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single charge , in encetfflfering which Dhoondiah fell . The corpse of . . « Kis Majesty" being recognised , was lashed to a . gaHop 61 ' gun an < * carried back to the British camp , but a certain item of the spoil deserves more particular mention . Among the baggage was found a boy about four years old , who proved to be the favourite son of Dhooridiah . Colonel Wellesley took charge of the child himself , carried him to his own tent , protected him through his boyhood , and , on quitting India , left a sum of money in the hands of a friend to be applied to his use .
Colonel Wellesley was next stationed at Trmcomalee in Ceylon , and was to have commanded an expeditionary force sent to take the French in Egypt in the rear ; but ultimately General Baird was appointed , and Colonel Wellesley returned to Mysore . Shortly after the famous Mahratta war broke out , and General Wellesley was invested with full powers to commence active operations against the Mahratta forces in the Deccan . The force at his command for these purposes consisted of about 10 , 000 men of all arms , Europeans and natives , including the 19 th Dragoons and 74 th Regiment of Foot . He had desired that his old corps , the 33 rd ,
should be attached to his division , but circumstances prevented the arrangement . The duty of co-operating with his movements devolved on Colonel Stevenson , an excellent officer , who commanded for this purpose the subsidiary force of the Nizam , which , by the addition of the 94 th Regiment , had been raised to about the same strength as General Wellesley ' s division . The plan of the campaign was novel and masterly . Selecting a season when the rivers were not fordable , he turned this feature of the country to the advantage of the British by preparing boats and pontoons , with which he knew the enemy would be unprovided- His despatches contain the most minute instructions for the fabrication of these bridges and boats , for the
establishment of particular ferries , and for their protection by proper guards . Aware that a native army relied on the superior rapidity of its movements , he had been indefatigable in improving the breed of draughtbullocks by the aid of Tippoo ' s famons stock ; and he had resolved , when occasion came , to discard the traditional rules of marching and halting . The forts , he observed , were strong enough , if well defended , to give serious trouble , and too numerous to be besieged in form . He gave orders , therefore , by way of conveying an adequate idea of British prowess , that one or two of them should be carried by simple escalade , and that an example should be made of the garrison in case of any desperate resistance . These tactics were completely successful . A Mahratta chief wrote to his friend as
follows : — " Those English are a strange people , and their general a wonderful man . They came in here this morning , looked at the Pettah wall , walked over it , killed all the garrison , and returned to breakfast . Who can withstand them ? " The result was that the strongest forts in the country were afterwards taken with little or no loss of life on cither side . Htiving dropped all negotiations , he compelled the Mahratta chiefs to unmask their intentions and endeavoured to bring them to a decisive battle .
After some wearisome manoeuvres he at length learnt that the enemy was on the north bunk of tho Godavery , meditating a swoop on Hyderabad . " If the river , " ho now wrote , " does not become fordablo six weeks sooner than usual , I hope to strike a blow aguinst their myriads of horse in a few days . " This was on the 30 th of August . On the 21 st of September , having received more particular information , ho concerted mcamires with Colonel Ktnvenson that onn should tuko u
western routo and tho other an eastern , and both full together from opposite quarters on the enemy ' s camp earl y on tho 24 th . Tho next day tho two divisions diverged accordingly , and pursued their respective routes , when on tho 23 rd General Wellesley learnt h-om his spies that the Mahratta cavalry had moved •*» , but that the infantry were still enciunped at about N 'x miles distance . Pushing on with his dragoons , he presently descried not only tho infantry , but tho entire inny of the MahrattiiH in the Deccan , numbering at leant 50 , 000 combatants , and strongly postal , with 100 pieces of cannon before tho fortified village of Assaye .
At thin critical moment of his fortunes , tho force which General Wellenley had in hand , including the infan try which was coining up , did not exceed 4 , 500 men ; his faw light guns were utterly unable to make head tiguiiiHt tho tremendous butteries of tho MithriittiiH , nud bin druught cattle , notwithstanding the pains ho ' » ad expended on them , were sinking under tho severity ° l tin ; campaign . IIih resolution , however , wan taken ut . onco , and without measuring the relative proportion ° f the two armies , or waiting for Colonel Stevenson to "'" ire the perils and glories of the Held , ho gave instant orders for tho attack . Owing to a misapprehension of »» N t , nictioi ) H , his precautionary directions for avoiding ' ¦ 'io most menacing pointa of tho Mahratta position
were disregarded , and the battle was won with a terrible carnage by the bayonet alone , exactly like some of the actions recently witnessed with the Sikhs . This was the crowning stroke of the war , and since that time British supremacy has never been disputed with any chance of success . It was in the month of September , 1805 , that Sir Arthur Wellesley—after an absence of nine years , during which his services in the East had earned him
a Major-Generalship , the Knighthood of the Bath , the thanks of the King and Parliament , and a confirmed professional reputation—landed once more on the shores of England . Between this period and his departure on those memorable campaigns with which his name will be immortally connected , there elapsed an interval in the Duke ' s life of nearly three years , which a seat in Parliament , an Irish Secretaryship , and a Privy Councillorship , enabled him to turn actively to account .
