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Augvst ¦ ¦$$, 1853/f THE LEADER. 825
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A 33KITISII STATESMAN'S IDEA OF THE CUBA...
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* Those pnporH appear in tho roconUv pub...
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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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Rationale Of Strikes. Several Of Our Con...
showed them , that if he gave . them the . wages which they asked , his profits would be obliterated . Under such circumstances it would have been unreasonable for the . men to / persevere ; but they did not persevere . They had struct because their information , so far as it went , led them to suppose that they could have higher wages : when they found out their mistake , they returned to work at the old rate . In another much more remarkable instance ,
the strike was justified by the events . The people at Stockport asked for an increase of their wages ; the masters said that they could not give it ; the men declared that what they asked would but place them on a level with the rate of wages given elsewhere ; the masters maintained the contrary , and declared that the amount demanded would be impossible for them to pay ; and the strike lasted several weeks . As it was believed
that the masters could not give the increased amount , strong censure was levelled at the men for being so obstinate as to persist in the strike . " You are only inflicting injury on yourselves , " it was said , " . in keeping yourselves out of wages for so many weeks . Think of the poor shopkeepers with whom you generally deal , and to whom now you pay nothing ! " The men still maintained that it would be possible to give them the amount they asked , and they resolved to continue until
they should be proved to have made a mistake . And what was the result P The result was , that the m asters yielded . They discovered that they couldpay the increase which they declared to be impossible , and the strike of the men succeeded in obtaining that which had not been granted on grounds either of reason or justice . Yet Mr . Crawshay ventures upon this sweeping assertion against all
strikes" The consequences of all strikes , without exception , have been , and ever will be , more injurious to the men than their employers . The master only loses time , which can be regained by subsequent manufacture and sale of goods which were not manufactured or sold during the strike ; but the workman has irretrievably lost his time and wages , * and has deeply distressed himself and family . "
Now , this statement is so incorrect as to be the reverse of the truth . It is not true that the consequences of all strikes are more injurious to the men . In the Stockport case the men succeeded in obtaining higher wages , which they would not have done without the strike . But the Stockporfc case was only one o innumerable instances which have happened during the present year , of strikes amongst the working classes ; we have recorded cases of masons , carpenters , shoemakers , in all parts of the country , who have obtained in many instances a very great advance ; and so little is it true that the strikes were more injurious to the
men , that the employers are forced in almost all instances to concede . We may be quite sure , from the obstinacy exercised in Sfcockport , and professed by Mr . Crawshay , that in many other instances the masters would not have yielded if the strike had not been more injurious to them . The men , however , in all the cases to which we allude , obtained a positive advantage from the strike—they obtained , with very short hesitation , considerably enhanced'wages . Mr . Crawshay says of his works— " I was , I am , thoroughly determined that they shall stop , if I am not to be master and the sole arbiter of
what wages I can afford to give for labour performed in them for me . " Tho right may be absolutely conceded to Mr . Crawshay , but then tho corresponding right must be claimed for the men of being ' masters and sole arbiters" of what wages they can afford to take for tho labour perfor mod by them for Mi * . Crawshay ; and they have as much right to a collective opinion on that point as the master . If he chooses to be master and boIo arbiter without consulting his men , the nion have a right to be masters and solo arbiters
without consulting him . But it is that arrogating and fixing the terms of a bargain without consulting the othor side which gives rise to moat of those strikes ; and in the" sequel of his letter Mr . Crawahay shows that ho feofs the impropriety of remainin g " master and solo arbiter , " because ho offers to the chairman of tho workmen means of testing the fairness of the rate of wages which he proposes , by effecting a particular hargoin in the sale of rails . Mr . Crawehay , to a certain oxtent , argues it out—rails , he says , aro under 91 . a ton , and at that price he cannot afford more than ten per cent , under the head of wages which his men force him to pay .
It is , however , want of these explanations that leads to strikes ; and also , let us add , the want of rational or truthful language on the part of the masters to the men . Here we see the masters of a whole town asserting that a certain advance of , wages is impossible , and afterwards making that very advance . Now , then , after such an assertion and such a result , can men believe the masters P It is hot in human nature to do so .
But if the masters make themselves the sole arbiters of what they can afford , unquestionably they will take a different view of wages , both as to justice and possibility , from what the men will ta & e . Experience , therefore , justifies the men in saying , that the masters fix the wages on a one-sided consideration , and do not use correct language when they speak of impossibilities . The only test remaining to the men is to stand back from the bargain—to " strike ; " and although in many cases that test proves that they were mistaken , yet , also , in innumerable cases , as
we have so often seen this year , it proves that they were right . We regard the strike as being in itself an absolute evil ; but it is the only resort to which the man can appeal , unless he will submit to let the master always fix the rate of wages according to the master ' s view . We do not believe , however , that there is no other alternative ^ between this submission , or the rude process of strikes , whether these are strikes of workmen or strikes of masters . Mr . Crawshay has himself supplied the alternative , when he gives his men reasons and details . Yet something more is wanted . We believe that Mr . Crawshay thinks himself to be telling the strict truth in
these accounts : no doubt other masters have thought the same ; yet they have made assurances to their men which their oWn actions have subsequently falsified . It is very probable that the Stockport masters believed what they said when they thought they could not afford to give ten per cent , more wages , yet they found that they could . Under such circumstances it is only reasonable to say , Mr . Crawshay's arguments and figures would be much more convincing , if they were more complete , and corroborated by vouchers . Nevertheless , his exposition is a commencement in the right direction ; and we believe that if masters would only proceed a little further in that risrht direction , strikes would be
comparatively rare , if they did not die out altogether . Because , under no circumstances can it be advantageous either to masters or men absolutely to arrest the industry which they carry on in common . In most instances of a strike it will be found that there are faults on both sidesimpatience and obstinacy on the one—obstinacy and want of explicitness on the other . Sometimes the fault is all on one side ; and looking at the greater difficulties with which uneducated
men have to contend , it does appear to us that tho masters ought not to grumble if the balance of the fault lay with the men . Yet the masters ought to confess that , in fact , tho balance of fault hai moro frequently lain with themselves . Until masters consent to adopt the means of securing a thorough understanding with their men on the nature and terms of any bargain between them , they ought to admit that tho only appeal which the workman has against the employer is to strike —an appeal which , has as often been successful as not .
