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    dence : this , he says , implies that it may be capable either of raising additional ideas in the mind , or of

    detaching some of the ideas already there , from the rest with which they are associated , and dismissing them from view ; which is contrary to the conclusions of the best metaphysical

    writers . * But the proof of the involuntary nature of belief depends not on the justness of any metaphysical argument . Every one may bring the question to the test of

    experiment ; he may appeal to his own consciousness , and try whether , in any conceivable case , he can at pleasure change his opinion , and he will soon find that the most ardent wishes can he of no

    avail . Take any controverted fact in history ; let a man make himself perfectly acquainted with the statements and authorities on both sides , and , at the end of his investigation , he will either believe , doubt , or disbelieve the fact in question Now apply any possible motive to his

    mind . Blame him , praise him , intimidate him by threats , or allure him by promises , and after all your efforts , how far will you have succeeded in changing the state of his intellect with regard to the fact ? How far will you have altered the connexion which he discerns between certain

    premises and certain conclusions ? To affect his belief you must affect the subject of it by producing new arguments or considerations . The understanding being passive as to the impressions made upon it , if you wish to change those impressions you must change the cause which produces them . You can alter

    perceptions only by altering the thing perceived . Kvery man ' s consciousness will tell him , that the will can no more modify the effect of an argument on the understanding , than it can change the taste of sugar to the palate , or the fragrance of a rose to the smell ; and that nothing can

    weaken its force , as anDieheiided hv thp weaken its Force , as apprehended by the intellect , but another argument opposed to it . "—Pp . 14 , 15 . Section III . treats of the " Opinions of Locke and some other Writers CReid and Bacon ) on ibis Subject .- "

    These great writers are shewn to have maintained the involuntary nature of belief . A little inconsistency is pointed out in Locke ' s language . The author had exposed in the 1 st Section the incorrectness of some of the

    definitions in the ¦ " Essay on Human Understanding . " These exceptions to Locke ' s accuracy are not made in disparagement of that great philosopher ;

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    their being made is in fact an acknowledgment of his just authority . No one is at the pains to vindicate his dissent from Stillingfleet , Norris , or any other of Locke ' s antagonists .

    In Section IV . the author suggests " the Circumstances which have led Men to regard Belief as voluntary /' The common error may , he thinks , be mainly ascribed to the intimate connexion subsisting between belief

    and the expression or declaration of it , the latter of which is at all times an act of the will ; the term assent being used to express the intimation of our concurrence with an opinion as well as the concurrence itself .

    Another source of the error he conceives to be the practice of confounding the consent of the understanding with that of the will or feelings . He further accounts for the error by remarking , that it may have arisen in some degree from the circumstance of many

    people having no real conception of the truth or falsehood of those opinions whicl ^ they profess . With such persons opinions are mere professions , a party-badge , not depending on the

    understanding , and to be assumed or discarded at pleasure . In regard to some subjects , all mankind are in this predicament ; opinions being on most occasions simply objects of memory , results at which we recollect to have

    arrived without at the moment recollecting the process . Hence it is obviously possible for even an acute logician to be mistaken , as to the opinions about which he has attained a decisive conviction , and not to find out his mistake till he is reduced to the

    necessity of recollecting , or rather repeating , the process through which he had originally gone . The author proceeds in Section V . to "the Sources of Differences of Opinion , " and on this very difficult part of the subject displays great

    ingenuity . Belief is an , involuntary state of mind , but may , like sleep , which is also involuntary , be to a certain extent prevented or induced according to our pleasure . This result is traced to wilful partiality of attenexternal

    tion or examination . Again , circumstances which vary in the case of each individual , occasion different ideas to be presented to each mind , different associations to be , established even amongst the same ideas , ana ^*

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    554 ' Review . — Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinions .

• Citation
  • Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Sept. 2, 1822, page 554, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2516/page/34/