But he was in arms again in 1807 , assisting- at the siege of Copenhagen ; and this led the way to his future commands in the Peninsula . An expedition to sustain the Spanish patriots was determined on , and Sir Arthur Wellesley was appointed to command it . Portugal was the destination of the forces under his command ; and Portugal was held by Junot with fully 25 , 000 men . The force of Sir Arthur amounted to 9000 men , and these he landed in Mondego Bay in August 1808 , and being joined by another small expedition , his command was raised to 14 , 000 men . It was here , on the heights
of Rolica , he won his first Peninsula victory , defeating the French at the first encounter . Other successes lay promisingly before him , and he again beat- the French at Vimiera ; but a rapid change of commanders snatched them from his grasp ; Junot escaped ; and , under the orders of Dalrymple and Burrard , Wellesley signed the disgraceful convention of Cintra . Napoleon had sneered at the " Sepoy General ; " he now saw one of his best Marshals , and some of his finest troops , flying before him . And Sir Arthur Wellesley returned to England in September , with new laurels , to betake himself for a short time to civil duties .
Napoleon bad , however , nearly conquered Spain ; Sir John Moore had retreated on Corunna , and lost his life ; and Spanish independence seemed the vaguest probability . At this juncture the British Government , stimulated by Sir Arthur Wellesley , resolved to try once more to check aggressive France in the Peninsula ; and Sir Arthur , with General Bcresford to second him , was once more appointed to command . The British force under Sir Arthur Wellesley ' s command , amounted at this time to about 20 , 000 men , to which about 15 , 000 Portuguese , in a respectable state
of organization , were added by the exertions of Beresford . Of these about 24 , 000 were now led against Soult , who , though not inferior in strength , no sooner ascertained the advance of the English commander , than he arranged for a ret reat by detaching Loison , with 6000 men , to dislodge a Portuguese post on his left rear . Sir Arthur ' s intention was to envelope , if possible , the French corps , by pushing forward a strong force upon its left , and then intercepting its retreat towards Ney ' s position , while the main body assaulted Soult in hisquarters at Oporto . The former oftheseoperations ho entrusted to Beresford , the latter he directed
in person . On tho 12 th of May the troops reached the southern bank of tho Douro ; tho waters of which , 300 ^ yards in wid th , rolled between them and their adversaries . In anticipation of the attack , Sonlt had destroye < fthe floating-bridge , bad collected all the boats on the opposite aide , and there , with his forces well in hand for tuition or retreat , was looking from the window of his lodging , enjoying the presumed discomfiture of his opponent . To attempt such a passage- as this in face of one of the ablest marshals of Franco was , indeed , an audacious stroke ; but it was not beyond the daring of that genius which M . Thiers describes as calculated only for tho stolid operations of defensive war . Availing himself of a point where the river , by a bend in its
course , was not easily visible from tho town , Sir Arthur determined on transporting , if possible , a low troops to the northern bank , and occupying an unfinished stono building , which ho perceived was capable of affording temporary cover . The means were soon supplied by the activity of Colonel Waters—an otlicer whose habitual audacity rendered him one of the heroes of this memorable war . Crossing in a skiff to the opposite bank , ho returned with two or three- boats , and in a few minutes a company of the Hulls was established in tho building . Reinforcements quickly followed , but not without discovery . The alarm was given , and presently tho edifice was enveloped by fl | e eager battalions of the French . The British , however , held their
ground ; a pansage was eflected at other points ( luring tho struggle ; the French , after an ineffectual resistance , were fain to abandon the city in precipitation , and Sir Arthur , after bin unexampled feat of arms , wit down that evening to tho dinner which had been prepared
for Soult . Nor did the disasters of the French marshal terminate here : for , though the designs of the British commander had been partially frustrated by the intelligence gained by the enemy , yet tho French communications were so far intercepted , that Soult only joined Ney after losses and privations little short of those which hud been experienced by SJr John Moore . This was the first of a series of successes which carried the British flag triumphantly to a bloody victory at Talavera , and Sir Arthur Wellesley became " Baron Douro , of Wellesley , and Viscount Wellington of Talavera , and of WcHmotcn , in the county of Somerset /'
