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252 THE LEAD'S IB. [No. 312, Saturday,
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SATURDAY, MAECH 15, 1856.
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here is nothing so revolutianaiyv becaus...
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THE KA.BS PAPEES.* Blttu Books, after al...
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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Transcript
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.
252 The Lead's Ib. [No. 312, Saturday,
252 THE LEAD'S IB . [ No . 312 , Saturday ,
- - ¦ ¦ Notices To Correspondents, No No...
- - ¦ ¦ NOTICES TO CORRESPONDENTS , No notice can : be taken -of anonymous communications . ¦ Whatever is . intended for insertion must be authenticated by the name and address of the writer ; not necessarily for publication but as a guarantee of his good faith . It is impossible to acknowledge the mass of letters we receive . Their insertioa is often delayed , owtng to a press Of matter ; arid when omitted , it is frequently from reasons quite independent of the merits of the communication . ' - ¦ ¦ ¦¦¦ . ¦ ' * - We cannot undertake to return rejected communications . During the Session of Parliament it is often impossible to find room for correspondence , even the briefest .
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Saturday, Maech 15, 1856.
SATURDAY , MAECH 15 , 1856 .
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Here Is Nothing So Revolutianaiyv Becaus...
here is nothing so revolutianaiyv because- there is nothing so uimatural and con . Vulsi . vej as the strain to Iceep things fixed wnenaH tne world ia " by the verylawof its creation , in eternal progress .- —Da . Abhouk
The Ka.Bs Papees.* Blttu Books, After Al...
THE KA . BS PAPEES . * Blttu Books , after all , are not contemporary history ; they are only materials for contemporary history ; resolve Taut few questions , renxoye but few doubts , and those paly of a minor kind . They raise larger questions , and more serious doubts than thbse they solve and ¦*«* -iTVv / v-irr /* . * IHii Air i \ i » flchri + ^ iwin tirT ^ l ^ n PAi » ioa * -vF Jk jvu wvjlvxj ovjlx ^
i ^ iuy . vci . - . uwjr- . j ^ xvp ^ iiv . cv o \ ja . unconnected facts , links of a chain of evidence , isolated texts sadly in need of commentary . We have no desire , in making these remarks , to depteciate the value of Blue Books ; we <> i & y wishv to point out that when they have , yieldedall their evidencej there still remains behind a mass of testimony and fact , which are necessary to a full comprehension of the
vital questions at issue . These papers relating to Kara furnish a striking exemplification of the meaning we wist to convey . What is it that all are burning to know ? How it came to pass that the Russians were permitted to take Kars . But the solution of that problem is not to be fb ^ d in the Papers ^—ionly hints towards a solution , only particular facts bearing on special
branches of the subject—nothing more . The papers conclusively prove that the hero of the whole adventure was the unyielding British Coznmissioner , * General Williams ; that Lord ClarEsibon , on " behalf of the Home Government , heartily and continuously supported and encouraged the gallant soldier 5 that Lord Stratford , at the outset of his career , treated General
T » JJUJLiJUrtJUQ XXX O , J-UtlbLpi . UXliCA i _ y XU . U . CJ . CJ . lOJ . PJi . t : , XXX 3 , manner that was cruel , if not criminal , and extremely injurious to ther general interests of the alliance ; , the papers show that the Turkish officials in Asia were in the last degree corrupt ; that Omar Pacha and the Porte , the British Ambassador and the British JQovernment , were desirous of doing something to re-Sieve Kaxs ; that the French Government -shared that desire in a less degree , and that the French Marshal stood in . the way of its esecutipn : these things the papers show us , but th , ese things axe a very small part of the
question ; its larger branches stall remain unsolved . Why did not the Allies afford the Forte the assistance of European troops ? and wii-y / vrhen it was agreed that Omar Pacha should rn , ake a powerful diversion to relieve -Kara , did , it happen that Marshal Pjelissier retained the Turkish soldiers in the Crimea ? Tft these . yital questions we can imagine very g <| 6 d . answers '; but in matters of such moment ^ e '^ ej jnot trAtst to our imagination for < rea-* 2 ?? £% ^ $ ® Wi to the MUitwy Afft t ra of Anatio , o tM ' % tS ? . ££ < # *<* . « nd Capitulation of Kan . Presented & IWi -Howe * 0 / JParliMncnt .
