highest respect for the characters and talents of such as arc

    advocates for the opposite doctrine , and leave the reasoning to the judgment of the reader . HOMO . P . S . I do not perceive that the

    Edinburgh definition of Cause and Effect , as quoted in your last Number , [ XVI . 700 , ] by Dr . Morell , at all affects the subject in dispute ; it is , besides , rather a definition of the manner how we obtain the evidence of the

    existence of Cause and Effect , than of what constitutes Cause and fiffect . The dispute about what we call Liberty and Necessity is not at all a merely verbal dispute ; but one concerning a most momentous distinction . If the conduct of man be the certain result of his bodily and mental

    constitution and circumstances , of which he is not the author , the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity is true ; if otherwise , it is false . Is this a mere verbal question ^ ^ Ir ^ cottfess , I can conceive of no question that was ever agitated by man , less entitled to the character of a play upon woirds than this $ s .

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    32 Freedom of Human Agency .

• Citation
  • Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Jan. 2, 1822, page 12, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2508/page/12/