Napoleon now made tremendous exertions to carry his point . Nine powerful corps , mustering fully 280 , 000 effective men , under Marshals Victor , Ney , Soult , Mortier , and Massena , with a crowd of aspiring generals besides , represented the force definitely charged with the final subjugation of the Peninsula . To meet the shock of this stupendous array , Wellington had the 20 , 000 troops of Talavera augmented , besides other reinforcements , by that memorable brigade which , under the name of tho Light Division , became afterwards the admiration of both armies . In addition , he had
Beresford ' s Portuguese levies , now 30 , 000 strong , well disciplined , arid capable , as events showed , of becoming first-rate soldiers , making a total of some 55 , 000 disposable troops , independent of garrisons and detachments . Against such hosts as he brought to the assault , a defensive attitude was all that could be maintained , and Wellington ' s eye had detected the true mode of operation . He proposed to make the immediate district of Lisbon perform that service for Portugal which Portugal itself performed for the Peninsula at large , by furnishing an impregnable fastness and a secure retreat .
By carrying lines of fortification from the Atlantic coa-st , through Torres Vedras , to the bank of the Tagus a little above Lisbon , he succeeded in constructing an artificial stronghold , within which his retiring forces would be inaccessible , fncl from which , as opportunities invited , he might issue at will . These provisions silently and unobtrusively made , he calmly took post on the Coa , and awaited the assault . Hesitating-, or undecided , from some motive or other , Massena for weeks delayed the blow , till at length , after feeling the mettle of the Light Division on the Coa , ho put his army in motion after the British commander , who
slowly retired to liis defences . Deeming , however , that a passage of arms would teud both to inspirit his own troops in what seemed like a retreat , and to teach Massena the true quality of the antagonist before him , he deliberately halted afc Busaco and offered battle . Unable to refuse the challenge , the French marshal directed his bravest troops against the British position , but they were foiled with immense loss at every point of the attack , and Wellington proved , by one of his most brilliant victories , that his retreat partook neither of discomfiture nor fear . jlapidly recovering himself , however , Massena followed on his formidable foe , and way dreainiii" - of little leys than a second evacuation of
Portugal , when , to his astonishment and dismay , he found himself abruptly arrested in his course by the tremendous lines oi" Torres Vedras . These prodigious intrenchments comprised a triple line of fortifications one within tho other , the innermost being intended to cover the cmbarcation of tho troops in the last resort . The main strength of the works hud been thrown on the second line , at which it had been intended to make the final . stand , but even the outer barrier was found in effect to be so formidable as to deter the enemy from all hopes of » successful assault . Thus cheeked in mid career , the French marshal chafed and fumed in front of thciic ; impregnable lines , afraid to attack , yet unwilling to retire .
He did at length retire , and was followed by his wary foe . From this time to the end of the wnr , Wellington was only once seriously cheeked at Burgos . Excepting that repulse , he held his own in tho teeth of ill-mien immensely superior in number . Ho won Fuentes d'Oror , took Almeida , was victor at Salannineii , carried Cuidnd Rodrigo , and Badnjoz , Madrid , and Seville ; defeated the Krench at Vittoria , nnd drove Soult through the Pyrenees . Napoleon abdicated , and Europe was awhile ; at peace ; until Waterloo closed the reign of a hundred days , and Wellington became tho conqueror of Napoleon .
Ontlio ] . J ) th of June , the allies were moving in good order towards France , which they entered on the 21 ht : and on the : ir < l of July , after koiiio rather sharp encounU ( rn with Ulucher , on that , and tho previous day , Paris wiih surrendered . The city was occupied on tho ( 5 th , and on the following day , Louin XVIII . was replaced on his flirone . On the 22 nd of June , Napoleon had abdicated in favour of his son , the King of Itouut ; and on the 20 th , he had repaired to Itochefort . On | , hn 15 f . li of July , after having made an abortive attempt to procure a passport to America , from Wellington
Untitled Article
September 18 , 1852 . ] THE L E A DE R . S 87
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Leader (1850-1860), Sept. 18, 1852, page 887, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct1952/page/3/
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