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60 T H E L E A D ER. [No. 301, Saturday,...
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NOTICES TO CORRESPONDENTS. Mo notice can...
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csgp ^J«c cJg&twtt:
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: . SATURDAY, JANUARY 19, 1856.
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'^tt li itt Mara .
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There is notMng so revolutionary, becaus...
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the settlement be worth ? Of what durati...
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THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. J It is difficu...
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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Transcript
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.
60 T H E L E A D Er. [No. 301, Saturday,...
60 T H E L E A D ER . [ No . 301 , Saturday , I
Notices To Correspondents. Mo Notice Can...
NOTICES TO CORRESPONDENTS . Mo notice can . be tafeen of anonymous communications . Whatever is intended for insertion must be authenticated by the name and address of the writer ; not necessarily for publication , but as a guarantee of his good faith . It is impossible to acknowledge the mass of letters we receive . Their insertion is often delayed , owing to a press of matter ; and when omitted , it ia frequently from rea-Bons quite independent of the merits or the communication . Communications should always be legibly written , and on one side of the paper only . If long , it increases the difficulty of finding space for them . " We cannot undertake to return rejected communications . - >
Csgp ^J«C Cjg&Twtt:
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: . Saturday, January 19, 1856.
: . SATURDAY , JANUARY 19 , 1856 .
'^Tt Li Itt Mara .
' ^ tt li itt Mara .
There Is Notmng So Revolutionary, Becaus...
There is notMng so revolutionary , because there is nothing so unnatural and comrulsive , as the 3 fcrain to keep things fixed .-when-all the world is by the very la-TV of its creation in eternal progress . —Db . Abnokd . v
The Settlement Be Worth ? Of What Durati...
the settlement be worth ? Of what duration will the good understanding be ? Interpreting the Russian reply , however , in its probable sense—the acceptance of the proposals " as a basis "—it may be an imposture , and , if entertained at all , must have an ambiguous effect . Morally , it means nothing less than that Russia is now forced into an attitude of submission ; diplomatically , it leaves everything unsettled . There is this difference unconditional
it will be time to reckon with that governing I class whose incapacity has allowed the national I reputation to suffer during a two years' war 1 which has cost England one hundred and fifty | millions of money and thirty thousand men . 1
between an ana a vague acceptance- An unconditional acceptance admits of no discussion as to principles , but simply as to the methods of putting theni into execution ; An acceptance of the terms as a " basis " means , broadly , that Russia is willing to negotiate , and to approach , directly or indirectly , the plan laid down by Austria and the Allies . The ambiguous result we allude to is , then , + li « f . tT » p . vfwvnfiLTiincr r » f npo-otiations . within this ¦
VUWV V **» rf » ¦*«» ¦»* - | - » - -w—— ^^ — — ^ -j — : . f indefinite area , must have the effect of relaxing the naval and military . preparations of the Allies . With a probability of peace before 4 . 1 ^ # sv « t , \*\ -i 4- i » qoc « aiioK 1 c -f / - \ V \ OIT ATTCi f \ r » C » fc x \\ C ^ XT * XV ~ l 11 ¥ »/ w » ¦
^ Ml fl ^" . ¦ 11- i » 5 It ) X ^ IMJVUUU-l ^ W ^^ v- » - * . V * - * - * . *«^* ' **^ » w ——— : continue expending their treasures , fitting out their armaments , preparing the means of invasion ? Men do not , in private life ,
litin ? HE RUSSIAN ACCEPTANCE . There is a clear distinction between the acceptance of the Austrian proposals by Russia , " unconditionally , " and her acceptance of them " as a basis of negotiation . " An unconditional acceptance would imply that Russia has submitted , explicitly and literally , to certain terms ; and that it only remains lor the Allies , conjointly with the mediating Power , to . give them effect . This , however , is the unofficial version . The more guarded . G-overnmental organs , with surer means of informationstate that the
gate with unabated pertinacity when there is a prospect of a compromise . A formal armistice would not , in all likelihood , be declared , yet a virtual suspension of arms would no doubt follow the announcement of a new Conference , even at Brussels . No truce ensued upon the discussion of the Four Points ; but at that moment a great military operation was in progress which no event , short of the actual signing of a treaty , could interrupt . " We are now on the debateable ground between peace and war . No warlike movements
, Austrian scheme has been accepted only " a basis , " which would leave room for any extent of equivocation and compromise , of discussion and modification . If this view be correct , Europe has not advanced , diplomatically , beyond the point at which she stood before the Vienna Conferences . Russia accepted , the Four Points , without reservation , L L m * * ta - _ T » *» m ^~ « . -. ' / 1 a _ b A ~ _ w * . ^ . 1-fc A —J -aXa a A * . A * W W « W 1 . A L * ^ twV ^ W *« ^ % ^ J cuducu
are actually proceeding ; and , we repeat , the inevitable effect of a vague debate with Russia on the basis" of the Austrian proposals , must be to paralyse those whom Napoleon called " the organisers of victory . " In such a diplomatic contest it is easy to foretell on which side the superiority will lie . Whether sincere or not in her intention of procuring peace , T ? naeia will sfind to the Conferences her most
^ ^^ no a uaais , uui ] in tuc u . « utitt ; a wiiiuxi , it was found that she treated as matters of detail , stipulations which the Western Powers maintained as matters of principle . So it may prove in the present negotiations . Supposing , however , the clear and xinconditional acceptance by Russia of the Austrian propositions , many important arrangements have tobe carried out before the settlement will be complete . It would be undeniable , in such a case , that the original objects of the war have been ful-• ftllori Tnvlrotr -vcttI ! Vioiro V ^ oon ao / VMT'Pfl n . Tt < l .
