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Note: This text has been automatically extracted via Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. The text has not been manually corrected and should not be relied on to be an accurate representation of the item.
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TO CORRESPONDENTS . "A Burgess of Sheffield" should give his name and address . It is impossible to acknowledge the mass of letters we re ceive . Their insertion is often delayed , owing to a preas of matter ; and when omitted it is frequently from reasons quite independent of the merits of the communication . No notice can fee taken of anonymous communications . Whatever is intended for insertion must be authenticated by the name and address of the writer ; not necessarily for publication , but as a guarantee of liis good faith . Communications should always be legibly written , and on one side of the paper only . If long , it increases the difficulty of finding space for them . We cannot undertake to return rejected communications . All letters for the Editor should be addressed to 7 , Wellington-street , Strand , London .
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THE CAMPAIGN IN THE CRIMEAWHAT IT LEADS TO . Fob all political purposes , it may be assumed that Sevastopol is taken . After the great military achievements of the Crimea , commence the great political difficulties . There is a diplomatic Sebastopol still . Emperor Francis Joseph , receiving a telegraphic announcement of the battle of Alma , sends a message of congratulation to Emperor Napoleon . " Austria , " say all the profound publicists , " will- join the " Western Allies , now that she sees the cause of Russia
is hopeless . ' No doubt . Austria saves Russia by joining England and Prance . The Austrian diplomatists have proved themselves , in this last phase of the Eastern question , to be the first statesmen of Europe : they comprehend that the military war tends to becojne a political war ; and they intercept a declaration of war against Despotism by bringing one-half of the forces of Despotism into the camp of Liberalism . They thus not only save Russia , Hungary , and Italy , but they bid for the Principalities , —Turkey to talce the Crimea .
It would , no doubt , be a grotesque conclusion of the war against Russia to aggrandise Austria ; and we may anticipate that English liberalism will protest—a section of our cabinet ; breaking away from Lord Aberdeen , and offering temporary services to the liberal cry . But if English liberals will resolutely insist on tho war being regarded , from the present point , as a war , aio louger for tho maintenance of Turkey , but for tho suppression o f Russia , as a political system , tho Austrian alliance may yet bo turned to good account .
This generation of Englishmen has now tasted blood—and that will do it good . Having entered o n war , and found that war does not necessarily ruin trade or blight harvests , this generation of Englishmen will have a tondoncy to go on with war . It can nfl ' ord wnr—commercially . Ifc can afford war—politically . Tho period ia so far felicitous that there is no question of the day but tho war . There is no colonial difficulty to suppresses in tho first Pitt ' s tome ; there is no demand for reform , as in the eocoad Pitt ' s time ; thero is no Catholic nation to conciliate ( Mr . Disraeli thinks there
is one to insult ) , as in Castlereagh ' s time . The nation , revelling in this war , perhaps illogically , but still heartily , is headed by a Government which , unlike preceding Governments carrying on war , is not a party Government , —is essentially and sincerely , a national Government . The circumstances are then propitious for a long campaign against Czardom .
Austria will now attempt to procure a peace . But if the Trench and English nations force the French and English Governments to advance to St . Petersburg next spring , Austria will still exhibit her enormous ingratitude to Russia . Our object is not to repudiate the Austrian alliance : it is to paralyse Austria , which can only be effected by accepting her alliance .
A war against despotism—and one at a time : that would be a rational cry for liberal public meetings demanding that Parliament be summoned to sustain the Cabinet against secret diplomacy and despairing dynasties . May not we ^ be attacking "Vienna ^ Sfc . Petersburg T ~~ ISTay—not , indeed , Vienna thus lead back to Paris ? We are in for a long war ; and , having the faults of our forefathers to warn us of blunders , we ought to take care that , when peace is at last signed , we may have gained something for our money .
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CUTTING OF THE AUSTKIAN KNOT . There will , indeed , be one sequel to the reduction of Sebastopol ,. which has not yet presented itself conspicuously enough , but which is brought out in stronger relief by the ch > eumstances of the present week . The efforts to keep the two great German Powers would become more unsuccessful in proportion as the two Courts of Berlin and "Vienna grow more divided in their yiew . Prussia desires
to compromise , to trim . Austria is becoming engaged more and more in alliance with those powers who are coercing Russia , and are succeeding in the coercion . Here lies the true cause of the division , which has a different force for Austria and for Prussia . The more the Western Powers succeed in beating the Czar , the more certainly does it appear the interest of Austria to take part with the victorious side . There is a point from which sbo could scarcely retract . If Austria were once to stand in arms
against Russia , it is highly improbable that the Czar woiild any longer keep measure with his former jprotJgo ' c . He that gave might think to take away ; and tho Czar , who restored Hungary to Austria , might try to snatch it back , and to give it to tho Hungarians . Now , Austria has continued so
much to increase her connexion with tho Allies , in act as well as diplomacy , as to render it difficult for her to nvoid going yet further ; and as she abstained from breaking off , when the Allies were still at Varna , it really seems improbable that she would retract when they are at Sebastopol—or could retract . Their success is her bond .
