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NOTICES TO CORRESPONDENTS. (feveral arti...
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^*—^ v ^ y ~ SATURDAY, APRIL 10, 1858.
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. There is- nothing so revolutionary, be...
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THE MINISTRY AND THE INDIA BILL. !Loki> ...
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OUR RELATIONS WITH NAPLES. The attempt t...
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Transcript
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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Tt&. 4>20\ £&&&* T&, 1808..
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Notices To Correspondents. (Feveral Arti...
NOTICES TO CORRESPONDENTS . ( feveral articlfes are unavoidably postponed this week . ^ 5 o notice oaa bo takeu of amonymous correspondence Wbateverisiirtendedforinsertioii must beauthenticated bvttte name and address pf the writer ; not necessarily fornublioation . but as a guarantee of his good faith , "ttis impossible to acknowledge the mass of letters we receive Their insertion is often delayed , owing to a press of matter- and when omitted , it is frequentlyfrom reasons quiteindependeut of themeritsof thecommanioafcion .
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^*—^ V ^ Y ~ Saturday, April 10, 1858.
^*—^ v ^ y ~ SATURDAY , APRIL 10 , 1858 .
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. There Is- Nothing So Revolutionary, Be...
. There is- nothing so revolutionary , because there is nothing so unnatural and convulsive , as the strain to keepthings fixed-when allthe world is by thevery law of itsoreatiomneternal progress . —Be . Aenold « . .
The Ministry And The India Bill. !Loki> ...
THE MINISTRY AND THE INDIA BILL . ! Loki > BLiiBWBOROUaH ' s India Bill is already in ruins . It has been the mark of hostile criticism from every side , and the Premier himself is avowedly preparing for a surrender . ! Few instances are on record of a legislative proposal so immediately and unambiguously rejected by public opinion . But , as Lord Derby declares , the great object in view stands bej'ond the scope of party conflict . We have no desire to assist Lord Pajg-STERSTON in rushing through the gap created ~ b y Lord EiiiiENBOROUGH ' s failure . The work in which all public men of public spirit are disposed to combine is the establishment of an improved administrative power in and for India , with commensurate responsibility , clearly defined functions , and a supreme general direction , personal or corporate , at home . If by referring to a select committee the two schemes now before Parliament the views of leading statesmen can be simplified without raising a Cabinet question , the Xiberal party has no interest whatever in the instant deposition of Lord Dishby . The JELLENBOTiouan Bill is clearly impossible ; and to save India from an experiment so wild , ¦ wanton , and precipitate , is not faction but public policy . By the Court of Directors , Xord Palmeiiston ' s project is reported as less empirical and fallacious ; botli plans are naturally repugnant to the East India Company ; but , since the necessity for legislation has been admitted , it would be the merest waste of reasoning to treat the Government of India as ouo that can long remain upon its existing basis . There must bo change . That is a settled point . The remaining question ia one of form and principle * , and here the analysis of the two bills by the Ooui't of Directors is practically valuable . Into the details of the argument we need not enter , as we lnst week recapitulated tho principal objections stated in tho report to 1 ) 0 discussed at tho India House noxt Tuesday . ' We now wish to deal with a part of the subject altogether neglected in Lord E rjj icNvonouait ' s Bill nnd in the Report of the Directors . It is that which concerns the reorganization of tho Indian , nrmy , nnd , at tho risk of repetition , wo will first rcsumotho discussion nt tho point at which wo left it ^^ tflve ^ lcr'Tlro ^ CirATtfCTC ^^^^ QTJEit stated , in his speech on proposing the new India Bill , that it was not in contemplation at present to make any change in the constitution of tho British-Indian army beyond " that which necessarily results from the general scope of tho bill . " In other words , Lord Er . T . KNHOnouaii aaka for full powers to constitute himself on Asiatic Horse Guiuvin Minister na . well as a * Soovotuvy of tilnto ; and
when his pretensions take this lofty range , we naturally ask ,, what are his known opinions ? They are , as we have said , in favour of the military occupation of India by a British force , and it is even imagined that the President ? of the Board of Control acquiesces in the ignoble scheme of so arming the Sepoys that they might at any moment' be overpowered at long range by their European comrades . ! N " , we will not prejudge Lord ELLTDNBOiiouGii , but we may presume to insist upon an explicit declaration of Indian military policy from the statesman who is a candida / te for despotic authority over the vast realm of British India . It might be too late , when the bill had passed , to prevent him from
dealing in scientific remodellings and from treating his Mohammedan regiments in the spirit of the Somna ' th proclamation . Is India to be coerced by brute force or developed by moral force ? If the former , then what man acquainted with the character of the various native populations will need to have the process described or the catastrophe predicted ? To disarm India is to degrade it , finrl to degrade it is to lose it . "We have a
right to question Lord Elle ^ ec ) rough s policy when we remember that he has recently proposed a system by which eighty thousand Englishmen would attempt to coerce , by mere muscular and mechanical superiority , a hundred and thirty millions of Asiatics , as strong and , in a tropical climate , more enduring than the British soldier—a project for setting a bull-dog to watch an elephant . . But who is to disarm the people of India , and reduce Bengal , Bombay , Madras , the North-West Provinces , and the Punjab to a perpetual state of siege ? Who is to search the houses , destroy the manufacture , and prohibit the importation