practised diplomatists , who may obtain a success in their department , while the Imperial administrators gain , time to fortify the Baltic , and to move new levies into Southern Eussia and the Transcaucasian provinces . Therefore , no language held by Russia , unless it pledged her to accept , unconditionally , the terms admitted by the Allies , should induce any relaxation of the preparations for war . No such relaxation is discernible on her oart . Her proclamations in Asia Minor , and
in a certain sense , avenged . The violated frontier of the Danube will have been placed under new guarantees . In the South , Russian influence will have receded — Sebastopol exists no longer , and powerful naval armar ments are not to be permitted in the Euxine . The Protectorate monopoly will have been abolished . Finally , Russia will have acknowledged that she owes compensation for an in-• 5 n ** Tr * T"km * Tk * a 47 i » o l * nrl . nrroinaf l" »/* i » ¦ xsrAalr vifvuvrfc r ^/ vm * •¦
the concentration of her forces on the Courland frontier point to an opposite probability . If a debate is to be opened , there are numerous points of difference which may be bars to peace . To suggest one : the idea of surrendering Kars as a set off against the surrender of Sebastopol by the Allies is not only preposterous , but it indicates a determination not to part with any of the Bessarabian territory . For ourselves , we have no desire to see an
I UA Y |^ V >* l / VVA MiUUVIi MtUWAtlU U AAVA f ? VV «**< mwaH j A ^ wm . * she will have yielded to the public law of Europe , and confessed herself unable to sustain pretensions which she long refused even to abate . But , out of the original question , other questions have arisen . These are : the military occupation of the Crimea , the position of Austria in the Principalities , the protection of the Danubian Delta , the definition of the Asiatic frontier of Russia—never yet defined —the fortifications of the Aland Isles , the relations between the Scandinavian , and the Western Powers , and of Sardinia with the rest of Italy and with Austria . If theae points are not included in the settlement , what will
r aimless war prolonged . We have consistently expressed the opinion that the present struggle will be only political and diplomatic in its results , and that it has nothing to do with the liberties or with the civilisation of Europe . At the same time , however , there is an English point of view from which English journalists must regard the war . Its diplomatic objects being just , they must be taken by force , if Russia will not concede them . If Russia is prepared to concede them , we think the English public is prepared for peace ; if not , at whatever sacrifice to individuals of interest or feeling , the struggle must be unflinchingly pursued . Wlxen tranquillity ie restored in Europe
The President's Message. J It Is Difficu...
THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE . J It is difficult to see into the motives of men , I but the results of their actions can be seen . | Whatever may have dictated the bullying 1 / . / mitoo tal-oii rvn rmr nn . rt , towards tl \ o . TTnitr > rl i
States—whether it was an aristocratic con- i tempt for the citizens of a community which | has no titled grandees , or some positive mis- | information carried to head quarters—the | result is , that our statesmen have prepared § humiliation for themselves and their country . | They have placed themselves in the position | of endeavouring to extort what they cannot I compel , and of losing what they might have |
had for the asking ; and they have prepared , j for General Pierce , a triumph over them , from i which they might easily have shut him out . ' : Our readers will remember that when the first 1
demonstrations against the United States were | made in this country , we explained the cha- I racter of the two chief questions that then ' m r ^ r ^ l * * 1 I 1 * i * ed saiaouier in
^ exist , mere were , Ave , poims dispute , but these were the chief . They were the infraction of the Neutrality Act by the open recruitment of soldiers for the British Legion in the United States , and the violation of the Bulwer-Clayton treaty in Central America . The President ' s message will be found in exact accordance with the explanations ' we then gave ; only , if we may be permitted to , say so , our own explanation was much clearer than that which Franklin I ' ierce appears to be able to give to Congress . ul uium | juiuiui
± ne recruitment was reauy < affair , and it was made important only by the malignant intrigues of the subordinates whom Mr . Crampton and Mr . Howe too greatly trusted . Stinted in means , Mr . Howe was not able to be so open-handed as the representatives of an aristocratic country like this should have been ; he permitted himself to purchase the service of three or four
cosmopolitan adventurers , who really became agents and informers against him . Whether or not , he had not money enough fairly to purchase their service ; or whether , while they pocketed his money , they worked for the enemy , we know-not ; but certain it is , that they , his servants , rendered his case as open as it could be in the defiance of the Neutrality Act , and then informed against him . A little frank explanation , a little explicit disavowal of acts which our Government really did not intend , would
have sufficed to sever the Government in Downing-street from the blunders of its agents in the United States ; but , instead of repudiating acts that were really not sanctioned from London , the charges of the Americans were met by a surprising justification ; and thus our Government' virtually adopted the flagrant misconduct of Strobel , the mistakes of Mr . Howe , and the want of tact which led Mr . CIiampton into mixing himself up i 11
such very questionable proceedings . It was made a question between England and America only by this chain of blunders on the Knglish side . If there had been sufficient tact at any one point in the series of officials ,, those beneath would have been left to the i ' nto that they had brought upon themselves , the neutrality of the United SlntCH would have been vindicated , but England would lmvu had no complicity in the matter . Am it iw , Cicneri " Pierce has been provided with the opportunity of crowing over the defeated Knglis ' agents ; and our officials , wo Hay , have prepared that triumph for General Pikuce , » are volunteers in being chained to his car .
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Jan. 19, 1856, page 12, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_19011856/page/12/
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