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lacioua , it amounts to no more than this , that thfo reasoning does not rise to absolute or mathematical demonstration . But if it is intended to imply that all reasoning from the relation of causes and effects probably is
fallacious , it may be satisfactorily replied , that it does not follow because a thing possibly may be , that , therefore , it probably is . Moreover , if the observation Were to be thus interpreted , it would imply , that the contrary conclusions to those which mankind have hitherto
drawn from the relation of cause and effect would be more likely to be just ; an extravagance to which no soberminded man can assent for a moment . In innumerable instances we rest with as much confidence upon reasonings drawn from this source as upon the
evidence of the senses or upon mathematical proof . And this , however it comes to pass , we cannot help doing . But to spend another moment upon Mr . Hume ' s proposition : were the reasoning from the relation of causes and effects founded upon instinct , this ,
I conceive , would be a presumption that it would not be fallacious . It is , however , founded on no such thing . It is founded on experience , on which Mr . Hume can place sufficient
dependence when it suits his purpose . And the same experience which has taught us to believe that every effect must have a cause , has also taught us to look for a designing cause where there is an indication or contrivance in the
effect . And hence we infer thus much with sufficient certainty , that if the universe is an effect at all , it must be referred to an intelligent cause . But , jt seems , our experience does not reach far enough to justify the conclusion , that the universe , because it exhibits
an adaptation of means to ends , must have had an intelligent Author . We want the only experience which the case demands , an experience in the origin of worlds . Were this principle carried to its full extent , it would follow , that when I see a work of art , which is altogether new to me , I must
not confidently conclude that it had a makjer . t know , indeed , that men exist , and thqugh all reasoning from th $ gelation of causes and effects may be jTaU&fwusJ , tfrink I kjiow that the human intellect is adequate \ o the proT duction of those effects which we call the works of art . But as my experi-
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ence cannot reach to a novel case , unless I may venture to call in the axiom , that similar effects must be referred to similar causes , I must draw my conclusion with diffidence and he * sitation . But , as Mr . Hume observes ,
I have no experience of the origin of worlds . And if I had , what would he its precise value ? " All reasoning from the relation of causes and effects may be fallacious and deceitful . " But the argument from experience , which Mr .
Hume says is wanting , would rest upon the presumption , that similar effects proceed from similar causes , in which presumption Mr . Hume ought to have maintained that in all cases there may be no force . Indeed , if all reasonin g from the relation of causes and effects
may be fallacious and deceitful , were a world constructed before my eyes , the possibility of doubt , as to its origin , would not be precluded ! In opposition , however , to these
extravagancies of scepticism , I maintain that experience affords a sufficiently certain ground of reasoning , and I farther maintain , that the experience which we have had of the connexion between
contrivance and a contriver , abundantly justifies the conclusion , that the universe must have had a designing cause . To reject this conclusion is to set aside , without necessity , * of the
strong-* . I said without necessity , because no difficulty attending the hypothesis of Theism am possibly be greater than the difficulty of conceiving that such an adaptation of ineans to ends , as is equivalent to contrivance , should exist without the operation of intelligence . Indeed , no Ideas are more closely associated in the
human mind than those of contrivance and a contriver . Iu contemplating the works of art , as connected with intelligence , we not only repogni ^ e the general relation of cause and effect , but are , moreover , led to acknowledge that the
work effected corresponds to au archetype in the mind of the artist . And hence we seem satisfactorily to infer , that every thing which indicates contrivance answers to a certain model which previously existed in the mind of some intelligent
agent . Aftd sfeaJl tiie works of nature , with all their various and exqiiisUe adaptation of mean * to > ends * tejepW . cuitfwermg to , ma m # * tel * a $ OTWfrpP . ° d uig to no . apefefftypg . ? Tte / 3 , i * one ppm * ° difference , it is true , between tfce works of nature and the works of art , which is ,
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( v 6 Mr . CogrtrCs Examination of Mr . Hume ' s Objection to the
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Citation
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Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Feb. 2, 1822, page 66, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2509/page/2/
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