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est associations of the human mind , mid to reason upon a principle , if a principle it can be called , which would subvert the foundation of ail reasoning . If similar effects are not to be referred to similar causes , all ratiocination is at an end . It is in vain to urge that there is a difference between the works of
nature and the works of art . As far as respects the adaptation of means to ends , and on this alone the argument rests , there is no difference , except that this adaptation , in the former , is fur more curious and exquisite than in the latter . Were any one still to say that the experience of which I have
been speaking is no certain guide in a ease to which it does not itself extend , I should think it sufficient to reply , that it is the only guide which we have , aud that it is absurd to relinquish this guide in order to wander in a field of vain conjecture , without a ray of probability to direct us . One thing" we
know , which is , that intellect can adjust means to ends , and produce effects which indicate contrivance ; but that any thing else can produce these effects , we not only do not know , but have not even the slightest reason to believe .
But men sometimes argue as if it were the perfection of human wisdom to follow the weaker probability instead of the stronger , or to set probability altogether at defiance , because it falls short of strict and mathematical demonstration . *
& ___ | | , a , _ ' ¦¦ ¦ - ¦ ¦ . ' - -------that the latter are nut together by the application of mechanical powers , whereas the former are many of them evidently produced by the actiou of certain laws , which are called the laws of nature . But this circumstance oY difference by no means counterbalances the circuinstances
of resemblance , and , therefore , does not avail to set aside the analogy . And what are the laws of nature but a certain mode of operation ? Does the law in any ease design and anticipate the effect ? It * aa » y not be altogether foreign to the argument
to observe farther , that the laws of nature , together with all real existences , mu 3 t he , in themselves considered , the objects of knowledge . And yet from the hypothesis of the Atr * eiMt , it will follow that no being (\ ttets by Whom these laws are understood . * If any one should say that probability w not < a reasonable ground x > f conftdorioe , * should op \ y desire hhn to" cwrry this
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From the view which has been no \ r taken of Mr . Hume ' s objection to the being of a God , it appears that the reasoning which ascribes the universe to an intelligent Author , rests upon precisely the same foundation as that which attributes what is denominated
an effect to that which is denominated a cause . Contrivance is the thing to be accounted for , and that reasoning , founded on experience , which lias led us to conceive that every effect must
have a cause , has led us to demand an intelligent cause for every effect which indicates such an adaptation of means to ends , as could not , in our apprehension , be the result of chance or
accident . And against this reasoning I do not see what can be urged , except that it does not amount to such a demonstration as would exclude all possibility of doubt . If the argument does not amount to the highest probability , J do not know what probability
is . And Mr . Hume ' s reasonings only shew that this probability is not absolute and incontrovertible proof . That this may appear more clearly , I will deduce from Mr . Hume ' s observations the only conclusions which would be formidable to the hypothesis of Theism ,
and leave the reader to judge whether these conclusions are legitimate . Be * twecn cause and effect we perceive only conjunction ; therefore the probability is , that cause and effect are not connected I All our reasonings from the relation of causes aud effects
may be fallacious ; therefore the pro ^ Imbility is , that they are fallacious 1 We have no experience in the origin of worlds ; therefore it is prohable ti * at the universe , which shews throughout an adaptation of means to ends , is not the work of an intelligent Author !
principle as far as it will go , and to act upon it . I need not { xunt out wh ' M consequences would follow , Buj sball that evidence , upon which mankind do not scruple to act in ordinary concerns , be considered as unsatisfactory only in concerns Of the highest importance ? 1 * he practice of demanding absohlt ^ demonaeration where it is not to be had , and where it is not Tieetied , has done much
mischief . It has given rise to an unreasonable sceptidstti <*« the one hand , &nd to an afesard appeal to eommtm sense mi the « M ) tar .
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Argument for the Being of God . 67
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Citation
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Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Feb. 2, 1822, page 67, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2509/page/3/
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