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January 26, 1856.] THE LEADER. 83
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NOTICES TO CORRESPONDENTS. '• Vindex" li...
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SATURDAY, JANUARY 26, 1856.
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liiere is. nothing so revolutionary, bec...
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THE PEACE PRELIMINAEIES. The public must...
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COUNT MONTAXEMBEUT ON ENGLISH DESTINIES....
Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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Transcript
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
Additionally, when viewing full transcripts, extracted text may not be in the same order as the original document.
January 26, 1856.] The Leader. 83
January 26 , 1856 . ] THE LEADER . 83
Notices To Correspondents. '• Vindex" Li...
NOTICES TO CORRESPONDENTS . ' Vindex" lias undoubtedly a perfect right to be heard on the subject of !> is communication , and we shall "be doing Mtn no more than justice in allowinghim an opportunity io make tlie fullest , explanations . But would it not be better to allow really trifling inaccuracies to pass unnoticed ? However , if lie adheres to his desire that his letter shall be published , wew-itl make room for it in our ensuing number . It has reached us too late for insertion this week . Bjiitic . —Our correspondent informs -us in a postscript that he has enclosed his card . This , however , he has omitted to do ; and sis our rule is absolute , we cannot insert his letter . We beg to assure him , however , that he has , in a manner not unusual to hasty readers , strained the meaning of the sentence he disputes . The fact that Admiral Dundas was summoned to the Council of War indicated simply that he had not been " shelved . " Why General Airey was « alled we cannot , any more than our correspondent , undertake to explain . X . Y . Z . — « re Palmer . )—If our correspondent "will send us his name and address , we will give him that of our correspondent . During the session of Parliament it ifl often impossible to fiad room for correHponrtence , even the briefest .
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Saturday, January 26, 1856.
SATURDAY , JANUARY 26 , 1856 .
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Liiere Is. Nothing So Revolutionary, Bec...
liiere is . nothing so revolutionary , because there is ' nothing so unnatural and convulsive , as the strain do keep things fixed when all the world is "by the very law of its creation in eternal progress . —De . Arnold .
The Peace Preliminaeies. The Public Must...
THE PEACE PRELIMINAEIES . The public must remerajjer that hitherto no mutual ¦ und erstanding has . been established between ' Russia and the Western Powers . The ¦ Western' Powers have not stated explicitly the nature or extent of their demands '; Russia has by no means committed herself to . any positive programme of concessions . " When Count Estjeuhazy reached St . Petersburg , he delivered
to the Eussian Minister , not , of course , a plan of peace framed by the Allies , but a scheme suggested by tbc neutral Government of Austria , accompanied by a despatch from Count Buol . It is well known that at first she accepted a part , and demurred to a part of the proposals , winch it bad been distinctly announced must be accepted or rejected as a whole . The Russian reply , therefore , contained reservations which amounted to a
refusal . Then , some journals have told us , a high tone wag held by the Austrian Minister , and Count Esteimazy prepared to leave St . Petersburg with the Legation . But it is more probablg , more consonant with circumstances which have since . transpired , that another course was taken . Count Nesselkode ' s attention would naturally be drawn to the passage in Count Buol's despatch , in which it was remarked that , although the negotiations had been . entirely confined to Austria and Russia ,
the signature of the propositions by Russia would , it' they were signed by the Western Powers also , constitute preliminaries of peace . Thus the promise of a suspension of arms was half implied . What more in harmony with the habitual action of Russia thaw to purchase an . armistice at this easy price ? The Emperor Alexander , no doubt , desires peace , but if peace "be impossible , ho desires , of Course , to cwnfy on the war under the
most favourable conditions . Nothing could be more . advantageous to him than a temporary cessation of hostilities , which might aid him , diplomatically , by throwing on the Allies the responsibility i > f renewed war , and , in a military seuse , by aillowing bim to strengthen hw pp . fjjpa ? ta , while the Western Powers relaxed the ] * preparation * . Accordingly , the . Russiiu ? ^ fiGpJawee , I > lir ct simple ( not uncpnditjbnalY of % ? . > A . u ^ tr . Jiun propositions , wa 8 transmitted to ¦ yip nn » , Anda immediately , the German ancj .
Dutch organs announced that Russia had accepted " the preliminaries of peace . " But the Austrian propositions were not the preliminaries of peace ; nor does it necessarily follow , from the Russian reply , that the preliminaries of peace will be signed . The English Government hastened to disavow the half-expressed promise of Buol , by reminding Russia that the Austrian propositions were not the propositions of the Allies . They describe the conditions of peace , but are not those
conditions . Consequently , the Western Powers will frame a series of stipulations , not contradicting , but developing the Austrian plan , and upon these the decision of Russia will be taken . Then will be settled the question between peace and war . The public must remember , however , that further conditions have to be proposed , and that these are not , probably , the least important to the Allies , or the least
obnoxious to Russia . When this stage has been reached , the Cabinet of St . Petersburg will transmit its reply , through the mediating Court , to Paris and London . Should it amount to a direct refusal , the negotiations will lapse ; shoi ^ ld it be a repetition of the answer given to Austria , the propositions will be signed , and they will constitute preliminaries of peace .
