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    ce que font ou pensentles antres . Usant done de franchise , je vous dis nettement , que si l'Angleterre songe fc s ' e ' tablir un de ces jours k Constantinople , je ne Je permettrai pas . Je ne voas prete point ces intentions , mais u vaut mieux dans ces occasions parler clairement ; de mon cote " , je snis egalement dispose * de prendre l ' engagement de ne pas m ' y _ e * tablir , en propre " taire , il s ' entend , car en ddpositaire je ne dis pas ; il poorrait se faire que les circoristances me misent dans le cas d ' occuper Constantinople , se rien ne se trouve preVu , si l ' on doit tout laisser aller au hazard . " * Sir Hamilton , although unprepared with a decided opinion , thought that some arrangement might be come to guarding against certain contingencies .

    Passing to the events of the day , the Emperor said he must insist upon the execution of the promises of the Sultan in respect to the Holy Places ; and the British Minister admitted that negotiation , followed , as he supposed it had been , by the threat of military measures , would be sufficient to secure compliance with the just demands of Russia . *• With regard to a French expedition to the Sultan's dominions , his Majesty intimated that such a step would bring affairs to an immediate crisis ; that a sense of honour would compel him to send his forces into Turkey without delay or hesitation ; that if the result of such an advance should prove to be the overthrow of the Great Turk ( le Grand Turc ) . he should regret the event , but should feel that he lrnd acted as he-was compelled to do . " In reply Lord John Russell forwarded the following despatch : —

    " Lord John Russell to Sir G . H . Seymour . 44 ( Secret and confidential . ) " Foreign-office , February 9 , 1853 . 41 , —I have received , and kid before the Queen , your secret and confidential despatch of the 22 nd of January . " Her Majesty , upon this as upon former opcasions , is happy to acknowledge the moderation , the frankness , and the friendl y disposition of his Imperial Majesty . 44 Her Majesty has directed me to reply in the same spirit of temperate , candid , and amicable discussion . "The question raised by bis Imperial Majesty is a very serious one . It is , supposing the contingency of the dissolution of the Turkish empire to be probable , or even imminent , whether it is not better to be provided beforehand for a

    contingency , than to incur the chaos , confusion , and the certafftty of an European war , all of which must attend the catastrophe if it should occur unexpectedly , and before some ulterior system has been sketched : this is the point , said his Imperial Majesty , to which I am desirous that you should call the attention of your Government . 44 In considering this grave question , the first reflection which occurs to her Majesty ' s Government is that no actual crisis has occurred which renders necessary a solution of this vast European problem . Disputes have arisen respecting the Hol y Places , tut these are without the sphere of the internal government of Turkey , and concern Russia and France rather than the gublime Porte . Some disturbance of the relations between Austria and the Porte has been

    caused by the Turkish attack on Montenegro ; but this , again , relates rather to clangers affecting the frontier of Austria than the authority and safety of the Sultan ; so that there is no sufficient cause for intimating to the Sultan that he cannot keep peace at home , or preserve friendly relations with his neighbours . " It occurs further to her Majesty ' s Government to remark , that the event which is contemplated is not definitely fixed in point of time , When William III . and Louis XIV . disposed , by treaty , of the succession of Charles II . of Spain , they _ were providing for an event -which could not be far off . The infirmities of the Sovereign of Spain , and the certain end of any human life , made the contingency in prospect both sure and near , The death of the Spanish King was in

    no , way hastened b y the treaty of partition . The same thing may le said of the provision , made in the last century ,, for the disposal of Tuscany upon the decease of the last prince of the house of Medici . But the contingency of the dissolution of the Ottoman empire is of another kind . It may happen twenty , fifty , or a hundred years hence . "In these circumstances it would hardly be consistent with the friendly feelings towards the Sultan which animate the Emperor of Russia , no less than the Queen of Great Britain , to dispose "beforehand of the provinces under his dominion . Besides ibis consideration , however , it must bo observed , that an agreement made in such a case tends very surely to hasten the contingency for which it is intended to

    provide . Austria and France could not , in fairness , be kept in ignorance of the transaction , nor would such concealment be consistent with tie end of preventing an European war . Indeed , such concealment cannot be intended by his Imperial Majesty . It is to be inferred that , as soon as Great Britain and Russia should have agreed on the course to be pursued , and have determined to enforce it , they should communicate their intentions to the Great Powers of Europe . An agreement thus made , and thus communicated , would not bo very long a secret ; and while it would alarm and alienate the Sultan , the knowledge of its existence would stimulate all his enemies to increased violence and more obstinate conflict . They would tight with the conviction thnt they must ultimately triumph ; while the Sultan ' s generals and troops would feel that no immediate success could save their causo from final overthrow . Tims would be produced and strength-

