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THE NAPIER DISCLOSURES. Would that all o...
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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The Hope Of Italy. The Presages Of An It...
tain that European diplomacy has nothing to do -with the Italian question , but to sanction whatever result is evolved from the efforts of the Italian people . No nation was ever « et at rest { by the decisions of a , Congress , lasting institutions must spring out of their natural developments , or out of spontaneous impulses . With respect to Italy , it is most important that the Governments of Europe should observe this rule , prescribed alike by justice and by sound policy . Spain has not been
• weakened by intrigue more than by intervention . Greece is a warning against the creative "propensities of diplomacy . Italy , tortured by x ner despots ^ has been harassed by her friends , ' and would dearly purchase the sympathy and aid of the Western Powers , if , upon the * achievement of success , they were to stipulate "for a voice in the settlement of her affairs . So much must be conceded by the friends -of Italy . Their good-will is no title to
interference . They will best serve Italy who counsel her against abortive insurrections , without pretending to offer the free gift of a constitution . We believe that this didactic liberalism , which prevails among the English almost as inveterately as it does among the French , who think no country free unless they decree its iftrm of freedom , is that which has excited most jealousy and most distrust among the Italian patriots .
But , without any right to interpose , practically , in the settlement of this great question , we are free to criticise the acts and the temper of the Italian liberals . Some of them are engaged in an argument 1 —iri our own columns—between two sets of opinion , which do not appear to us to be very widely separate . The believers in " Itaiy for the Italians" avow that Piedmontese development would be preferable to Austrian occupation ; " Italian" declares
himself Willing to choose a constitutional monarchy in place of the degrading yoke of Austrians , Bourbons , and priests . The King of Piedmont ; at least , has broken no oaths ; he is not , like Pius IX ., better known than - trusted . Again we put it , therefore , to ¦ these ' advocates of a common cause : is it wisdom or fanaticism , if they feel the necessity of uniting against despotism , to divide upon points of secondary interest ? They have to wait for their opportunity , and
to profit by it . They may have German armies to resist , ecclesiastical iutrigues to discomfit , Jesuits to detect and expel , civil nnd military institutions to organise against the return of oppression . This is the varied task in which their intellects and their energies must bo absorbed . It is not a fanciful prospect that excites their fears and their hopes . The hour is at hand . A national army is already in the field , a remote field indeed , yet not obscured by distance , for every Sardinian victory is a sign of life , and may be ' a precursor of many glorious feats
at home . Equally important would be the successful enrolment of an Italian legion . It would habituate the people to discipline ; it would teach them to fraternise T > y marching side by side ; it would cement the union of the Koman with the Florentine , of the soldiers of Venice and Savoy . We are perfectly awnre ' of the indignation which Italians feel when they are invited to enlist as desperate mercenaries to fill up the chasms of the Blnm before Sebastopol . The principle which excludes the best Poles from the
Polish [ Legion , would exclude the best Ita-• liafts from that of Italy . They must share ^ the results of the war , or the war will be a iriotikery to them . Wore a speedy peace to be concluded , it might relieve the court of 1 "• Vienna from some of its apprehensions , but 'diplpnta ' cy can neither destroy nor save tho Italian people if they are steady and patient ,
as well as full of hope and spirit . But we must implore the friends of Italy not to hurry on an unprepared revolt . Their enemies already resort to terror ; Italy can afford to watch and wait . Thoiigh diplomatic war without revolution be futile , revolution without diplomatic war is possible , and the Italians have too many resources , too many traditions , too much genius and strength , that they should need to anticipate their opportunity or surrender their objects , whether or not the Western Powers be inclined to accept a compromise instead of a conquest .
