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^76 * The Leaderaaid¦Saturdayr Analyst. ...
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THE HAPSBUKG PLOT REVEALED. THE " Corres...
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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English Proposals Regarding Ital^ • Grea...
legitimacy in every country of Europe , lie durst not depart in the least iota from the formula of freedom established here ; nay more , he $ eems to think himself bound to discourage on all occasions every possible application of the . life-giving principles of liberty , otherwise than in consonance -with the notions prevalent at Windsor and Whitehall . As-long as Lord John Rub sell has to deal with the ministers of Austria and Naples , he is all for the expediency and necessity of popular sanction . But when he comes to talk to the . envoy of the self-emancipated Tuscans , his tone is ^ triphaticallymoharchical , not merely as advocating the superior advantages of royalty above republicanism , but specifically in favour of that dishonoured and repudiated royal house whose impudence and baseness the Tuscans bore too long , We have it upon the authority of Lord Gbaxville , speaking in his place of leader of the House of Lords , that when the lamented Marquis
La / atico was in this country last autumn , the Foreign Secretary xepeatedlv urged upon him the desirableness of the restoration of the HousVof HAPSBintG-LoRKAiNE , concomitantly with the establishment in Tuscany of constitutional forms . In other words , tbe English revolutions of 1660 and 1688 were to be set up as models for imitation , no matter how rejmgnant to the circumstances of the case or the feelings of the people . The old delinquent prince was to be cashiered as CHAitLES I . and Jajies II . hadbeen ; but his hopeful progeny was to be substituted in liisstead , its Charles II . and Queens Mary and Anne had been , for the sake of preserving the principle of legitimacy " vvith , a difference /' And this , no doubt , was thought a most . skilful' and adroit evasion of conflicting difficulties b y the courtier colleagues of Lord John . It equally distinguislied the policy recommended by England from that of Austria ^ an d that of France from that of M . Cavouk and that of M . Mazzint . Nobody could confound
it with that of Vienna , for it proposed to stipulate as an essential condition upon the consent arid act of the people ; and nobody at the time was likely to confound it with the policy of the Tivileries , for no one theij doubted that Napoleon III . affected only to threaten the Italians with the restoration of the Grand Duke ; in order that they might , in preference , be forced to ask for . a French prince as their sovereign . The obstinacy with which the French Emperor refused at that time to tolerate the idea of the annexation of Central Italy td Piedmont constituted an additional reason s perhaps , in the eyes of the English Cabinet , for this extraordinary recommendation ; and now that that obstinacy seems to have yielded to the desire of securing Savoy ,
it is very possible that the two Governments may make tip their minds to acquiesce in the decision to -which the Tuscans and oiher Central Italians have come . M . Mazzini himself concurs in the proposed annexation , because he has always advocated national unity as superior in iinportelnee to all other objects which his countrymen hailed : and the formation of a . northern Italian kingdom , stretching from the Alps to llavenna , would unquestionably be a great stride towards that consummation . 33 ut now that this point seems nearer to attainment , the English Government steps in anew with its unsought-for advice , and proposes to saddle the annexation ivith conditions respecting llome < wd Venice , ' which the Italians
are as unlikely to agree to as they were to concur in the recoin-r inendations conveyed through M , Lajatico . Venice , it is proposed , shall be constitutionalized , and' the Pupal States are to liave administrative reform : and as soon as these things have been done , all French and Austrian troops were , to bo withdrawn from Italy . But even were'it our dutyand our business to tnke diplomatic measures to prevent the union of tho Yenetians or the Roinnns with the rest of . their countrymen , what is the value of so vogue and ill-defined a plan , ' ? Who is to be the judge of the sufficiency of tbe reformatory measures in Venetia or the States of the Church , upon whoso realisation French and Oermau garrisons nre to be withdrawn beyond the Alps ? Probably Lord John Russell
liimself is neither surprised nor disappointed at the indisposition sliown at Berlin as well as at St . Petersburg and Vienna to enter into negotiations on such a basis . It is not the less to bo regretted , in our opinion , that it should have been proposed , The duty of England is ' to recognise frankly and without reserve the sacred truth , that Italy was made for the Italians , and that they and no other people on earth have a right to bear rule therein . AU attempts of foreign powers to fettor their free choice ore alike unwise and wrong , and there is no respect in which nt the present moment we should more sigunJly thwart the notional will , than by devising now lines of territorial demarcation between those parts of Italy . which uro in future to be Italian and those which arc not ., ' , .
^76 * The Leaderaaid¦Saturdayr Analyst. ...
^ 76 * The Leaderaaid ¦ Saturdayr Analyst . -. | Fbb . 25 , 1860 .