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    March 25 , 1854 . ] THE LEAD EH . 269

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    Now I desire to speak to you as a friend and as a gen-UcntMn ; if England and I arrive at an understanding of this mattor , as regards the rest , it matters little to me it is indHForont to me what others do or think . Frankly then I tell you plainly , that if England thinks of establishing herseir one of those days at Constantinople , I will not allow it 1 do not attribute this intention to you , but it is better on those occasions to speak plainly ; for my part , I am equally ainpo 8 © a to take tuo engagement not to establish myself there , as proprietor that it * to say , for as occupier 1 do not say : \ t might happen that circumstances , if no previous provision were made , ir everything should be left to chanoo , might placoj mo In the position of occupying

    Oonstantiened that very anarchy which is now feared , and the foresight of the friends of the patient would prove the cause of his death . " Her Majesty ' s Government need scarcely enlarge on the dangers attendant on the execution of any similar convention . The example of the Successic-n War is enough , to show how little such agreements are respected when a pressing temp , tation urges their violation . The position of the Emperor of Russia as depositary , but not proprietor , of Constantinople , would be exposed to numberless hazards , both from the longcherished ambition of his own nation add the jealousies of Europe . The ultimate proprietor , whoever he might be , would hardly be satisfied with , the inert , supine attitude of the heirs of Mahomet II . A great influence on the affairs of Europe seems naturally to belong to the Sovereign of Constantinople , holding the gates of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea .

    " That influence might le used in favour of Russia ; it might be used to control and curb her power . " His Imperial Majesty has justly and wisely said : —My country is so vast , so happily circumstanced in every way that it would be unreasonable n ) me to desire more territory or more power than I possess . On the contrary , he observed , our great—pernaps our only danger—is that which would arise from an extension given to an empire alread y too large . A vigorous and ambitious State , replacing the Sublime Porte , ought , however , render war , on the part of Russia , a necessity for the Emperor or his successors . ¦ :

    " This European conflict would arise from the very means taken to prevent it ; for neither England nor . France , nor probably Austria , would be content to see Constantinople permanently in the hands of Russia . " On the part of Great Britain , her Majesty ' s Government at once declare that they renounce all intention or wish to hold Constantinople . His Imperial Majesty nay be quite secure on this head . They are likewise ready to give an assurance that they will enter into no agreement to provide for the contingency of the fall of Turkey -without previous communication with the Emperor of Russia . " Upon the -whole , then , her Majesty ' s Government are persuaded that no course of policy can be adopted more wise .

    more . disinterested , more beneficial to Europe , than that which his Imperial Majesty has so long followed , and which -will render his name more illustrious tban that of the most famous Sovereigns who have sought immortality by unprovoked conquest and ephemeral glory . 44 With a view- to the success of this policy it is desirable that the utmost forbearance sliould be manifested towards Turkey ; that any demands which the GjreatjJPiiwerB of Europe may have to make , should be made matter of friendl y negotiation rather than of peremptory demand ; that military and naval demonstrations to coerce the Sultan should as much as possible be avoided ; that differences with respect to matters affecting Turkey , within the competence of the

    Sublime Porte , should be decided after mutual concert between the Great . Powers , and not be forced upon the weakness of the Turkish Government ^ 44 To thesecaotions her Majesty's Government wish to add that in their view it is essential that the Sultan should be advised to treat his Christian subjects in conformity with the principles of equity and reli g ious freedom which prevail generally among the enlightened nations of Europe . The more the Turkish Government adopts the rules of impartial law and equal administration , the less will the Emperor of Russia find it necessary to apply that exceptional protection which his Imperial Majesty lias found so ourthensome and inconvenient , though no doubt prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty .

    ' * You may Tead this dispatch to Count Nesselrode , and , if it is desired , you may yourself place a copy of it in the hands of the Lmperor . In that case you will accompany , its presentation with those assurances of friendshi p and ' confidence on the part of her Majesty the Queen , which tho conduct of his Imperial Majesty was so sure to inspire . — I am , &c . ( Signed ) " J . Kussell . " A month after , namely , on the 20 th of February , Sir Hamilton Seymour met tho Emperor at the Grand Duchess Hereditary ' s , and had a short conversation , in the course of which the Emperor pertinaciously insisted that Turkey had not the elements of existence . If he could converse with , the British Ministers , with Lord Aberdeen , for instance , who knew him well , he could come to some understanding .

    The next day , by appointment , Sir Hamilton Seymour waited on the Emperor , and a long colloquy ensued , based on the reading of Lord John Russell s despatch . 44 Upon arriving at the fourth paragraph , , the Emperor desired me to > pause , and observed , that ha was certainly most desirous that some understanding slionld be entered into with her Majesty ' s Government , tor providing against a contingency so probable as tliat of the downfall of Turkey ; that he was , perhaps , even more interested than Engluud could be in preventing a Turkish catastrophe , but thnt it

    was constantly impending ; that it might be brought about at any moment ^ either by an external war , or by a feud between the old Turkish party and that of tho ' new superficial French reforms , ' or again , by a rising of the Christians , alrcudy known to be very impatient of sbakiug off the Mussulman yoko ( Jong ) . As regards the first cause , the Ernporor said that lio had a good ri ^ ht to advert to it , inasmuch as , if he had not stopped tho victorious progress of General Diebitcli in 1829 , the Sultan ' s authority would have been at an end . "

    " I said , perhaps your Majesty would bo good enough to explain your own ideus upon this negative policy . This his Mujetsty for some time declined doing . Ho ended , however , by saying : Well , there are several tilings which 1 will never tolerate . I will begin b y ourselves . I will not tolerate the permanent occupation of Constantinople by the Russians . Having said tins , I will say that it never shall bo hold by tho Engjiah , or JFrench , or any other great nation . Again , I never will permit an attempt at the recooatruction of a

    Byzantine empire , or such an extension of Greece as would render her a powerful state ; still less wUl I permit ; the breaking up of Turkey into little republics , asylunis fbrthe Kossuths and Mazzinis , and other revolutionists of Europe 5 rather than submit to any of these arrangements I wouldro to war , and as long as I have a man and a , musket left would carry it on . These , the Emperor said , are at onca some ideas ; now give me some in return . 14 1 remarked upon the assurance which would be found respecting the English resolution of never attempting to possess Constantinople , and upon the disinclination of her Majesty ' s Government to enter into eventual arrangements but upon being still pressed by his Imperial Majesty ; I said !

    Weil , sir , the idea may -not suit your Majesty , may not suit her Majesty's Government , but what is good between inan and man is of ten a good system between one State and another ;—how "would it be if , in the event of any catastrophe occurring in Turkey , Russia and England were to declare that no power should be allowed to take possession of its provinces—that the property should remain , as it were under seals until amicable arrangements could be made as to its adjudication ? .. ' .. - .-... ' -r ,., "I will not say , theEmperor observed , that such a course would be impossible , but , atHeast , it would be very difficult ; there are no elements of provincial or communal governninit in Turkey : you would have Turks attacking % hristunB ,

    Christians falling upon Turks , Christians of diflerent sects quarrelling with each other ; in short , chaos and ananshy ; " Sir , I them observed , if your Majestyi ^ Ulralloir ^ me to speak plainly , I would say t ) iattb « g ^ eat difference between us is this : that you continue to dwell upon ; the fiUlfof Turkey , and the arrangements requisite'before and ^ f ¥ er Or * fall 5 and that we , on the contrary , look to Turkey remaining where she is , and to the precautions which are' neceslaryriar preventing her condition from becoming worse . Ah ^ lrepl ^ id the Emperor , that is what the Chancellor is ¦ perpstullly telling me ; but the catastrophe will occur some daypajid will take us all unawares . .... •¦ / i . \? 'Hv 3 ^§ £ § - 44 His Imperial Majesty spoke of France . - Godibrbid ^ hie