Fox Prussia tho success of tho Western allies has almost tho opposite effect . The more Russia ia pressed , supposing tho Czar to remain iinn in resistance , tho higher would he bid for aid , and tho moro Prussia might be led to speculate in the lluasinn alliance . Tho last noto from Prussia indicates something of this . While wo have no intimation that bIio has yet withdrawn equivocating negotiation with tho Wewtorn Powers ) , bhe places herself distinctly in antagonism to Austria in Germany . The whole drift of the last Prussian noto in answer to the Western
circular is involved in a labourod suggestion that Austria , working with foreigners , nmwt by tiiat fact bo non-Gorman . One specimen will exemplify tho spirit and tondoncy of this
note . It is remarked that the navigation of the Danube will be free in proportion as the foreign element is absent ; meaning that Austria must have nothing to do with France or England in protecting that river . Now it was Russia that permitted the mud to grow up at the mouth ; and it is that passive cause of the war that Prussia would restore ! IJeave the Danube alone , cries Prussia , and
all will be right ; yet the whole war is testimony to tlie falsehood of the suggestion . Th « note plainly lets us see that Prussia is steadily working to oust Austria from the confidence of Germany , and to bring over the German Powers to Russia . The success of that aim is another question ; the aim itself is enough for our present purpose , as showing the tendency of the two German Powers to separate more widely than ever .
One prevailing idea seems to be , that a new distribution of territory ma y take pl a ce on the Pruth—that Austria may have Moldavia and Bessarabia , Turkey receiving the Crimea . instead .. Turkey would then have no frontier conterminous with Eussia in Europe ; Austria would have a better military frontier to the East . Of course , we need not say , these notions are altogether premature ; the frontiers will be planned when the frontiers
are gained ; the victors will dispose of the vanquished territory in a common council ; and happy will ifc be for those Powers who have earned the right to sit at that council . But fall out as events may , there is every prospect that Austria will not lose by the Western alliance . Certain friends of Italy and Hungary mourn at the prospect ; we rej oice , and we believe that several friends of those countries—some of the most sharpsighted amongst them—will appreciate our
reasons . No extension of Austrian territory , especially inconnexion with the belligerent West , can fail to bring to her increased employment fox her military strength . Already she garrisons Moldavia and Wallachia , not with , subject Turkey , but with Turkey stronger than she has been for generations . Every step in this direction exposes Austria to new enemies ; her retractation ia more and more cut off ; the corresponding necessity of cementing her alliance more and more is
displayed even to Viennese discernment . By vigorous acts her financial position has been amended ; but it will need further recruitment ; and in that process she must be Bustamed by the public opinion of her own citizens , by the financial opinion of moneyed E urope . She has to insure , and to borrow upon her policy of insurance . It can be done , and it is necessary to do something of the kind . She must ensure herself , inter alia , against tho recurrence of 1848 . She can . A skeleton
machinery for obtaining tho support of the people long existed , oven ia the dried representative system of Lombavdy . Hungary has been loyal ; Bohemia would bo more loyal if she had the opportunity to form a corporate opinion . Nob one of the countries yet named produces all tho wealth that freedom and energy give . Tho example of Sardinia , loyal and steadily improving , with the development of constitutional freedom , is at hand . Even Turkey is im example . Tho great present facts are pregnant with lessons ,
with hopes . If 184 : 8 could produce a Stadion , if tho House of llapsburg has produced a Leopold , are wo to prcsumo that Vienna and tho family can never again givo birth to statesmen or prinevs capable of understand- ^ ing tho dynamics of drcuiijatnucca ? It Austria were to ; ul < l i <> iho nllmneo with tho Weat and Turkey , an alliance also with Italy , with Hungarv , wil-li Hohomiu , there would bo no danger ' for hur in tho employment of hor ju-inioH on garrison duty ; treasures , would soon grow for her in tho pluiua of Hungary
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SATURDAY , OCTOBER 7 , 1854 .
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There is nothing so revolutionary , because there . is nothing so unnatural and convulsive , as the strain to keep things fixed when all the world is by the very law of its creation in eternal progress . —Db . Arnold .
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October 7 , 1854 . ] THE LEADER . 945
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Citation
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Leader (1850-1860), Oct. 7, 1854, page 945, in the Nineteenth-Century Serials Edition (2008; 2018) ncse.ac.uk/periodicals/l/issues/vm2-ncseproduct2059/page/9/
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