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September 2, 1854.] THE LEADER. S33
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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A Russian Pamphlet.* [.We Repeat The Cau...
mighty battle , which we do not seek to cheapen , British exploits , on the European field at least , are limited to Navarino , and the operations on the Syrian coast in 1840 . We leave to more competent military critics to judge the merits of these exploits . We shall simply take leave to say , that neither the destruction of the Turkish fleet , nor the bombardment of St . Jean d'Acre , nor the expeditions of the British armies and fleets against the Hindoos , the Chinese , and the Cafres , will persuade us to take the recent prophetic utterances of Lord Clarendon seriously . If it was a question of intrigues , if intrigues alone could bring an empire sustained by a million bayonets to destruction , the genius of" the English Ministry would be far more formidable to Russia and the Continent . Portugal and Spain , Morocco and Algiers , Messina , Naples , Rome , Milan , Florence and Venice , Switzerland an , d Hungary , more especially Greece , Egypt , and Turkey , bear witness enough to the power of intrigue , and to the art of paralyzing your enemies one after the other ( and by ' eneinies' we mean , every state which asserts the right to live its own life ) , at one time by isolating and then insulting , at another by letting loose the tempests of revolution .
But these resources have not sufficed to intimidate Russia or to make her accept humiliations in the East . Notwithstanding the powerful co-operation of France , the success of English policy , now that the struggle is to be decided by the sword , is at least problematical , except in one sense : —we mean the ruin of continental commerce as in 1848 . England seeks her recompense in the contest itself rather than in its results . That France and England meant war while professing peace is proved by their rejection of the Vienna note . Had there been the least sincere disposition to peace , they might well have been , satisfied with the modifications imposed by the Four Powers upon the ori g inal demands of Russia ; But while the Four Powers drew up that Note which Russia , relying on their good faith , was induced to accept , the influence of one Ambassador at Constantinople prevailed over the unanirnoiis decision of Europe , arid war was precipitately declared .
The Sultan seriously believed in the rights of independence and sovereignty which the Western Powers affected to attribute to him in order to prevent his guaranteeing to Russia the rights of the Greek Church— 'the only act of his which could have jprolonged the dying : hours of his Empire , and averted the disasters that are how desolating th 0 ; Eastern world , Chris'tian' and Mussulman alike . Here let us pause to note one episode ^ in the diplomatic drama which passed almost unnoticed . The refusal of Turkey to accede to the Viennji propositions had been secured by Lord Stratford beforehand . In July (< £ s le mois de jinllet ) , the British Ambassador had suggested to the Turkish Ministry the idea of convoking an extraordinary council of sixty dignitaries , to submit to theni the Russian demands in this form : are they compatible with the interests and honour of Turkey ? The
reply could not but be negative under the influence , at that time all powerful in the Ottoman councils , of the fanatic Mehemet Ali , the Sultan ' s brotherin-law , who menaced the Sultan himself with the' vengeance of the Softas . And this reply was solemnly recorded by a public aet signed by all the high dignitaries of the Empire in , and out of , office ; by all the chief secretaries of the Ministries and the chiefs 6 f the TJlemas ; in short , by every personage who could possibly form a part of any Ministay . This proclamation was profusely distributed throughout the empire . It was thus that , at the instigation of Lord Stratford , the honour and interests of the Porte were irreparably committed against the demands of Russia , even if those demands were , in a modified form , supported by the Concert of the European Powers .