    said , that I should accuse any one wrongfully , but ihereire circumstances both at Constantinople and Montenegro which are extremely suspicious ; it looks very much aB ^ if ^ e | FireiKdl Government were endeavouring to embroil na albih ^ the £ ast , hoping in this way the better to arriveat itheirSbwn objecto , one of which , nodoubt , Aa the possession . ofi 3 . ' unis ; sK V ' -H * £ " The Emperor ^ proceeded to say , that 'for jiis ^ own part ^ fa * cared very little what lme the French might tliinkproperftft take in Eastern affairs ^ and that little . more tban Kmontlt ago he had apprised the Sultan ^ that if his ; assistance ^ wecft required for resisting the menaces of the French * it-ivifcieilrtirely at the service of the Sultan 1 . ¦ •; , ' - ¦¦ •¦' ¦¦ > % ? ri $ g $ " In a word , the Emperor went on to observe . Aft . I before

    told you , all I want is a good understanding with * J £ ng |§ naf and this is not as to what shall , but aa to whatiShaU ^ i ^ bC done ; this point arrived- at , the English ( (^ yernmeii ^ ana \ s fji ^ I and the English Government , havmg ; ehtiw confid ^ rt in ^ one another ' s neWB , I care nothing about the rest , . &&& ' " ' ¦ % 44 1 remarked that I felt confident that her Majesty ^ Go-v vernmenfc couM be as little disposed as his Imperial Maj « cy ; to tolerate tha presence of the . French at [ Constant ^ iip | le and being deairouB , if possible , of ascertaining wJheth «| t £ |«» were any underatandmV between the . Cabinet | J : p ^' ^ Piter 8 § burg and Vienna , I added . But your Majesty has , forgotte i ^ Austria ; now all these Eastern questions affect her vferyv nearly ; she of course would expect torbe consulted . : ~ . , -, . ; 44 Oh I reoDedthe Emperor , ereatly to my surprise , but

    you must understand that when I speak of KujBBW , - , Jk ; Sp ^ aJc ; of Austria as well ; what suits the , one suits the bifcne jri ^ tj interests as regards Turkey are perfectly identjical . I « iu > u | have been glad to have mai ^ another inquiry or two upjuk , this subject , but I did not venture to-do so ; - < & "* ' *> 44 You see low I am behaving towards the Sultan . . Thig gentleman ( ce monsieur ) breaks his , written word to me and acts in a manner extremely displeasing to me , ' and , * , have contented myself with despatching an ambassador io r Constantinople to demand reparation ; certainly I cpuld seudL an army there if I chose , there is nothing to stop . them ; but I have contented myself with such a show of force as will prove that I have no intention ot being trifled with . < : 44 And , sir , I Baid , you wore quite right in refraining from , violence , and . I hope on future occasions you will act with

    the same moderation j for your Majesty must be sensible that any fresh , concessions which have been obtained by the Latins are not referable to ill will towards you , but to Ui « excessive apprehensions of the French entertained by ' the unfortunate Turks ; besides , sir , I obseived the danger , I will venture to say , of the present moment is not Turkey , but that revolutionary spirit which broke out four year * ago , and which , in many countries , still burns underground ; there is tho danger , and no doubt that a war in Turkey would be the signal for fresh explosions in Italy , Hungary , and elsewhere . We see what is passing at Milan . " 44 The Emperor went on to say that , in the event of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire , ho thought it might le less difficult to arrive at a satisfactory territorial arrangement than was commonly believed . The principalities ur < v he said , in fact , an independent State under my protection ; ht receive the form

    this might m continue . Servia mig same of covernment . So again with Bulgaria . There seems to be no reason why this province should not form an independent State . , A , "As to Egypt I quite understand tho importance to Englund of that territory . 1 can then only aay , that if , in the event of a distiibutiou of tho Ottoman succession upon the fall of the Empire , you should take possession of Egypt , I ahull huve no objections to offer . I would Bay the same thing of Cttndia . That island might suit you , and I do not know why itahoulii not become an English possession . "As 1 did not wish that the Emperor should imagine that nn English public servant was caught by this » ort of overture lalmply answered , that I had always understood that the English -views upon Egypt 3 id not go beyond the point of securing a safe and ready communication between British India and the mother country . " On the 9 th of March . Six Hamilton Seymour for

• Citation
  • Leader (1850-1860), March 25, 1854, page 269, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2031/page/5/