At present , it is true , few men anticipate peace . It is not the desire of the influential classes in England . It is far from the policy of the French Government . Events have become complicated , and threaten to become still more so . Every act on the part of our own and of the French Executive indicates ^ belief in the prolongation of the war . Bussia gives no sign , but suffers resolutely . Only the German Cabinets persist in coquetting , while our loudest blusterers , who are the
slaves of diplomacy , affect a menacing liberalism , and pass the word of warning to Naples and to Austria . Any exciting act , however , on the part of the Western , Allies would prove premature , and embarrass their operations , without serving the Italians . In Naples , indeed , even our country gentlemen , friends of order as they are , think dimly that it might be proper to interfere- —not to do the work of " incendiarism , " but to spare Europe the reproach of a sanguinary idiot ' s rule . King Ferdinand is recommended to imagine how effective a British squadron would look
in his bay , and were the threat made in earnest , there might be serenity for a while in the squares of the sunny capital . . But no established Government is really interested in abolishing the rdgime of the spy , the bastinado , and the subterranean cell . Perhaps it is too much to require from statesmen educated in the principles of the Holy Alliance that they should interfere , where interference would signify revolution . As far , therefore , as yet appears , the Allies have resolved to keep Sebastopol only in view , when the season of indecisive demonstrations
in the Baltic is closed . The opinion of some Italians is worth studying by all—that it would be false policy , through any devotion to a special idea , to disaffect the Piedmontese towards their Government . Patriotism has enough to encounter in the princes and priests , whom all liberals in Europe abhor , without attacking institutions which have the sympathy of a vast body of moderate men . The moral advance of Piedmont has been of incalculable
service to the cause of Italy . It has proved that Italians need only to be emancipated to progress in all the arts of society . It ought to prove also , to the satisfaction of every temperate mind , that a national kingisbetter than an Austrian viceroy , or a branch of the Holy Alliance . Without asking for a public analysis of the Italian patriots' creed , tin ' s much we may require—that they should not vilify their few powerful friends , or prefer their own crotchets to the salvation of " their
country . The stones that rise * one upon another in Venice menace tho Adriatic with an emporium of military force , designed to quell the movements of the Lombardo-Venetian people . While tho factions debate , theso fortifications grow in Verona and Pola too , threatening the borders of Piedmont . If tho Bufferings and degradations of Italy have impressed upon the Itniiuns , the truth that their hope lies in generosity , in forbearance , in confidence , jit is time that their mutual . wrongs should urge them to prepare cautiously for the fulfilment of their common
design . They'liave a right to su ^' e ^ t 'diplomacy . ; but > to strike before Europe is ready , or to remember domestic feudsi , is to light the fire which has ever been a beacon"tb their foes . ' ' ' : ' : '¦'" ¦' . '"'' .
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The Napier Disclosures. Would That All O...
THE NAPIER DISCLOSURES . Would that all our statesmen were ^ as cun-i ning as Sir James Graham , for cunning men resort to devices which often lead to the exposure of their own schemes . In 1 S 54 , Sir James Graham sent Sir (^ iIakles Napier into the Baltic , under circutostances calculated to make the British public believe that " the right man" was put into " the right place "—that the Baltic would be scourged , feussia ' s rocky stronghold " shaken , in , and St . Petersburg itself put up for ' safe or lease .
That was the view held out to the public for a great part . of that year 1854 . Meanwhile Sir James Graham was soothing ' the irritation of the old gentleman who Was placed at ' the head of the British officers with various syrups in the form of friendly notes , until ; James Graham ' s cabinet became involved in tho discredit caused by the resultlessnessf of the Napier campaign ; and then from soothing , Sir James turned to goading . On . this Sir Charles , ' after thinking of it for a year , turns to the written drama , which he has in store , and determines to " shame the fool and print
it . " The exposure is the more amusing , from its exhibiting the exposer as well as the eiposee . There was a slight obstacle in the form of a punctilio : geritlemeii never publishing private communications without leave of their correspondents . Sir Charles wishes to publish , but how to get over the difficulty ? A friend observes for him that the Admiralty had " evidently" supplied the Times with materials , for attacking him , and thus , it is implied ? he is released oy the malfeasance of the present Admiralty from any honourable reserves towards ' the' late loM ! We can
not see how the excuse applies to the case , or how it obviates the irrefragable rule that gentlemen never publish private letters without the leave of their correspondents . The indiscretion of the old boy , however , bursts the bubble of the e & rly Baltic campaign ; it exposes the Admiralty as'it was then , and teljs us how the British public , aa well as the British admiral , may be bamboozled . There was a great pretence that to Sut Sir Charles at , the head qf [ the Baltic ao + nrna -t-r \ mi 4- * ' ¦ 4-TVq - »» i rrlvti rvlo ' n rrt'tVl ** T » lf / llf : 1
Ma . \^ y-JV VV * IK ? UV U ( . IU V LX \ S f tgUU 4 U 14 J & A U V **^ - ' ** Q place . " Several of us' Uoifbted it ; he had been a great sailor , a noisy advertiser of Sir Charles Napier , bi . it s ' oilors doubted whether he would be qualified to conduct ' a naval war according to the new arts of naval warfare , or suited with the increased irritation of years to manage a class of gentlemen wearing epaulettes . However , he was certified by the Keform Club dinner as " the right man in the right place : " The dinner waa held at the Beform Club on the 7 th Of March . A few
days * before tliat Sir Charles Napier was reminding Sir James Graham that he complained of tho tools which were handed to him > 'fbi breaking open the strong gates oil Russia . Wo all Imow what kind of workman that is who complains of hie tools , and Sir Jambs offered to let off his ' gallant friend it hoJliad any misgivings about his work . Sir Chaju / es ' dbolined to accept the offer , evido
dently because ) ho supposed that to so would b ' e to confess himself" u coward . " Sir JaMkej GUakam , therefore , had the strongest reason for believing that Sir Charles \\ a » tho worst man for the p lace , that is , an un willing ) misgiving , complaining Workman . Yet he was sent out with innumerable puffs . J 3 oing nt tho scene of action , Sir Charles instantly
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Sept. 8, 1855, page 12, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_08091855/page/12/
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