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    June 23, 1860.J The Leader and Saturday ...

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    THE NATIONAL DEFENCE QUESTION. RATIONAL ...

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    June 23, 1860.J The Leader And Saturday ...

    June 23 , 1860 . J The Leader and Saturday Analyst . 583

    The National Defence Question. Rational ...

    THE NATIONAL DEFENCE QUESTION . RATIONAL measures for the defence of England must be founded upon a survey of the whole of the circumstances likely to affect our possible enemies and ourselves . On either side there might , at the beginning of a war , be _ a naval defeat , or a successful attempt to outmanoeuvre the opposing force ; and we should-probably be exposed'to more-peril of this sort than . our foe , on account of the incorrigible imbecility of the sort of Cabinets that are tolerated by an un reformed Parliament , and that flagitious jobbing with appointments , -which is a far greater sin than any of the " vices" against which her Majesty has just

    issued her royal proclamation , and would have formed a better subject for rebuke , especially if the powerful offenders about the Court had been compelled to surrender the offices ; uui pay which they cannot honestly hold . In this matter of possible defeat , or outmanoeuvring , the chances would be more against us than during the last French Avar , as the fleet most lik < ly to be opposed to us is much hearer on a par with our own than was then the case , and if such an accident should occur , the consequences would be more serious from the increased rapidity of such operations ' as disembarking troops . We have not the elementsof an exact comparison , but we should not be far out in intimating that twice the number of men misrht be landed in . a given number

    of hours . On our side , such a possibility ought not to excite alarm , for our means of meeting ail assailing force have multiplied in a far greater proportion ; and by means of railways we could throw upon any important point more men in twelve hours , than could have been concentrated in a week under the old system . With a male population capable of bearing arms estimated at five millions , and of whom one half , or two millions and a 'half may be fairly taken as reall y able to assist in their country ' s defence , a Government that " was not always impelled by some

    sinister motive would have no difficulty in organising " so powerful a defensive system asVtp make a . successful invasion of England as chimerical as a capture of the moon . The problem would be how to establish : a good line of defence by a powerful fleet , and behind tins to have always iii readiness a force for concentration on any point to prevent a landing , and other forces t 6 occupy positions commanding all practicable roads ^ to- great arsenals-or large towns . Such arrangements would be very easy , and comparatively inexpensive ^ as CblonePXENNEDy has distinctlv shown in liis able pamphlet which treats of the

    organization of volunteers . . The natural and rational plan of defence is disliked by the Court and aristocracy for political" reasons : ' and they fear any extension of popular power , not from the belief that the people would misuse it , but from a conviction that it would be incompatible with arrangements by which a select few profit a great deal at the expense of the general interests of the community . With ^ Ms-detCTminationH sion was set going , and its members had neither the moral courage nor the integrity to speak out the whole truth . They commence by assuming that the Government will be permitted

    to thwart the development of the Volunteer movement into a great national institution , and instead of boldly denouncing such conduct , as would have been instantly done by the late Sir Chakles Napiku , they present us with the following process of ratiocination . " We cannot admit , " say the fortifiers , " that moveable batteries of field guns , and the few thousand riflemen who might be available on any given point , would prevent the landing of a hostile force . " What business have they to assume that only " a ^ ew thousand " riflemen would be " available at any given point ? " or what right have they to be thus iu . limhie accomplices in the base design of limiting our means of defence , and of imperilling the nation for the convenience of worn out political factions ? That they have done so casts a doubt upon do its

    all their plans , and the House of Commons will not duty if it votes one farthing without better authority than can be furnished by such men . It would be easy to throw a considerable force in a few hours on any important landing-place , that is , any landing-place near a primary object of defence ; and with reference to less important landing-places , their value could bo neutralised by the occupation of all the chief ronds accessible from them . With the means nt our disposal , if any Government permitted an enemy to lnnd and march twenty miles in any direotion , its members would deserve to .., be impeached ; iindtho aristocracy , who now monopolize all the " military power , may rely upon it that they would have to pay for any serious disaster occasioned by their own plans .

