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compounds . But how do we come to set it down as a general fact , that two substances , as oxygen and hydrogen , being compounded together , form a third substance , water ? By experience , it must be answered . But what is experience ? Why , it is the remembrance of that which is past . In what , therefore , does this chemistry differ from memory V Mr . Blakey
continues—* But to put this matter in as clear a light as possible , let us suppose that A is a present idea in the mind , and that it has a tendency to introduce another idea which has never been in the mind before , and which we will call B . To this tendency of A to introduce B into the mind , is given the name of association . Now how can we assert or deny any thing respecting the tendency of A to introduce B , till we have witnessed A ' s power over B , and have had B present 10 the
understanding ? The very proposition that A has an influence over B implies that we have seen this tendency , and that B must have previously been in the mind , and consequently an object of memory .
Thus we see then , when we speak about connexions among our ideas , we must consider them as connexions which have been known before ; and therefore we ought to infer , that the treating of them comes within the province of memory , and not within any other intellectual power whatever . '—p 1 J 7 . What a paralogism ; we might almost call it a bull . Yes , certainly , the proposition that A has a tendency to introduce B ,
implies that we have seen this tendency at some former time , because otherwise we should not know it : but the fact itself implies nothing of the lund . When A for the first time introduced B , < which had never been in the mind before / B was not an object of memory ; although it is so when we have observed and treasured up the occurrence . Because an event must be remembered before it can be talked about , Mr . Blakey imagines that it was a subject of memory when it first happened . It is upon the strength of such reasoning that he assumes such a tone as this :
What a dull and paralyzing effect has the reading" of a book in which the principle of the association of ideas forms the philosophical dramatis persona ? in the piece . '—p . 127 . * There is no way of getting through the book , without violating the rules of politeness by enjoying a smile at the expense of the system . * —ib . With much more of the same sort .
Of foreign authors Mr . Blakey seems to be profoundly ignorant . He affirms that in the majority of
cases—4 The continental philosophy of human nature presents to a wellconstituted mind a repulsive aspect , and is profusely saturated with everything that is impure , ridiculous , profane , whimsical , and pernicious . '—p . S 00 . Meaning , we suppose , some French writers only , and those only in the eighteenth century . The celebrated theory of Malebranche he states thus , that * all things should b ? seen in God ; ' ( p . 308 . )
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Blakey * s History of Moral Science . 665
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Citation
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Monthly Repository (1806-1838) and Unitarian Chronicle (1832-1833), Oct. 2, 1833, page 665, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/mruc/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2624/page/5/
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