Augvst ¦ ¦$$, 1853/F The Leader. 825
Augvst ¦ ¦ $$ , 1853 / f THE LEADER . 825
A 33kitisii Statesman's Idea Of The Cuba...
A 33 KITISII STATESMAN'S IDEA OF THE CUBAN QUESTION . Tniii precise nature of tho claim which tho United States have to Cuba appears not to bo understood in this country , ovon by those statesmen whoso business it is to understand such matters . We do not objoct that such Btatosmen refuso to admit tho claim of tho United States , nor do wo object that they undorrato tho right of the American Republic ; because both tho claim and tho right are undeniably proper subjects for dobato ; but what wo moan is , that
thoy" do not ' seem to percoivo the force of the arguments , or oven tlio moaning with which those arguments are advancod . If we want a proof of this misconception wo should find it in tho despatch addreasod by Lord John Itnssoll to Mr . Crampton , tho English representative at Washington , on tho ICth of February lust . Tho despatch is intended as a reply to a , despatch by Mr . Everett to Mr . Crampton , on tho 1 st of the previous Docombor — a dospatoh etating the reason why tho United States Government did
not feel inclined to accept the proposal of the French and English Government to join in a tripartite convention , guaranteeing possession of Cuba to Spain . * - We ' will npw _ state the case in as brief terms as we can , somewhat as it is presented by Mr . Everett . If any one will take the map of America , he will see that towards his own right hand the St . Lawrence pours forth the waters of the
northern interior into the North . Sea ; the Hudson , the Susquehannah , and other rivers of considerable size flow from the water of the Alleghanies , and corresponding heights , into the Atlantic ; but behind that water-shed , on the other side , the Mississippi , with its two northern tributaries , the Missouri and the Ohio , each , sufficient to be the river of a continent , opens into the Atlantic between the two continents of
North and South America . V ery far to the lefb lie the Rocky Mountains , and on that side the chief river is the Columbia . But to the mightiest of all these streams , flowing down the centre channel , which is the largest continental valley in the world , are those waters of the Mississippi . Scarcely yet peopled , the valley of the Mississippi is destined to be the produce ground of a countless race , yet unborn . The waters do not how directly into the Atlantic between the two continents , but they first pour into the gulf of
Mexico , a circular basin , with two land-heads : on your left is the peninsula of Yucatan ; and on your right , the southern limb of Florida . Between these two , as a species of break-water , lies the island of Cuba—itself large enough to be a kingdom , The distance between Cuba and Florida is about a hundred mile 3 ; and the sea is not so deep but what there have been projects for damming the navigation between the two . Thus , Cuba constitutes a natural key to the whole water-shed of the interior of North
America , even from the sources of the Missouri , the Ohio , and the Mississippi , for the whole length downwards . Tho Americans , therefore , say that in war time it would be necessary , in a military sense , for them to be sure of the friendly disposition of any person in the occupation of Cuba ; tb . at power to be actually at peace with the United States , at war with its enemies ; for neutrality would as little suffice as the neutrality of a man holding your street-door and its key between you and a riotous mob outside seeking to enter your house .
There are also other reasons why amongst the American people there should be a ctesiru to obtain possession of the island . The violent Abolitionist spirit already has a hold upon Cuba , and is very likely to turn it to account as an instrument of annoyance to the United States . Already the Spanish Government has gone tolerably far in a species of emancipation , the sincerity of which is thrown under the greatest doubt by the connivance of the same government at the slave-trade A strong prejudice has been circulated amongst
the Americans by the report that the English have also joined in conniving at the slave-trade ; and that having stuffed it with rude , savage , " liberated Africans , " they intend to emancipate them , and to establish there a species of model Abolitionist universal-suffrage Negro-revolt-provoking colony—hateful to white Americana , incitatory to black Americans—altogether detestable , malignant , and inconvenient . That there is any truth in this report our readers will not
conceive ; nor will they readily eoneeivo tho really plausible colour which such a report ; may be made to bear by putting together the facts , that Cuba is replenished with savage Africans , that emancipation is making progress notwithstanding the connivance at the alave-trado , and that tho British Government , by failing to enforce anti-slavery treaties with the slippory Government of Spain , appears to back the connivanco of the Spanish Government by an hypocritical sufferance . Independently of these grounds , tho Americana believe , and wo also believe , that a Jar ^ o proport ion of tho most intelligent inhabitants of Cubadoairo
* Those Pnporh Appear In Tho Roconuv Pub...
* Those pnporH appear in tho roconUv published " Corrospondonco bofcwoon tho United States , Spam , and Franco , concerning allowed project of conquoHtn and annexation on fcho island of Cuba . Prosontod to tho ICouho of Commons by command of her Mnjemfcy m pursuance of their address of April 11 , 1853 . " In somo oi ^ y pUgoa of tiw parliamentary folio , iho roador Jinn preaontod nearly tho whole ease of Cuba and its posmblo annoxation to tho United Staton , going book to negotiations which aro nsoribed to Urea * Britain in 1822 , for tho acquisition of that island by ftupeoioa of purchase .
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Aug. 27, 1853, page 9, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/cld_27081853/page/9/
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