    Our 'Fortification Commissioners , after laying down the obvious truism , that a nation ' s means of resisting invasion depend upon the forcos it can bring into play , proceed to tell us that our regular army must be small--a fortunate circumstance , we are glad to admit . After this , they inako the astounding assertion thnt "the expense of a force brought together by

    voluntary enlistment is necessarily much greater than that of one raised by conscription . " If this statement referred only to regular armies it might be admitted , but even then not without some reservation , as a system of conscription cannot be Avorked except the eountry subjected to it is oppressed with an army to act as a military police , as well as ' with ' -a lighting army , an arrangement that involves a large outlay , and makes every fighting soldier cost much more than appears . The fact is , that the expense of armies depends chiefly on the rate of wages and the rate of living in various countries ; and when the conscription armies of continental despotisms are compared with our to

    own , we niii ^ t no t forget compare also development of industry , the ordinary food of the people , and the average earnings of the nations from which the troops are raised . Our Commissioners , however , do not make any reservation ,- and would have us believe that the 120 , 000 volunteer riflemen said to be -enrolled , cost the . country as much as the same number of regular troops . These rinVmcn are indeed spoken of in another paragraph in ; i slightly different way ; but after a lei ' t-handed compliment , we are told they " must necessarily be unable to meet the regularly-discip lined soldiers of continental armies on anything like equal terms . " We have no doubt these

    Commissioners could prove that the newly-raised and unpractised soldiers who fought under Wellington at Waterloo , were unable to meet the enemy on " anything like equal terms ; " and they might , for all we know , deny the victories of Garibaldi ' s volunteers over the trained soldiers of Austria ; but leaving them to make what absurd statements they choose , every one knows that , under good leaders , troops hastily raised have , after a very moderate allowance of drilling , constantly beaten more practised soldiers ;

    and , in . the case of an invasion , our Volunteers would have the immense advantage of fighting in their own country , where every inhabitant would assist their plans . We are not reckoning upon the performance of men who had learnt nothing :, and hastily shouldered a musket when the enemy came ; but we should rely on the conduct of Volunteers who had been in training for -weeks ' , or months under judicious teachers , and who have been proved to acquire ; the business of soldiercraft very much faster than the lowest section of the working-classes ^ of whom the

    regular army is ehieflyr convposed . If we will not be strong through our Volunteers , we must be weak ; and this last alternative being accepted by the Fortification Commisioiiers , they propose to spend twelve million on works of various kinds . These maybe divided into two sorts—the one rational , and the other irrational , or dishonest . The first-are directed to obstruct , the approach of the hostile fleet near enough to burn our arsenals , and to these we have no objection provided they arc likely to answer their purpose . The second , and very expensive portion of the scheme , is to erect costly defences against land attacks . The Commissioners , acting upon the iniquitous notions of the governing class , recommend us tb submit to the probability that a larger army would be landed on our shores than we could bwhich

    meet in the field ; and to trust our safety to huge forts , y we might < rain time to do what ought to be done at once , namely , provide forces sufficient for our need . Instead of defending London by a couple of hundred thousand riflemen and a good supply of artillery , we arc asked to fool away . £ 700 , 000 on th « top of Shooter's ' Hill , and each principal arsenal is to be surrounded by outworks and entrenchments with a view to a siege . Sir . John Buugoynk , alluding to the schemes of defending Portsmouth , observed , — "If I had 20 , 000 men , and were a general in command , I would occupy Portsdown Hill and throw up field works , and hold it us long a ' s I possibly could , and very . likely mtth name success ; but whatI should he afraid ' of would be placing perviduenl work * llw > % and not bring able , to occupy the position . . I think it would hu of such consequence to put all

    your good troops constantly iu the field , that there would be none to spare for tho purpose . " ' Of course not ; and the first thing a prudent general would do would be to blow up the preposterous land fortifications of the Commissioners , in order to set the soldiers at liberty to do the real work of the war . With ' reference to defending dockyards against bombardment , Sir J . liURGOYNK makes the remark— "It is one of the contingencies of the new rifle-gun , that the extent of fortifications to secure you from bombardment would be so great , that it , would shows the

    be almost inipractieable ever to reach it . " 'Una lolly of relying upon fortilieatioris for tliu protection of arsenals , except in those eases in which they can prevent mi approach by sea . On the subject of landing in fact ! of an oueiuy , Sir J . J 3 ukooynk affords , equally valuable information ; lie observes— " I have a very strong opinion about landing in the I ' auv , of ' -im enemy . 1 think it ' the most desperate undertaking possible , unless the landing-plnce is of considerable ' ox tout . ' 1 bulieve . that it . never was done with » u « m > H except in E-vpt , and thnt was under very peculiar circumstances . The enemy ' s batteries were few and tar

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), June 23, 1860, page 3, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_23061860/page/3/