All this time , while negotiations were carried on , and peace was preached , and unhappy Turkey was victimised by her friends , the end of all these efforts and provocations was tvar . If at the outset Russia had been placed in an inextricable position , she had now no alternative but decadence and dishonour . Public opinion was misled by the secret operations of diplomacy preaching peace and provoking war , and by the vociferations of a revolutionary press , while the Russian Government scrupulously abstained from rousing the national susceptibility ; and even when Turkey declared war , she occupied the Principalities with a force limited to the strictly defensive ,
and scarcely increased her armaments . She did not even prevent the exportation of corn when Western Europe was stricken with dearth . We cannot give clearer proof of the good faith of Russia throughout the negotiations . She was the dupe of her own misplaced confidence in the probity of her enemies ; while she was accused of outwitting all the world by her diplomacy ^ But there has been such an elaborate perversion of all theories of international law , and such a confusion of right ' and wrong , that tjie ticiva combat of S ' utopc was actually considered almost an infraction of treaties , and called a butchery and an insult . Sinopc has positively been compared witli Copertliaoen I
Thus passed the last months of 1853 , and it was not until February Of the present year that Russia was driven to abandon her system of moderation , and to take up proudly the gauntlet of defumac by increasing her armaments and giving publicity to the enemy's insultB . So scrupulous had been the desire of tho Russian Government to lull rather than to > excite the popular passions , that it hud not oven permitted the journals to publish tho atrocities committed by tho Turks at tho capture of the Fort St . Nicholas , at the beginning of the hostilities , —such , for example , as tho crushing of a priost between two plunks , und the crucifixion of a custom-houso officer , by name Gouriol , by tho soldiers of Solim Pacha . But in February , at length Russia responded to tho enemy ' s imprecations and insults by patriotic songs , by
voluntaiy gifts , by populnr demonstrations which recalled 1812 , and which were all tho more formidable from her anciont hatred of the oppressor of her Church and faith . In 1812 the Russian people knew only one enemy—Napoleon ; now it beholds two Western nations the satellites of Mahomet , la 1812 it had not all tho consciousness of powor ; it had not traversed the capitals of Europe as a liberating army : now tho consciousness of roivl strength and of its intellectual and moral development is exalted by tho prosumption of invincible provyoss , and by tho holiness of the cause which it is summoned to defend . Without assorting that Russia is invincible , it is clear to any one who has studied tho character of tho Slave populations that it will tako ton yearn' successive diaaators to shako tho confidence of Russia in hor govornmoiU and herself . Military glory is capable of great deeds ;
but the consciousness of duty and the confidence of faith , which , are the basis of the moral character of the Russian army , inspire a more persevering courage than the prestige of glory : and when these feelings are tempered b % the religious convictions which now animate tlie Russian army and people , we may well believe that army superior to all dangers . We once travelled in the East in company with a French colonel , a veteran of the grande armee . He had been a captain at the battle of Krasnoie ; the most profound and affecting impression lie had preserved of that field was of one evening when the fire of the armies was slackening as if by a tacit consent of both parties ; he was at the outposts , at a very short distance from the enemy ; the calmness of the Russian soldiers , leaning on their muskets , and regarding the French with an apathetic bonhomie , struck the French with a superstitious terror . One can understand the mot of Napoleon , that -with such soldiers it is not enough to mow them with grapeshot , you must knock them down afterwards .
The present war assumes the character of a national war ; the menaces of the allied fleets to the north and south of the empire stamp it with this character . Not so the western nations ; they will only feel the war in taxes and burdens ; the populaT passions will subside ; is it supposed that one campaign will bring the contest to a close—that the destruction of the Russian fleets , and the bombardment of a few towns on the coast will reduce a government to sue for peace which feels itself invincible in the inexhaustible sympathies of a nation ? The Russian people asks : " What have we done to these men in the West that they should insult us and make war upon us ? They come among us to get rich , and our rich men go to spend their money among them ; we sell them wheat , and flax , and timber ; they send us nothing , but finery . Forty years ago they laid waste our country , pillaged our church . es , profaned the tombs of our Czars : and when our emperor , Alexander , ted us into their cities , we did npt break a pane of glass ; yet they are attacking us again because , our emperor has prevented the Turks frompersecutingthe orthodox faith . "
Western Europe iiiaysjpin . sU . btle theories about the balance of power and the ^ necessity of restraining the ambition of Russia , but they will be of little avail against the siniple natural reasoning of the Russian people . It is only simple ideas that can move the heart of a people : subtle theories have only begotten sects and heresies . This pharitom of aggression has long been invoked to rouse the Western peoples against Russia . Their good sense , we believe , will soon or late discover the hoUowness of the delusion . To England , indeed , conscious ofter supremely factitious existence , floating always in the midst of fears—fear of invasion , of emancipation , of her colonies ' , - , of the renewal of the continental system—to England phantoms are realities . Xet surely to her the fear of Russia is a chimera : Russia threatens neither her coasts nor her colonies , nor even her Indian possessions .
