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    a moment ' s doubt that the truth of the one proves the falsehood of the other . We m&y safely allow indeed , with Div C , that ail event does not happen because it was foreseen , and that it is in no degree whatever influenced or affected by foreknowledge ; but we certainly do maintain that it could not be foreseen unless ft

    afterwards really takes place . To the assertion of Jonathan Edwards , that " infallible foreknowledge may prove the necessity of the event foreknown , and yet not be the thing that causes the necessity , " Dr . C . replies , that

    infallible foreknowledge proves nothing-, unless when the Being possessing this foreknowledge declares that an event will happen , and that even then it does not prove its necessity . But this writer ought to be aware that it is not the futurity but

    the certainty of an event from which we infer its necessity . It is evident from the explicit language of these Discourses that the author entertains no doubt respecting the omniscience of- the Deity , comprehending an intuitive knowledge of

    the past , the present , and the future . Now knowledge in the human mind undoubtedly proves the reality of the subject of that knowledge . We cannot strictly know any event to have happened , unless it actually has happened . We cannot be assured of the present

    Existence of any object in nature which does not truly exist . And since the omniscience of God implies an infallible knowledge of the future , as well as of the past and present , it is clear that whatever lie foresees

    that is , the suhject of his foreknowledge , must take place with absolute certainty ; and from this certainty of the event we justly infer its necessity . For admitting , as we must , that the Supreme Being infallibly knows all the causes and effects in the universe ,

    all the antecedents and consequents , then if any other effect could take place than that which actually does take place arid is foreseen , it would follow that the same cause might produce different effects which have

    no necessary connexion with it . Opposite effects might proceed from the same cause ; and if this is not a glaring contradiction , it would be difficult to say what is . In short , it seems impossible to deny that unless an event be necessarily dependent on its cause ,

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    it obuld not be foreseen . But what , let me also ask , is a contingent event but one which either may or may not happen ? And how can it be foreknown to happen when it is known

    at the same time , that it may not happen ? In truth , a grosser solecism in reasoning cannot be conceived than that which is displayed in the attempt to prove the possibility of

    foreknowing a contingent event . The necessarian system , however , is also established by arguments wholly independent of that which is derived from the prescience of the Deity ; aud that reasoning which , however forcible k may possibly be in other respects ,

    omits all notice of those arguments , must be regarded as extremely defective . But even supposing for one moment that the doctrine of free-will tvere as truly susceptible of independent proof as our opponents allege , and as we maintain to be the case

    with necessity , yet if the one is found to be irreeoncileable with the usual and legitimate notions of the Divine foreknowledge , while the other is shewn not only to be compatible with it , but to derive from it an additional and most powerful evidence , there can be no room for hesitation to which

    of these opposing doctrines a dispassionate inquirer ought to yield his assent . The two last of Dr . Copleston ' s Discourses are employed in applying the principles before explained to the Calvinistic tenet of Predestination ;

    but as my object was merely to shew the futility of his objections against the truth of the necessarian doctrine , I shall not pursue his reasoning on that part of the subject . It is a

    remarkable circumstance , however , that he has laid himself open to attack even where we might have supposed him to be most secure . Adopting the sentiments of Archbishop Kin # , who contends that the attributes

    ascribed to the Deity must be understood merely in an analogical sense , he has called forth an able opponent , to whom we are indebted for a satisfactory exposure of the dangerous consequences of such a concession to our belieftin the moral qualifies of the Supreme Being . Though Mr . Grinfield coincides with the Provost of

    Oriel on the main subject of dispute * yet on the particular point discussed in the Pindicice Analogxc < Ey the de-

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    556 Strictures on Dr . Ccplestotfs Discourses , SfC .

• Citation
  • Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Sept. 2, 1825, page 556, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2540/page/40/