But there are important steps to be taken before this point is gained . France and England have to formulate , in detail , the primary and secondary objects of the war , and to fix the limits of concession . For , Russia has . not pledged ' herself to positive sacrifices , but , through the official journal , announces that she will consent to neutralise the Black Sea , and " . discuss the other points . " Count Nesseleode , in his Circular , declares that the Czar yields , for the sake of peace , to the urgency of his friends , not to the pressure of his enemies . Of course a first-rate power is
never expected to make a confession of weakness ; but Russia recoils , obviously , from exhaustion . The important question is , has she abandoned her aggressive policy ? If not , what term of repose will enable her to resume it ? How many years would have been added to the expectations of peace by another year of warfare ? We believe this to be the point of view whence the mass of the English public regard the projected settlement . They feel not merely that Great Britain had still to assume her full proportions as a belligerent power ; but that Russia had still to receive wounds
which might have extorted an indemnity and incapacitated her from , interrupting , by the violation of a neighbour ' s frontier , the political concord of the world . We think , it is true , that should Russia accept in good part the propositions of the Allies , her submission would leave the English public without any serious desire to prolong the war . From Count Nesseluode ' s Circular , however , and from the language of the official journal ,
it is evident that , while desirous of peace , the Einporor Alexander desires to resist the conditions of the Western Powers ; in fact , wants to cut short tlie sufferings of his empire without making material concessions . We anticipate obstinate attempts to modify and to compromise , loose and evasive interpretations , and counter-propositions . Already , it is hinted , the neutralisation of tbc Black Sea is held not to include the abandonment ; of the forts on the Circassian coast , or of Nicoluicff . Alexander the Second , also , has prepared for an appeal to Europe , by putting his moderation in contrast with the excessive severity which , by anticipation , he imputes to the proposals of ( lie Western Powers . TUo reply of th « English ministerial journals to these insinuated propositions , has hitherto begn funi . The French Government , it is
believed , though impatient of any policy not her own , will not abandon England in enforcing the essential submission of Russia . In our own Cabinet , the general opinion is probably in favour of peace , but the peace is not likely to be bought by any disgraceful compromise . We have described , we believe , the actual state of the negotiations . All that has been done has been done between the enemy , and a neutral : Great Britain and France remain as
yet in ignorance of the manner in which their distinct propositions will be met . They must give their own interpretation to the Austrian clause , which stipulates for the neutralisation of the Black Sea ; they must protect the Danube from German as well as from Russian encroachment ; they must extirpate the incipient power that would in a few years menace
the Baltic from the Aland Isles ; they must provide for the perplexing questions that arise out of the fall of Kars . They are in a position to argue with dignity against any evasive reply on the part of Russia , for they are fully armed ; and , we "believe , they liave a ne ; w ally ready in the North , whenever they may decide that the aid of Sweden is worth obtaining oil her own terms .
Count Montaxembeut On English Destinies....
COUNT MONTAXEMBEUT ON ENGLISH DESTINIES . " What will become of England ? " M . DE Montaiembert proposes the question , because he says , in the opinion of the world EfigLan ^ l has attain t ed her apogee , and even her own citizens "bewail Her inevitable decline . Bat , interposes' M . de Montalembert , she is not yet fated to decay ; her safeguards are greater than her dangers ; and he undertakes to describe these dangers and safeguards , and thence to deduce the probabilities of our political future . His qualifications for this task lare peculiar . He knows more , probably , of English manners and institutions than any other Frenchman ; he has studied English literature , and conversed with English statesmen in their own language . Generous in his sentiments , be is perfectly just in his intentions , and is disposed neither to exaggerate the perils of a free Constitution , nor to conceal its virtues . It results that he suggests many profound reflections , falls into no ridiculous errors , and reads to
Englishmen a lesson on their laws , and on their political habits , which they may study with advantage and without pain , His theory is , perhaps , the converse of M . Leduu Roiain ' s , but in no r pthei- respect is any comparison possible . M . Ledru Rollin composed a chimerical libel , assuming the decline of England , and attributing it to the corruption of our aristocracy , and the avarice of our middle classes . But he wrote in ignorance . M . i > e MontaleMt
bert , possessing a knowledge rare among foreigners , writes under the influence oJ natural prejudices , which have misled him , and may mislead his readers . When we find M . dk Montale . mbeut glorifying our Constitution , and warning us to reform no more , lest by disturbing the edifice we destroy its solidity , we arc forced to ask , who is M . i > e Montausmbeut ? Why is ho perplexed by fear of change ? What does ho understand by Innovat icfti ?
M . dk MoNTAi . EMUKur , dismayed by family traditions , drriin * " progress" as the precursor of anarchy . To him , and to his order , ( ho opodi in which a Bourbon thron « was encircled by a feudal noblesse was the epoch of peace and felicity . They who dwell ; in the castles felt all the warmth and safety -within , and saw not the shadows of the castle-towers . M . dk Montaulmbeut , to whom the revolutionary retrospect is a phan-
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Jan. 26, 1856, page 11, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_26011856/page/11/
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