Russia is for ever accused of projects of aggrandisement . No doubt when she first entered into the political system of Europe she became threatening to her neighbours . A young and vigorous nation entering upon civilisation created for herself wants which she could only satisfy by a development proportionate to the destiny assigned to her position between east and west . She must have seas and harbours at north and south . The successors of Peter tlie Great faithfully fulfilled the task bequeathed to them by that colossal genius whose conceptions and previsions are still a code , a
political revelation for Russian statesmen . A century after his decease the conquests he marked out were accomplished ; but the material resources of his Empire remained to be worked out ., The present successor of Peter closed the era of conquest , and devoted his energy to the construction of those public works , canals , roads , railways , industrial and manufacturing establishments which were to cpmplete the conceptions of his ancestor . The most ridiculous calumnies nave been published of late years upon the pretended hereditary policy of the Russian Emperors , and even an apochryphal testament of Peter the Great has been fabricated for the purpose . These absurdities and mystifications prove at least that Europe believes in the perseverance of Russia'in the accomplishment of the work which Peter the Great began .
Just at the time when Russia ' s career of conquests was closed , and when that empire was no longer a menace , but a guarantee of the peace of Europe and the observance of treaties ; when all her attention was directed to internal and pacific developments , a retrospective and factitious alarm seizes upon the mind of the West , and fabulous projects of aggrandisement , never dreamt of at the time of the successive incorporation of the Crimea and the Caucasus , of Poland , Finland , and Bessarabia , are attributed to Russia . And the multitude believe these fables . It is their privilege . But do you , statesmen and serious politicians , do you credit them P You do not ; but you permit , you oncourago these absurdities ; you stimulate and inflamo these fears of a distaat enemy as a condition of your own security and impunity at home . You fear tho moral ascendant of " Russia . To express our
convictions with perfect frankness , wo bohevo your design to be reducible to tho following formula : —England has succeeded in . securing tho cooperation of France for the realisation of her own designs in the East against Russia . Franco hopes , in hor turn , to secure tho co-oporation of Russia and of Austria to ronlise her plans in Germany , and to complete what the Emperor of tho French has always considered to bo his providential mission —tho restoration to the empire of its natural frontiers . Tho idea is dazzling ; it is Napoleonic . But will all Germany throw her weight into tho balance for a oause which is not hor own ? Will she compromise hei destinies for tho advantage of the mercantile greed of England and the baffled and nnsatcd ambition of Franco ? Does she not instinctively perceive that tho " frontiers of tho Rhino" imply , soon or lato , their inevitable
complement , tho Protectorate of tho confederation , the Protectorate again of tho continental blockade and naval war which , wit ]* tho aid of steam , will land tho French on tho English coast Wo will not proceed furthor with this chain of deductions , which disappear before the eternal principle of history , never to repeat itsalf . Austria and Prussia for having failed to ' arrest these troubles at their outset by an unequivocal policy , may be culled upon to expiate tlioir fatal hesitations by defending tho territory assigned to thorn in exchange for their honour ? Will thoy do so ? For tho furtherance of tlioir designs , Western statesmen have con » pired with Gorman demagogues . Russia ' s natural solicitude in
September 2, 1854.] The Leader. S33
September 2 , 1854 . ] THE LEADER . S 33
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Sept. 2, 1854, page 17, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_02091854/page/17/
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