The Hapsbukg Plot Revealed. The " Corres...
THE HAPSBUKG PLOT REVEALED . THE " Correspondence oh the Affairs of Italy , " just laid before Parliament , may bo viewed under two aspocts , both of "which are highly satisfactory , and ought to strengthen public
confidence in the present administration , and especially in Lord John Russell as Minister for Foreign Affairs . In the first plade , it evinces an unprecedented frankness in giving so much important information at a time when if is capable of influencing the current of events , instead of following the vicious-precedent of withholding it until it could do little more than gratify historical curiosity ; and in the second place , it affords conclusive demonstration that , in the main , the Government has faithfully and assiduously represented the opinions of the people . Lord John Russell ' s despatches contrast most favourably with those of Lord Malmesbury ; instead of being verbose and windy efforts to conceal the cloven foot of absolutism , they are concise , cleat , and business-like expressions of statesmanlike forethought and liberal policy . It is moreover impossible to read them in connection with the details afforded in-other
documents , without being impressed with the conviction that the British Government has exercised a most beneficial influence upon the conduct , of France , and the prospects of freedom and independence in Italy . . It is satisfactory to us to find confirmation of every important statement which we have made upon Italian affairs , and especially of our continued assertions— -put forward at a time when most of our contemporaries took opposite views—that if England did her duty the French Government would be encouraged , and enabled to do more for Italy than the . unfortunate Villafranca preliminaries would lead any one to suspect . The reason for the sudden and Unsatisfactory peace is partly explained . The
French Emperor found victory costly , and was alarmed at the expense by which further triumphs could be secured , and at the same time his adversary Was 'frightened at the prodigious outlay , which only led to defeat . Accordingly the two combatants patched up a truce , which they misnamed a peace , and . each one avoided explicit engagements " upon the most difficult points of the Italian question . They -arranged a suspension of hostilities , and then , , like two Imperial Micaavbeks , waited for " something to turn up . " Lord Jo iix Russell at once saw the uncertainty and hollowness of the ¦' -arrangement , '' and continued to put a series of shrewd , pertinent questions , as to what its clauses meant , and how they were to be worked out . From first
to last he boldly and steadily maintained tlic . right , of the Italians -to cltoosc their own rulers , and . protested against any employment of force to obtain the restoration of the dismissed and runaway potentates . . He was equally explicit as to the danger of any Italian confederation of which Austria formed a part , and very successful in gradually approximating the policy of the TuileriVs to his own . Upon the question of tlie Congress lie was likewise able and firm—ahvays ready to enter into it , provided just principles were previously recognised ; but determined neither . to compromise the dignity of England nor endanger the rights of Italy . This conduct , although it -may have placed momentary difficulties in the way of the ' French Government , steadily led to mutual-respect and agreement , and was invaluable in checking the desijms of the contemptible and unprincipled
Government of Austria . It is a matter of regret to those who , like ourselves , wish well to Germany , and desire to sec her united , and occupying an honourable position in Europe , that her leadingpower , Prussia , should , as usual , have failed alike in dignity and in duty . Instead of supporting ; England in maintaining the broad , principles ? ofliherty , her Government refused to recognise the rights ¦ of the Italians to rally round the King of Sardinia . and found a strong and free kingdom of Northern and Central Italy ; and they wished to leave the question , of whether or not ibrco should be employed to restore the Dukes , to be deliberated by the assembled Powers . The Prussian Court seems incapable of learning the plain fact , that a . Government only invites respect in proportion as it represents enlightened ideas ; a . nd that a halting , shuffling policy , compounded of reactionary formulas and a pretence of civilization , is utterly inconsistent with pretensions to lead a
numerous and cultivated race . Upon the conduct and intentions of Austrin , the " Correspondence" is exceedingly instructive 5 and it is clear that from the moment the two Emperors patched up their quarrel , the statesmen of Sardinia could only , in the language of Sir ^ J a mes Hudson , consider " that peace upon thoso bases cannot be other than precarious , anil that it adds to the old grievances of Italy the new one of , deluded hope . " There is evidence that the Emperor of tho French was fully conscious of this i ' net ; and
henoo , although he adhered in Words to the Villutranca preliminaries , ho appears-to have endeavoured to lead Austria to n more liberal and satisfactory solution of the difficulty , but , of course , without tho slightest ' oftect . In tiheso efforts Franco attempted to secure nn Italian administration for Veuotin , and an undertaking' from Austria not to employ force to effect , the restoration of the Dukoa . The first completely failed , and the second object only aueeeorteil to tho extent of obtaining some intimation that Austria was afraid of an immediate renowal of war , but that her
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Feb. 25, 1860, page 4, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_25021860/page/4/
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