of arms throughout India ? Who is to ransack the mystery of its jungles , or even live among its vast underwoods during the unhealthy season ? Would the revenue bear the cost of a gigantic native police , simultaneously with an army of eighty thousand British troops , in camps and dep 6 ts ? We have no doubt that it will be essential to keep the Indian arsenals in full efficiency , to maintain powerful European garrisons in the fortified places , to brigade the European army at commanding points , to open strategic lines of road and railway , and otherwise to assume more completely the character of a dominant power . But to force a curb into the mouths of n
hundred and thirty millions , hot-blooded and vindictive , is loss to establish supremacy than to challenge insurrection . But , if a British army of eighty thousand men could ho maintained , would it be adequate to its oflice ? If disseminated throughout the empire , it would infallibly be decimated by tho climate ; its scattered power would bo next to useless in on emergency , and tho principlo of permanent detachment would risk its total demoralization . If concentrated , who is to hold tho thousands of
mile *) of intervening country ? Not native polico certainly . Native police are simply native soldiers without their beat military qualities , and , so . far from protecting tho pooplo , would become their most intolerable tyrants . By introducing tho principlo of niililary occupation , wo introduce the principle of hatred between races ; wo turn adrift tl ) 0- ^ iivilitaiy- ~ olassoa ^ of- _ lndia , ^ autl ,-.. iu ^_ fch . ft event of a European war , wo find oiir resourcos drained in Europe and drained in Asia at one and tho same timo . Lastly
the contingency is romoto , but possible—by teaching tho soldier despotism in Asia , wo may teach him that despotism ia practicable in England . AVo create un army of Zouaves ' and Zephyrs , and , however aolidly fortified : niuy bo our constitutional libortiea > thero is
no necessity to introduce the Algerian , system ; into this country , let us of course accept the facts as they stand ; admit our Bengal native army to be dissolved ,, our Bombay army to be tainted , our' Masd * a 3 army to be still sound although subjected * to pernicious centralizing regulations , bofc let us act upon the principle of restoration , with as little convulsion as possible , consistently with the assertion of our absolute rule
With this aim the Bengal native army niay gradually be reorganized upon that principle which has preserved , through every trial ^ the loyalty and efficiency of the Sindh horse , composed as it is of agriculturists' frotttfc & e heart of the revolted districts . A Similar reform , so far as it is desirable , may be commenced upon the same foundation iii Che Presidency ' of Bombay , while in the remaining territories an identical principle may be kept in view , although acted upon slowly and with the utmost deliberation , as one
opportunity after another arises . The native army being thus re-established , the European force may ° be massed at healthy stations- in the immediate vicinity of swift and suitable facilities for transport . Thus system atized r the British muscular force is extant but not paraded . If required , five thousand men , held properly in hand , accustomed to work together , fully equipped , supplied , and provided with means of carwith effect
riage , would be thrown more upon any threatened point than any fragment from an army of eighty thousand men sprinkled over the empire , and whose presence in sole and palpable military occupation had impressed upon the subjected a consciousness of inferiority and degradation . We have no right to keep up a standing menace against the entire populatiou of India . If we cannot govern by other right than that of loaded muzzles and matches lighted , we have
no claim to govern at all . The ELiiENBOBOUGU India Bill leaves the great military question altogether unsettled , and iu this respect , as in most others , it stands condemned , upon its merits , if not to absolute rejection , at least to the threshing process of a Select Committee .
Our Relations With Naples. The Attempt T...
OUR RELATIONS WITH NAPLES . The attempt to break off diplomatic relations -with an independent state must necessarily be a failure . We have for several months hail no representative at tlie court of Naples , and the sufFercrs from this have been , not the Neapolitan authorities , but our own countrymen . The King of Naples , after all , has compelled us to accredit an irregular representative nt his court , and the question now arises , how far is the present dispute to bo earned . Count
Cavour , who has acted throughout with admirable consistency and vigour , and who took from the first a more correct view of the Cagliari case than the law officers of the British Crown , has distinctly demanded " the concurrence and , if need bo , the cooperation of the British Government to bring this important aiVair to a conclusion . " Lord Malineabury replies that he will consider the matter , but that Sir James Hudson had misunderstood his instructions . It appears , however , that Sir . lames Hudson had not misunderstood his instructions , but hud neglected his duty , and that Mr . Jirakino , diplomatic sccrctnry at Turin , had , of his own vohuou , hit upon the vory statement which Lord Clarendon should last
have forwarded to Count Cavonr m January , or earlier . There is no excuse fur Mr . Lrskino , and still less for Sir James Hudson ; but what Mr . Erskine wrote without authority Lord Mulmesbury i 3 . now-bound . l , Q wnto as Foreign Mimator ot ^ ngland Tlioro is no longer any rcMonrtblo'doubMtiat tho Cngliari was illegally captured , that two Bntmh subjools have sullcied laLso imprwonmont , and that ; u claim to indemnification hua boon oattiblislifflj . The responsibility of enforcing this chum lieawitk tho British , and Fiedmontoso Governments jointly ; tho emu us iiitorustod in tho steamer Caghari , captured m a pirato upon tho high seas , ami coiiuomuad in violnlion of inlenmtional law , tho othor as intorestod in tho rights of two lfiuglislimou who have
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), April 10, 1858, page 11, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_10041858/page/11/
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