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    passage to which I have referred : ' And as soon as it is discovered that he acted under compulsion , we no longer measure the action by the

    standard of duty . " * If the term compulsion is here employed in its usual acceptation , the assertion is perfectly true ; but it is evident that Dr . C . conceives that an action which

    is necessary cannot be voluntary , not aware , perhaps , that the moral necessity which he so vehemently opposes does in fact imply the consent and exercise of the will . We affirm , with as much confidence as he does , that no action can merit either praise or

    blame unless it be voluntary , but its being voluntary is perfectly consistent with its being necessary . This point , I believe , not unfrequently embarrasses persons who have studied the subject but superficially . Every act which is conformable to the will of

    the agent , ( presupposing his intellects to be in a sound state ) , will be acknowledged , I imagine , to be a voluntary act ; but as the will is governed

    by motives and dispositions which , under the same circumstances , invariably operate in the same manner , the volition is said to be necessary , and the agent could not possibly act otherwise than he does . There is no

    compulsion in the case , but a natural series of antecedents and consequents . The circumstances in which a man is placed give rise to certain motives . These motives unavoidably influence his will , and the action follows the exertion of the will , precisely as any other effect follows its cause . Without

    freedom of the will , in the popular sense of the words , we admit that morality can have no existence \ and this freedom we likewise contend is an essential property of human nature . Where there is no physical

    impediment , nothing can be more obvious than that every man may act as he pleases , and may freely follow his own choice . Not satisfied with this concession , Dr . Copleston wishes to establish that the will itself is under

    our power , and that the operation of motives is dependent on ourselves . The futility of these pretensions has been so often shewn , that I will not occupy the reader ' s time by a repetition of the arguments ; aud I will * Dis . I . p . 21 .

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    only observe , that morat responsibility admits of but one rational explanation He whose volitions invariably produce actions which tend to promote the

    ultimate happiness of himself and others , is deserving of praise and reward ; while he whose conduct proceeds from principles of an opposite nature , as justly merits blame and punishment .

    That blame is not to be imputed to actions occasioned by physical necessity , no one has ever ventured to deny ; but this writer , with little discrimination , extends the remark to moral necessity * < c If the necessity , "

    he observes , " be not absolute , or physical , but depending on moral causes almost equally powerful , we still acquit the agent of responsibility , as in the case of soldiers performing their military duty , or the mere executioners of laws or decrees , however

    severe . " * Without stopping to shew the irrelevancy of these two cases , which is sufficiently obvious , there is one circumstance which alone affords an ample refutation of the preacher ' s position , and that is , the influence of habit . One of the most striking

    examples of moral necessity is the habit of intoxication . After long-continued indulgence , it is known to be almost irresistible ; and it will scarcely be disputed by our learned academic , that the more inveterate the passion , the less is it in the power of the unhappy victim to refuse compliance .

    But according to the system of this zealous libertarian , in proportion as the moral inability to act otherwise increases , the culpability of the agent is diminished ; that is to say , the more criminal the conduct of the individual ,

    the more unjust must we regard the application of blame and punishment . The value of this argument , which is briefly stated in Dr . Milncr ' s Essay , ought to be properly estimated by a wr iter so fond of the reductio ad absurdum , as the Oxford divine .

    But where , it will be asked , can be the Justice of punishing any individual for deeds which , as the necessarian contends , he could not avoid in the precise situation in which he was placed ? For no other reason , we reply , can this treatment be deemed equitable , than because punishment * Din . 1 . p . 21 .

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    554 Strictures on Dr . Copleston ' s Discourses delivered before the

• Citation
  • Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Sept. 2, 1825, page 554, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2540/page/38/