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    inquiry ought to be the advancement of tru $ i , whatever be the result to established systems . How is truth to be attained ? We have no absolute standard , po unerring test of truth - y but we hafre faculties to discern it , and it is only by the unrestrained use of these faculties that we can hope to

    succeed in the pursuit . No individual mind , however , is so acute and comprehensive , so free from passion and prejudice , and placed in such favourable circumstances , as in any complex question to see all the possible arguments on both sides in their

    full force . Hence the co-operation of various minds becomes indispensably requisite ; and the greater the number of inquirers , the greater the probability of a successful result . The way , then , to obtain this result is to permit all to be said on a subject that can be

    said . To impose the leasjt restraint on investigation is to diminish the probability of truth , and to increase the probability of error . Unlimited discussion may introduce a multiplicity of erroneous speculations , out though error is an evil , it is frequently

    necessary to go through it , in order to arrive at truth . * We are midway in the stream of ignorance and error ; and it is a poor argument against an attempt to reach tl ^ e shore , that every step will be a plunge into the very element from which we are anxious to

    escape / ' ( Pp . 121 , 122 . ) The Essayist discusses in Section V ., "The Assumptions involved in all Restraints on the Publication of Opinions /* These are , either that the

    prevalence of truth woujd be pernicious , or , admitting its good effects , that it has been attained , and that , having been attained , it stands in need of the protection and assistance of power in its contest with error . But

    these positions have bee ^ already refuted in part . If there he no fixed standard , no unerring test of truth , the presumption of assuming that truth has been infallibly attained , is at once and sufficiently exposed . The firmness of one ' s own l > elief is no

    proof of its correctpesa , nor any justification of attempting to suppress another man ' s . Our predecessors felt as strong a conviction of bjeing in the right in tjojeir opinions as we can possibly feel , and had they opx this ground

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    stifled , as they too often tried jto stifle , investigation , the world would have been still shut up in darkness . Wide is the difference between being felly convinced of the truth of our creed , and regarding ourselves as infallible . He that reflects upon the constitution and the history of the human mind , and takes into account his own

    changes , the secret influences to which he is exposed and the illimitable varieties of opinion , will be forced to conclude that in his ow ^ creed it is next to impossible that there should not be an admixture of error , and

    that , in fact , there is an infinitelv that , in fact , there is an infinitely greater probability of his being wropg in some points than right in all . Now , under this sense of fallibility , no one , acting consistently , can seek to

    suppress opinions by force , because in sTo doing he may be at once lending support to error , and destroying the only means of its detection .

    jI he only remainiug assumption implied in all restrictions on inquiry is , that truth , in its contest with error , stands in need of the protection of human authority . But what truth ? Not physical or mathematical : why ( hen moral and political ? The

    doctrine supposes the human mind to be so constituted , as , all other things being the same , to cleave to error rather than to truth ; in which case the very pursuit of knowledge would be folly . But the supposition of the ultimate triumph of falsehood is a fallacy disproved by the experience of

    mankind " . Error may subvert error , one false doctrine may supersede another , and truth may be long undiscovered , and make its way slowly against the tide of prejudice ; but that it has not onjy the power of overcoming its antagonist in

    equal circumstances , but also of surmounting every intellectual obstacle , every impediment but mere brute force , is proved by the general advancement of knowledge . If we trace the history of any science * We shall find it a record of mistakes and misconceptions , a narrative of misdirected and often fruitless efforts ;

    yet if amidst all these the science lias made a progress , the struggles through which it has passed , far / ram evincing that the kuroa& timid is prone to error rathjer than to . truth , fui'EMaJl < qa 4 « ciqiye proof of the qontjeacy , and an illustriuioxi of the fact , that , in tb $ actual condition .

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    Meuiew . O J - ^ -Eswys 0 * $ he Formation and Publication of pinions . § %

• Citation
  • Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Oct. 2, 1822, page 627, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2517/page/43/