neglected to obtain from the Porte the high rank ia the Turkish service promised by Lord Clarendon . For this conduct Lord Stratford deserves severe censure ; but undoubtedly , -when we look to his peculiar position and influence in Turkey , to his energy and acuteness , we must admit that on the whole Lord" Stratford has well served his country and the cause of the alliance . Nevertheless , we fear that what General Williams trul y called a " golden opportunity" for retrieving the fortunes . of Turkey in Asia was lost by the omission of the British ambassador to act in the spirit and letter of the instructions of his Government , and give its officer the necessary powers . And , at the root of the causes of the loss of Kars , we find this , that General Williams , by the negligence , if not ill-will , of Lord Stratford , was rendered almost powerless , just at the time when he could have exerted himself most effectually in storing Kars with ammunition and provisions sufficient to supply its garrison through every possible blockade in 185 £ . The next branch of the subject inviting attention is that ffelatiner to the measures
taken for the relief of- Kars . When the Porte found that the fortress was invested , they became very anxious for its relief . They propounded a plan for a diversion in tile rear of the Russian army as early as July . The proposal was that General Vivian should take the chief command , and with a verv mixed
force , including the Contingent , land at Redout Kaleh and march on Tiflis . The plan would not bear examination . The Contingent was in a most inefficient state ; no commissariat was provided-- —it was doubtful whether the troops could be collected . The British Government extinguished the proposal by declining to permit General Vivian and his Dattanons to in
nan-organised engage any sucn enterprise ; So far as the views of the JBritisk Government were concerned , the plan in favour was an advance by Trebizond upon Erzeroum . The views of the French Government do not come out very fully in these papers , and we are left to guess them—at best a poor substitute for the facts . Soon after the first plan was broached at Constantinople , gcucaaio
KJVLAii stakjUA . caueu tugemex me « uu admirals in the Crimea , and asked permission to withdraw his own troops from the lines before Sebastopol , and take them to Asia . He , too , concurred with the Porte in thinking that it woioLd be better to land at Redout Kaleh than at Trebizond . But all the naval and military authorities , French , English , and Sardinian , were at that time decidedly opposed to the
withdrawal of any troops from the Crimea . It is due to Lord Clarendon to say that he made no objection , and that he proposed to fill up the gap in the lines with the Contingent , or other Turkish troops—a proposal which Simpson and Pelissier energetically opposed . Lord , Clarendon , disappointed , applied to the French Government . He found the same unwillingness to part with the Turkish troops . The Emperor , with characteristic caution , at length assented , however , to their withdrawal , if adequate substitutes were
proviaea . cmue uuhw wiojicbjwuojuui ^ w ^ w Pexissier and the French marshal hesitated . But it was now too late . While these complicated negotiations were in progress—these perpetual references from Court to Court , and Capital to Capital , and from the Courts and Capitals to the Camp—the propitious time for action had fled . It was actually close on to the end of September before Marshal Pklissieic consented to the departure of the first three battalions d ' elite 1 Omar Vacua did the I best he could ; formed the boat plane ho could ; and , onco on the ground , exerted
appointed me . JuooKing cioseiy into everything , he found everything in confusion , and in the worst possible condition . He tried to introduce reforms , to force the Pachas to be honest ; to get the men drilled , clothed , and fed ; to lay up stores in the fortresses , and to restore the army to a condition fit for the field . Of course he kept the nnWfi T ., r » rrlq abovp . TftFfirred to fullv informed i ¦ ¦¦ ¦ ¦
j | I— ^ 1 ^ p ^^^ fc ^^ n ^^ rm ~ i 1— i ~ . ^^»»*^ B > n ^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^™ ^^ ^^^^ ^^ — ^ ~~ ~~ m - - < - - — of all that occurred ; in fact he did his duty . How did they do theirs ? Far from gaining him the required authority and rank in the Turkish service , although Colonel Williams landed in Asia in September , yet Lord Stratford suffered the Colonel to write him fifty-four despatches between that date and December 8 , without deigning to answer or acknowledge one . He did not obtain for him the rank of lieutenant-general in the Turkish service until several months after he had been in Armenia . Meanwhile Lord Clarendon had 1 . 1 1 1 111 * all tne most attention to
paid scrupulous xne despatches of General . Williams ; and when he became aware of the silence of the British ambassador , he forwarded to him a letter containing a juat and severe rebuke . Lord Stratford's reply was , that he did not neglect the substantial complaints of General Williams , although he neglected to write to the General ; and that -wo believe to have been the fact . The ambassador further urged that he did not know distinctly what was the position of General Williams ; but he admitted that it was by an " inadvertence " that ho had
sons ; and we look hopelessly for them in the pages of the Kars Blue Book . For what we do find there , however , we are thankful , and will communicate the essence of the thick volume to our readers . It may be remembered that the Turkish army in Asia suffered a severe defeat in the open field , in the summer of 1854 , and that the troops fell into great disorder . The British Government , in the interests of the alliance , sent Colonel Williams as Commissioner to the Turkish head quarters . He was instructed to communicate constantly with Lord Raglan , Lord Stratford de Redcliffe , and Lord Clarendon , and it was his "business to keep them well informed respecting the state of the army of Anatolia . But , as the object of sending him was to revive that army , it was soon felt that Colonel Williams would require high rank in the Turkish service , and such power as would enable him to do what was expected from him . It would therefore seem natural that the British Ambassador should obtain both , especially as he knew the nature of Turkish officials , and could readily have , firnessed the kind of treatment our envov
would meet with if he frustrated the Turkish functionaries and stood between them and their unjust gains . But what did Lord Stratford do ? Remember it was of the last importance that Colonel Williams should be armed with authority at once , not only that he mis-ht make a ¦ Dowerful impression on the
minds of the swindlers he had to encounter , but that he might be obeyed , and be able to reorganise the army , and place Kars and Erzeroum in an adequate state of defence . Well ; Colonel Williams landed at Trebizond early in September , without any credentials , without any rank . He found the state of the army , the amount of fraudulent dealing on the part of : ¦ m v * - ¦»••¦*¦ - "wr * n ^ . ^ . almost incrediblexie iouna tnat
to command . * ^ tne Jracnas * , , in order to cheat the Government , they drew rat ions in two instances for upwards of 33 , 000 and 27 , 000 men , when , in point of fact , there were only 14 , 000 present under arms . When he reached the camp he found Zarif Mustapha , the runaway , at Kurukdere , still at the head of the establishment ; lie was compelled to see Shukri Pacela , a man quite as bad as Zarif , "• .-1 . . I " I TTT" 1 ' j 1 ¦
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), March 15, 1856, page 12, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_15031856/page/12/
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